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Editorial

Introduction to Communicating on/with Minorities

Leen d’Haenens * and Willem Joris

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Abstract

This editorial delivers an introduction to the Media and Communication thematic issue on “Communicating on/with Minorities” around the world. This thematic issue presents a multidisciplinary look at the field of communicating on and with different members of minority groups who, based on gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or a background in migration, experience relative disadvantage and marginalization compared to the dominant social group. The contributors to this thematic issue present a variety of professional contexts (i.e., portrayals in journalistic content, in fiction and non-fiction audiovisual content, on social media platforms and in health care). Taken together, the contributions examine various theoretical angles, thereby adopting new research directions through the use of quantitative, qualitative or mixed methodologies.

Keywords

communication; ethnic minorities; gender; immigrants; intersectionality; media; refugees; sexualities

Issue

This editorial is part of the issue “Communicating on/with Minorities”, by Leen d’Haenens and Willem Joris (KU Leuven, Belgium).

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1. Introduction

This thematic issue of Media and Communication aims at further enriching the debate on how to communicate on and with minority groups around the world. The latter are seen in a particular professional context (e.g., media production or health communication). They can be part of media content, produce or access it on a variety of platforms. Media representations on variegated media outlets, both mainstream or niche media, and reactions with regard to these representations among majority and minority audiences are dealt with in this thematic issue. This includes posing questions such as: Whose viewpoints are looked at and whose are being ignored? What media and communication infrastructures are in place to adequately cater for minority groups? What practices of media access, uses and representations exist, what structural inequalities occur, and how can these be remedied? Banking on the above, the ten contributions in this thematic issue of Media and Communication critically address the field from various disciplinary, theoretical and empirical dimensions. Several contributions study intersectionality given their focus on individuals who simultaneously hold membership in multiple minority groups.

2. Contributions in This Thematic Issue

Hanne Vandenberghe (2019) opens this thematic issue with “Representation of Women in the News: Balancing between Career and Family Life”. The article starts out with an automated content analysis of the occurrence of women in the coverage of two Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers so as to investigate whether the representation of women has changed between 2005 and 2015. Vandenberghe combines this longitudinal automated analysis with an in-depth qualitative analysis of the portrayal of two women stepping into a leadership position.
Koen Panis, Steve Paulussen and Alexander Dhoest (2019) investigate the representation of ethnic minorities in non-fiction programmes on the Flemish public service broadcaster. In their article “Managing Super-Diversity on Television”, they adopt a multi-method approach, combining qualitative content analysis of clips and episodes of non-fiction programmes with focus group interviews with participants from different ethnocultural minority background.

In their contribution “ICT Use and Digital Inclusion among Roma/Gitano Adolescents”, Maialen Garmendia and Inaki Carrera (2019) analyze the way in which the digital divide affects the Roma or Gitano minors in Spain. Through interviews with adolescents and social workers, the authors focus their analysis of inequality on three main areas: i.e., media provision, participation and protection.

Darien Perez Ryan and Patrick E. Jamieson (2019) present a pilot study named “Risk and Culture of Health Portrayal in a U.S. Cross-Cultural TV Adaptation”. The authors assess the health-related content of a Spanish-language telenovela and its English adaptation to test whether the English-language version ‘Americanizes’ the content by increasing risky and reducing healthy portrayals on screen.

David De Coninck, Koen Matthijs, Marlies Debrael, Rozane De Cock and Leen d’Haenens (2019) offer a four-country comparison (i.e., Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden) when looking into the public sentiment towards migrants and refugees. In “Unpacking Attitudes on Immigrants and Refugees” they analyze, among other things, to which extent household composition, news media consumption and trust in media are related to attitudes towards immigrants and refugees. The authors administered an online survey of the adult population in the four countries (N = 6,000).

Miguel Angel Casado, Carmelo Garitaonandia, Gorka Moreno, and Estefania Jimenez (2019) describe the Internet use by immigrant children in Spain, taking into account both the risks and opportunities. Based on in-depth interviews with children from the Maghreb region, Ecuador and Sub-Saharan Africa, combined with interviews with the children’s educators, the authors investigate the use of computers and tablets for education purposes and accessing information, as well as for communication purposes with their families in their countries of origin.

Stefan Mertens, Olivier Standaert, Leen d’Haenens, and Rozane De Cock (2019) investigate the link between journalism cultures, migration and integration policies, and public opinion. In “Tolerance and Cultural Diversity in Western Countries” the authors analyze 24 countries for which data are available in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the World Values Survey (WVS), and the Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS), in an effort to compare the journalists’ role to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in society across countries with diverging migration and integration policies.

