

Semi-automatic Verification of ISA Security Guarantees in the Form of Universal Contracts

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
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MinimalCaps

The MinimalCaps Capability Machine



- Capability**
- perm ∈ {O, E, R, RW}
 - begin : address
 - cursor : address
 - end : address

Hardware Guarantees

- Capabilities are unforgeable
- Permissions are checked
- Capability manipulation is safe

Capability Safety


$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{V}(z) &= \text{True} \text{ (} z \text{ is an integer)} \\ \mathcal{V}(O, -, -, -) &= \text{True} \\ \mathcal{V}(E, b, e, a) &= \triangleright \square \varepsilon(RX, b, e, a) \\ \mathcal{V}(R, b, e, -) &= *_{a \in [b, e]} \exists w, a \mapsto w * \mathcal{V}(w) \\ \mathcal{V}(RW, b, e, -) &= *_{a \in [b, e]} \exists w, a \mapsto w * \mathcal{V}(w) \end{aligned}$$

$$\varepsilon(w) = (pc \mapsto w *_{r \in \text{GPR}} \exists v, r \mapsto v) - * \text{ WP fdeCycle T}$$

Universal Contract:

```
{ (∃ c . pc ↦ c * V(c) *
CorrectPC(c)) * (∀ r ∈ GPR . ∃ w .
r ↦ w * V(w))
* IH }
fdeCycle
{ WP fdeCycle T }
```

Katamaran



Semi-Automatic Verification



```
{ (∃ c . pc ↦ c * V(c)) * (∀ r ∈ GPR . ∃ w . r ↦ w * V(w)) }
function exec_sd(rs : GPR, rb : GPR, immediate : int) : bool :=
let base_cap := call read_reg_cap rb in
let (perm, beg, end, cursor) := base_cap in
let c := (perm, beg, end, cursor + immediate) in
let w := call read_reg rs in
{ rb ↦ base_cap * V(base_cap) * rs ↦ w * V(w) ... }
use lemma move_cursor base_cap c ;;
{ rb ↦ base_cap * V(base_cap) * rs ↦ w * V(w) * V(c) ... }
call write_mem c w ;;
call update_pc ;;
true
{ (∃ c . pc ↦ c * (V(c) ∨ ε(c))
* (∀ r ∈ GPR . ∃ w . r ↦ w * V(w))) }
```

RISC-V PMP

RISC-V PMP

Physical Memory Protection

- Optional
- Grant permissions to S and U modes
 - By default none
- Revoke permissions from M mode
 - By default full
- PMP violations => trap
 - Load access fault, store access fault, ...
 - Exception
- Up to 64 PMP regions
 - Statically prioritized
 - Lowest number has highest



Universal Contract:

```
{ Start
* ▷ (CSRMod -* WP fdeCycle T)
* ▷ (Trap -* WP fdeCycle T)
* ▷ (Recover -* WP fdeCycle T) }
fdeCycle
{ WP fdeCycle T }
```

End-to-End Verification

```
init:
la ra, adv
csrrw pmpaddr0, ra, t0
lui ra, max
csrrw zero, pmpaddr1, ra
lui ra, 0xf
csrrw zero, pmp0cfg, ra
lui ra, 0xf
csrrw zero, pmp1cfg, ra
la ra, adv
csrrw zero, mepc, ra
la ra, trap_handler
csrrw zero, mtvec, ra
lui ra, 0x0
csrrw zero, mstatus, ra
mret

trap_handler:
auipc ra, 0
lw ra, 12(ra)
mret
```