Eviane Cheng Leidig (2019) also deals with questions concerning immigration when exploring the role of Indian diasporic voices as mediators in populist radical right-wing discourse in the West in “Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud: A Twitter Analysis of Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump”. This article presents a year-long data collection of a number of Indian diasporic individuals who took to Twitter to express pro-Brexit and pro-Trump views, in order to obtain insight into how social media may help construct ethnic and (trans)national identities, demarcating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

This thematic issue continues with two intersectional studies. Jeffrey Patterson and Koen Leurs (2019) in “We Live Here, and We Are Queer!: Young Adult Gay Connected Migrants’ Transnational Ties and Integration in the Netherlands” provide valuable new insights into how sexual identification combined with bonding and bridging social capital diverge and converge among gay young adult forced migrants and voluntary ones, while considering the interplay between online and offline explorations and entanglements of their worlds.

The second intersectional contribution is “The Cancer’s Margins Project: Access to Knowledge and Its Mobilization by LGBQ/T Cancer Patients” by Evan T. Taylor, Mary K. Bryson, Lorna Boschman, Tae Hart, Jacqueline Gahagan, Genevieve Rail and Janice Ristock (2019). The authors aim to document and analyze complex intersectional relationships between marginalization, gender and sexuality, when it comes to cancer health decision-making and care experiences, with a specific focus on knowledge access, sharing, and mobilization.

3. Conclusion

To sum up, the ten articles in this thematic issue of Media and Communication present empirical, analytical and theoretical investigations, reflecting research on communicating on and with minorities. All of these provide ample opportunities to further reflect on minorizing practices related to gender issues and sexual orientations, ethnic cultural background and migratory experience. We hope these contributions’ fresh insights will further inspire our readers into innovative research on ways to communicate on and with minority communities around the world.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all the authors, as well as the numerous reviewers, and Rodrigo Gomes and Cátia Simões from the journal’s editorial office for their valuable contributions to this issue.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References


Patterson, J., & Leurs, K. (2019). We live here, and we are queer!: Young adult gay connected migrants’ transnational ties and integration in the Netherlands. *Media and Communication, 7*(1), 90–101.


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Representation of Women in the News: Balancing between Career and Family Life

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Abstract
An in-depth literature review showed that women, despite their increasingly prominent roles worldwide, continue to be persistently underrepresented and stereotyped in news media. This study aimed to investigate the extent to which the representation of women changed over time in two Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws. An automated quantitative content analysis revealed that there is no increase of the number of women in the newspapers between 2005 and 2015. On the contrary, women are significantly less represented over time in the popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws. A qualitative analysis on two cases about women stepping into a leadership position—in 2012 (Catherine De Bolle as head of the Federal police) and in 2014 (Dominique Leroy as CEO of a Belgian telecom company)—showed that the press emphasised their femininity, their being a role model for other women, their being part of a family and having certain looks. Moreover, these women are clearly portrayed as ‘the best candidate’ pointing at the selection procedures and their capabilities to perform professionally. Probably, this strong emphasis is a way of justifying that these women are not selected because of positive discrimination. Further analysis of cases of both men and women stepping into top positions across countries and media platforms is recommended.

Keywords
content analysis; Dutch-speaking press; gender; news; representation; stereotyping; women

Issue
This article is part of the issue “Communicating on/with Minorities”, edited by Leen d’Haenens and Willem Joris (KU Leuven, Belgium).

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1. Introduction
Since the 1970’s the representation of women in the media is high on the political and research agenda (e.g., Ross, Boyle, Carter & Ging, 2016). An illustrative example is the 1995 ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action’ (UN Women, 1995) in which media are assumed to play an important role in achieving gender equality. This role is formulated in Article 33 as follows: “The media have a great potential to promote the advancement of women and the equality of women and men by portraying women and men in a non-stereotypical, diverse and balanced manner”. The role of media is reemphasised in Article 44 of the Declaration, stating that: “Governments...are called upon to take strategic action in the following critical areas of concern: stereotyping of women and inequality in women’s access to and participation...in the media”. The Declaration thus encourages the development and implementation of regulation on gender equality.

Gender equality is a multifaceted concept. The global gender gap index is composed of the following four aspects: economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment (World Economic Forum, 2017). The gender equality index on European level is based on six domains: i.e., work, money, knowledge, time, power and health (European Institute for Gender Equality [EIGE], 2017). Previous research focused on gender within a political context (e.g., Ross, Evans, Harrison, Shears, & Wadia, 2013; Vos, 2012). However, this study will focus on the professional context of women, more specifically in Belgium. Between 2006 and 2017 Belgium dropped from place 20 to place 31 on the global gender gap index.
ranking, although the gender equality index increased from .71 to .74 (World Economic Forum, 2017). Specifically for the ‘economic participation and opportunity’ category, gender equality improved from .62 to .72 (respectively an increase from place 54 to place 46).

According to the EIGE, on the European level gender increased from 62% in 2005 to 66% in 2015 (EIGE, 2017). Moreover, the proportion of women on the boards of the largest listed companies is more than doubled between 2005 and 2015 (from 10% to 22%), with the highest increase in Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands. The overall gender equality score in Belgium increased from 66% to 71% in that period.

The Beijing Declaration identifies two aspects of fair gender representation: gender equality in numbers, i.e., the quantitative approach, and in the manner of representation, i.e., the qualitative approach. This study has also a twofold aim. Firstly, as the gender equality index increased over time, this study will map the evolution of the number of female news actors between 2005 and 2015 in two Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers. Secondly, it will look at the way in which women who stepped into a leading position in the same period are stereotyped by analysing two cases in the same two newspapers.

2. Is gender Equality in Sight?

2.1. The Persistent Underrepresentation of Female News Actors

It seems that gender equality is still an elusive dream despite the increasingly prominent roles—also specifically in top segments—of women worldwide (e.g., Humprecht & Esser, 2017; Ross et al., 2016). An in-depth literature review shows that women are still underrepresented in news contexts.

Following the Beijing Declaration, the UN Women launched the Global Media Monitoring Project to evaluate the extent of gender equality in news media. Since 1995, every five years a research team reports the men-women ratio of news sources worldwide. The most recent results from 2015 identified a gender imbalance pointing at 24% female versus 76% male news sources (World Association for Christian Communication [WACC], 2015). Between 1995 and 2015, there was only a slow increase of 7% in women’s visibility in the news. Compared to radio and television news, the number of women increased the most in newspapers, i.e. from 16% in 1995 to 26% in 2015. The European results hardly differ from the overall pattern: in 2015 there were 25% women in traditional news media, which was an increase of 9% over the last 20 years.

In a US context, both in newspapers (e.g., Armstrong, 2004; Zoch & VanSlyke Turk, 1998) and in television news (e.g., Liebler & Smith, 1997) female actors are underrepresented compared to their male counterparts. In general, 70 to 80% men against 30 to 20% women were reported on. Moreover, men were proportionally more cited in front pages and longer articles (Zoch & VanSlyke Turk, 1998), as well as in titles and introductions (Armstrong, 2004).

A similar trend is found in longitudinal analysis of Russian, Estonian and Finnish newspapers between 1905 and 2015 (Kouts & Lõhmus, 2014). The percentage of female actors remained under 10% in Russian newspapers. Finnish newspapers represented on average 5% women, only in the 1990’s female actors reached a peak of more than 10%. The Estonian data revealed an explicit increase of women over time: from under 10% until the 1970s to 20 to 25% since the 2000s. However, on average the number of women was limited in the three countries.

The analysis of election reporting in British newspapers in 2010 tells a similar story. In 71% of the articles no female actor was mentioned, whereas this was only the case in 8% of the articles for male actors. The total men-women ratio for speaking actors was 84 against 16 (Ross et al., 2013).

A more recent study of English online news sites found that men are dominating the news stories both in texts and images (Jia, Lansdall-Welfare, Sudhahar, Carter, & Cristianini, 2016). In texts, male dominance ranged from 70% in entertainment stories to 92% in sports articles. For images, the overrepresentation of men was the smallest in entertainment (59%) and the largest in political news (80%). Fashion news was the only exception were women proportionally were overrepresented both in texts (54%) and images (64%). Similar conclusions were formulated by Matud, Rodríguez and Espinosa (2011) based on an analysis of the Spanish quality newspaper *El Mundo* where women also only dominated the news stories as models or winners of beauty contests.

A study of the Dutch-speaking Belgian television news coverage (De Swert & Hooghe, 2010) indicated that in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively in 34%, 36% and 42% of the news stories a woman was given a voice. Despite the increasing trend, in only two out of five news items a female source was found. Another Flemish television news study (Hooghe, Jacobs, & Claes, 2015) focused on the news coverage of female MPs. Women were underrepresented in comparison with the real number of women in parliament. Moreover, females were given less speaking time compared to their male colleagues. Not only in Flemish television news stories were women underrepresented, a recent study both in traditional print media and online news sites revealed a gender imbalance of 20% female actors in comparison with 80% male actors (De Vuyst, Vertoon, & Van Bauwel, 2016).

To conclude, women are persistently underrepresented in news contexts worldwide with a ratio of approximately 3 male actors for every female one, referring to the so-called R³ hypothesis (Rush, Oukrop, & Sarikakis, 2005). However, between 2005 and 2015 the gender equality index in Belgium increased from 66% to 71%. This study will analyse whether the underrepresentation of women changed over time in the Dutch-speaking Belgian press. Consequently, the first research question (RQ1) reads as follows: to which extent did the number
of female news actors increase over time (2005–2015) in Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers?

2.2. Are Female Leaders Framed as Professionals?

Although a quantitative approach on gender equality is valuable, it is also important to take into account how females are represented. Research revealed that typical female roles in news stories are women as spouses or mothers, and only occasionally as politicians or professionals (Ross et al., 2016). The Global Media Monitoring Project, for instance, found that worldwide women are five times more mentioned in news stories because of their family status than men (WACC, 2015). A study by Ross and Carter (2011) in British newspapers showed that women are three times more likely than men to be associated with their family situation. A Flemish study indicated that women are significantly more often represented in a family context than men (De Vuyst et al., 2016).

The main focus of this study is to analyse how women in a leading position are being framed in a news context. Earlier studies focusing on the representation of female politicians revealed that women are often associated with their family contexts, looks and age (Vos, 2012) and the fact that they were women was emphasised, resulting in less attention to their actual positions (Ross et al., 2013). This resulted in RQ2: how are women who stepped into a leadership position being framed as professionals in Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers?

In sum, women are not only less represented in news stories, there are also presented in a different way. As the Beijing Declaration stated, it is important to strive for a diverse manner of representation to achieve gender equality. Systematic under- or misrepresentation of women is both contradictory with social reality and resulting in reducing the social status of women (e.g., Tuchman, 1978). A study confirmed that a higher share of female actors in all kind of news stories had a significant positive effect as well on gender equality in the country as on attitudes on gender roles among the country’s population (Djef-Pierre, 2011). The purpose of this study is to investigate to which extent women play an important role in Dutch-speaking newspapers.

3. Method

A multi-method approach was used to investigate the two research questions. To map the evolution of female actors between 2005 and 2015, a quantitative automatic content analysis tool was created by the software developer Zicon. News articles of two Dutch-speaking Belgian newspapers were collected from the Belgian press database GoPress. The selected newspapers are the most widely read quality paper De Standaard and the most read tabloid Het Laatste Nieuws. In total 3,961,654 news articles were detected of which 14.7% was published in the quality paper and 85.3% in the tabloid paper. This imbalance can be explained by the large amount of regional editions (approximately between 20 and 25 regional editions in the period under investigation) of Het Laatste Nieuws in contrast with only 5 regional editions of De Standaard. Within the news stories, the gender of the actors was derived from the Knowledge Base Freebase, which was mainly based on information available at Wikipedia. Consequently, gender was not assigned to unknown or ordinary people such as a witness of an accident. In total, the tool identified 16,634,712 actors (16.7% of De Standaard and 83.3% of Het Laatste Nieuws). Gender was assigned to 3,118,881 actors or 18.7% of the total sample. The division between De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws was 34% versus 67%. Consequently, proportionally gender was more assigned to actors in De Standaard (38.3%) than in Het Laatste Nieuws (14.8%). Again, the regional focus in Het Laatste Nieuws applies as an explanation. Regional articles tend to cover more unknown people who are not included in the Knowledge Base. The performance indicators for assigning gender on the basis of the Knowledge Base (precision value of 0.98, recall value of 0.88 and F-measure of 0.93) can be considered as good to excellent (Habryn, 2014).

To answer the second research question, two cases were found in which a woman stepped into a leadership position in Belgium between 2005 and 2015. Women who became CEO were searched for via the phrase “female CEO” (vrouwelijke CEO in Dutch) in Google. This search resulted in the following names: Michèle Sioen who became head of Sioen Industries in 2005, Ingrid Ceusters who became CEO of Hugo Ceusters Group in 2007, Sandra De Preter who became CEO of the public service broadcaster in 2010, Catherine De Bolle who became Commissioner-general of the Belgian Federal Police in 2012, Dominique Leroy who became CEO of Proximus in 2014 and Saskia Van Uffelen who became CEO of Ericsson Benelux in 2014. Other names such as Ingrid Liiten and Françoise Chombar became CEO before 2005, respectively in 2001 as head of the public bus transport company De Lijn and as CEO of Meliix in 2004. Via the Belgian press database GoPress articles were collected in the same two newspapers De Standaard and Het Laatste Nieuws. Articles were selected based on the name of the woman and the moment they were appointed as CEO. Only the cases of Catherine De Bolle and Dominique Leroy were selected, because at least 4 articles were found in both newspapers. For instance, about Ingrid Ceusters no articles were found. The sample about Catherine De Bolle comprised 38 articles published between 2 August 2011 and 31 March 2012 of which 17 articles appeared in De Standaard and another 21 in Het Laatste Nieuws. The second case refers to Dominique Leroy who became CEO of the Belgian telecom company Proximus (formerly known as Belgacom) in 2014. Proximus is an autonomous public-sector company, which explains why the CEO position needs to be approved by the Belgian Government. The sample on the case of Dominique Leroy is composed of 39 articles of
which 24 were published in De Standaard and 15 in Het Laatste Nieuws. The selected articles were published between 9 November 2013 and 25 February 2014. To analyse the extent to which these two women were framed in the newspapers, a qualitative text analysis was conducted on all 77 news stories. Each article was divided into three categories based on the article length: a short article counting less than 150 words, a medium article counting between 150 and 300 words, and a large article counting more than 300 words. Secondly, three categories are used to indicate how Catherine De Bolle and Dominique Leroy were mentioned in the article: (1) as the subject of the article, Catherine De Bolle/Dominique Leroy was only mentioned, (2) as the subject of the article, Catherine De Bolle/Dominique Leroy was cited or paraphrased, (3) Catherine De Bolle/Dominique Leroy was only mentioned in the margin of the article.

Articles of the two cases were coded based on a theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The analysis consisted of the following stages. First, the articles were read in detail and open codes were attributed. In the next stage, selective coding was used to merge the identified codes into nine main themes: being a woman, being an exemplary role model, referring to the family situation, proposed as the best candidate, listing the capabilities, dealing with the male environment (so-called male bastion), referring to positive discrimination, referring to looks and mentioning the age. The main themes ‘being a woman’, referring to looks’ and ‘mentioning the age’ were in line with previous studies on the representation of female politicians (Ross et al., 2013; Vos, 2012). In the results section, the findings will be discussed and illustrated with quotations from the articles.

4. Results

4.1. Are Women Climbing Up or Slipping Down the Social Ladder?

Table 1 gives an overview of the percentage of female actors between 2005 and 2015 in both newspapers under study. A linear regression analysis showed no significant increase of the number of female actors over time in De Standaard ($r = -0.28$, $p > 0.05$). The average gender ratio was 12.8% female actors against 87.2% male actors ($SD = 0.66$). The lowest percentage was found in 2011 (11.8%) and the highest in 2015 (13.9%). However, instead of an increase of female actors over time in Het Laatste Nieuws, a linear regression analysis showed a significant decrease ($r = -0.65$, $p = 0.03$). The highest percentage of women was found in 2005 (10.9%) and the lowest in 2010 (8.1%). The average man-woman ratio was 90.5:9.5 ($SD = 0.95$). Moreover, on average significantly more female actors were detected in De Standaard compared to Het Laatste Nieuws, $t(10) = 14.49$, $p < 0.001$.

4.2. Journalists Emphasise the Femininity of Female Leaders

In the next section, the particular cases of the candidacy and appointment of both Catherine De Bolle as head of the Federal Police and Dominque Leroy as CEO of the telecom company Proximus will be discussed.

4.2.1. The Case of Catherine De Bolle as Head of the Federal Police

Half of the articles about Catherine De Bolle counted less than 150 words of which five were even shorter than 100 words. Two out of five articles were longer than 300 words. As Table 2 shows, the categorisation on how Catherine De Bolle was mentioned in the articles was the following: 17 as the main subject, 5 articles in which she is cited and 16 articles in which she is only mentioned in the margin of the article. In the next part, each category will be discussed.

In 28 of the 38 articles the fact that Catherine De Bolle is a woman is explicitly stated. In 22 of these 28 articles being a woman is presented in a neutral tone. In 20 articles this was expressed as ‘being the first woman for the leadership position of the Federal police’. Although

Table 1. The percentage of female actors with respect to the total number of actors by whom gender was assigned between 2005 and 2015 both in the quality paper De Standaard and the popular paper Het Laatste Nieuws.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>De Standaard ($n = 1.061.654$)</th>
<th>Het Laatste Nieuws ($n = 2.057.227$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Total number of articles mentioning the specific labels in the selected news articles about Catherine De Bolle and Dominique Leroy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Catherine De Bolle</th>
<th>Dominique Leroy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being a woman (1)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Standaard</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Het Laatste Nieuws</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an exemplary role model (2)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Standaard</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Het Laatste Nieuws</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family situation (3)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Standaard</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Het Laatste Nieuws</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best candidate (4)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Standaard</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Het Laatste Nieuws</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Het Laatste Nieuws</td>
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<td>Looks (8)</td>
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A more negative tone was found in an opinion article in De Standaard (January 13th) wherein a female expert criticised the blatant focus on the fact that Catherine De Bolle is a woman in a top position. In another article in De Standaard (October 7th) Catherine De Bolle is called by an ex-colleague: “our madam”, which has a rather pejorative connotation in Dutch. Besides, Catherine De Bolle stated: “I will not focus on female accents” (article publish March 1st in Het Laatste Nieuws), which is a clear statement that she will not use her femininity in her job. In the same article, however, she described being a woman in a positive way as follows: “I am proud that being a woman I have scored the best in the selection tests”. Another example of a positive connotation is an ex-colleague who describes her as “the mother of the house” (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 2nd).

In two articles the leading position of Catherine De Bolle is given as an example for other women. Catherine De Bolle stated as follows: “I am happy for all women. I have proven that there are career opportunities and that we [women] can achieve top positions” (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 1st). The mayor of her hometown also indicated that “she is an example for all women” (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 31st).

Her family situation is mentioned explicitly in six articles. In five articles her being a mother is mentioned in a neutral way. This is once indicated by her former boss, who also stated that Catherine De Bolle is very discrete...
about her private life (Het Laatste Nieuws, January 12th). Only in one article (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 1st) she indicated herself that combining her job with a family is challenging, however she emphasises this is not only the case for women but also for men. She also stated that her children’s reactions about her job were positive: “They are proud of me. That feels good”.

In 15 of the 38 articles it is explicitly stated that Catherine De Bolle is the best candidate for the position according to the tests. It is clear that she is selected because she had the best results on all the tests. Or as the mayor of her hometown stated in the article of March 31st in Het Laatste Nieuws: “Catherine had climbed to the top on her own and had the best results on the tests”. As already mentioned, Catherine De Bolle stated that she is proud to be both a woman and have the best results on the selection tests (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 1st). In another article she also said: “I simply was the first according to the selection criteria” (De Standaard, March 1st).

The capabilities of Catherine De Bolle are mentioned in ten of the 38 articles. In one case only, the journalist doubted about her abilities because of the lack of experience at the non-local level (De Standaard, January 11th). In the other nine cases, her qualities are highlighted, ranging from being smart, being determined, having a clear vision to being able to collaborate. Both ex-colleagues, journalists, friends and a criminologist described her talent. For instance, an ex-colleague described her as follows: “A good boss. She listens to everyone and has no macho behaviour at all” (Het Laatste Nieuws, October 7th). In one article Catherine De Bolle stated herself: “I am willing to listen, I prefer to make decisions in all openness.... I am not an iron lady who ignores the opinions of others” (Het Laatste Nieuws, March 1st). Overall, her capabilities are described in sharp contrast with the former head of the police, who was fired.

Five articles referred to the police context as a men’s world. This ‘men’s world’ is twice described as a ‘male bastion’ by journalists in Het Laatste Nieuws and once in an opinion article by a female expert in De Standaard. Catherine De Bolle refers twice to this male environment. In the first example she tells the following story: “In 1994...my superiors were not used to women....It was very confronting to enter this men’s world....Nowadays, it is much easier as a woman to stand your ground” (De Standaard, October 7th). A second time she said: “I am used to work in a men’s world” (De Standaard, March 1st).

Positive discrimination is mentioned five times. Twice explicitly in the sense that Catherine De Bolle is against preferential treatment. An example: “Although Catherine is a real woman, she never used it to be favoured....She is against all kinds of discriminatory actions. A woman needs to prove her professionalism just like a man”, stated by an ex-colleague in the article of January 12th in Het Laatste Nieuws. Catherine De Bolle referred also implicitly to positive discrimination, claiming the following: “People with common sense choose the best candidate, regardless of gender” (De Standaard, October 7th) and “Like the male candidates, I simply participated in the selection process, on which I scored the best. It proves that a woman can also reach the top within the police force” (De Standaard, March 1st).

In six articles we came across references to Catherine De Bolle’s physical appearance, most of the time referring to her short stature. One time a journalist of Het Laatste Nieuws (March 1st) characterised her appearance “punchy”. She also indicates in the same article the lack of femininity of the police uniforms, especially the fact that the insignia and name cards are worn at chest height.

Finally her age is explicitly mentioned in nine of the 38 articles, mostly between brackets. No extra information is given about her age. In one article of Het Laatste Nieuws the ages of her three children are also given.

4.2.2. The Case of Dominique Leroy as CEO of the Telecom Company Proximus

The majority of the articles—26 out of 39—about Dominique Leroy counted at least 300 words. Only five articles were categorised as ‘short’ and eight as ‘medium’ in length. As Table 2 indicates, in almost half of the articles Dominique Leroy was not the main subject. Overall, more attention is paid to Dominique Leroy in De Standaard compared to Het Laatste Nieuws (24 articles against 15 articles). Taking the same analytical approach to the coverage of Catherine De Bolle, the following analysis of Dominique Leroy will be structured around nine thematic concerns (see Table 2).

The fact that Dominique Leroy is a woman is explicitly emphasised in 17 articles. In 10 of these 17 articles, the fact that Dominique Leroy is a woman is formulated in an explicitly neutral way. Six times she is described as being the first woman occupying this high position. In several articles her gender is described positively. Journalists were positive in the following two examples: “A woman. Interesting for a government that wants to excel in opportunities for women” (Het Laatste Nieuws, November 18th) and “The appointment of Dominque Leroy is an encouragement because she will be the first woman in charge of a Bel20-company” (De Standaard, January 9th).

A more negative connotation about women in general is found in an opinion article in De Standaard (January 11th), although Dominique Leroy seems to be an exception: “She does not even seem to be a bitch”. However, a gender-neutral approach is also used, e.g. in an article published November 15th in De Standaard where the successor of the current CEO is named as follows: “successor (m/f)”. In three articles Dominique Leroy is presented as a role model for other women. A professor stated that her position as CEO of a listed company is an important role model (Het Laatste Nieuws, January 9th). In a second article in De Standaard (January 10th) Dominique Leroy ex-
presses her leadership position as a good example of the necessary gender balance in companies. She describes herself also as a role model in Het Laatste Nieuws (January 11th) when she answers the question “how proud are you to be the first female CEO of Belgacom?” with “It makes me definitely happy. I have always encouraged women to develop”.

In seven articles Dominique Leroy is presented as the best candidate for the CEO position. She ended highest according to headhunter Russell Reynolds. The then Minister of public companies Labille stated in Het Laatste Nieuws (January 10th) the following: “Her profile fits best with this function”. Also a list of her capabilities makes it clear she is the right person. In 12 articles her capabilities are presented in a positive way, both by the journalist, the Minister and (ex-)colleagues. Some examples are references to her experience, her reputation, her multilingualism (especially speaking both important national languages) and her strong clear-eyed vision. A good illustration of the way Leroy’s professionalism and experience is expressed is reflected in the following quote, expressed by a CEO of a company of which Dominique Leroy is a board member: “She is always well prepared and organised, has a sound body of knowledge and comes up with fresh ideas” (De Standaard, January 9th). However, in one of the articles a slightly negative tone is found where insiders stated that her promotion is a little bit early (De Standaard, January 9th), although in the same article she is called “the right person to work in the consumer market”.

Only in one article (Het Laatste Nieuws, January 9th) a professor stated that Dominique Leroy’s position is an example of a woman in a typical male bastion. She indicates in an interview (Het Laatste Nieuws, January 9th) that being an exception as a woman is something of her past career: “I was the first woman who ate in the management restaurant... Men didn’t know how to behave... Men are now used to the presence of women in high positions, but back in the past, it was uncomfortable”.

In four articles the case of Dominique Leroy is linked with positive discrimination; twice it is seen as an example of breaking the glass ceiling. Dominique Leroy supports positive discrimination, and especially the use of quota: “Otherwise, women will be permanently treated as sexual objects instead of competent persons” (stated in a French-speaking magazine and cited in an article published January 9th in De Standaard).

In one article the journalist called it hypocrite not to mention her looks (De Standaard, January 11th). Other striking examples are a description of the dress she is wearing (Het Laatste Nieuws, January 10th), in which she is also called “the Belgacom-queen”. In another article (De Standaard, January 10th) a journalist compares her also with the queen: “it seemed as if she was the Queen Mathilde of the towers of Belgacom”. Finally, in six articles Dominique Leroy’s age is mentioned, mostly between brackets and always with a neutral tone and without any further comment.

5. Conclusions

Longitudinal, automated content analysis pointed at a persistent female underrepresentation in the Dutch-language press (RQ1). While the best achievement as to gender balance between 2005 and 2015 resulted in 14% women against 86% men in 2015 in De Standaard, the worst counted 8% women against 92% men in 2010 in Het Laatste Nieuws. Similar to the Russian and Finnish newspapers (Köuts & Löhmus, 2014), there is no increase of the number of female actors over time. This result is in sharp contrast with both the increase of Belgian gender equality scores in reality, as documented by the World Economic Forum and the EIGE, and the more prominent role women play in society. The two selected qualitative cases are vivid illustrations of the latter. Surprisingly, the linear regression analysis showed that the amount of female actors significantly decreased between 2005 and 2015 in the popular newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws. Consequently, significantly more women were mentioned in the quality paper compared to the popular one. Further analysis is needed to clarify this difference. The results are based on an automated coding analysis that only took the gender of actors known in Freebase into account. This is a first limitation of this study. However, this shortcoming cannot explain the gender gap between both newspapers: there is no reason why the number of female actors should be measured less well in Het Laatste Nieuws compared to De Standaard. Another limitation is whether the automatic analysis tool is sufficiently valid. Although the performance indicators are good to excellent, the percentage of female actors is lower than in a subsample based on manual coding. The precision value drops from .98 to .82 when there is no link found in the Knowledge Base, resulting in a lower validity when a person is not listed in the Knowledge Base.

However, the main aim of this study was to analyse whether, and if so, how women are framed as professionals (RQ2). Overall, both Catherine De Bolle and Dominique Leroy are presented very positively as ‘the best candidate’ who obtained the best results on the selection test. Much attention is paid to the women’s qualities to step into the top position. Probably, this emphasis is a manner of justifying that these women are not selected because of positive discrimination. For instance, Catherine De Bolle emphasised clearly she performed best in the selection tests, thus proving that women can hold top positions. Similar cases with a man who stepped into a leadership position should be investigated in further research. A suggestion for such a case is the appointment of Marc De Mesmaeker as head of the Federal police as of last May 2018. Catherine De Bolle is now promoted to a top position at Europol. Her new promotion should also be an interesting case to evaluate the representation of professional women over time.

However, in both cases the fact these women’s femininity is emphasised most in the articles. Generally, ‘being a woman’ is framed in a neutral way, stating that they
were the first women in such a top position. Although most articles adopted a neutral or positive tone, some more negative connotations were also found. Catherine De Bolle is almost twice as much explicitly described as a woman compared to Dominique Leroy, respectively in 28 out of 38 articles and in 17 out of 39 articles. This discrepancy can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, there are proportionally less articles dealing with Dominique Leroy as a main subject, resulting in only mentioning her in the margin. Secondly, Dominique Leroy held already a top position in the telecom company, whereas Catherine De Bolle was an unknown figure working at local police level. Hence, the appointment of Catherine De Bolle was more unique and therefore newsworthy.

As indicated in previous studies (e.g., De Vuyst et al., 2016; Vos, 2012), in both cases under study, women were linked with their family status, their looks and age. For the sake of comparison, other cases where men stepped into a leadership position should be compared in future research.

Another striking result was that both women reported on a story in their career when they felt uncomfortable as a woman. However, they stated that nowadays it is accepted that a woman takes a position within what has traditionally been perceived as a male domain such as police work. These women indicated that the way they are treated and perceived has changed compared to the 1990s. This study did not find an increase of female actors since 2005. Consequently, to find out whether female representation actually changed over time, future research should go back earlier in time, for instance to the 1990s.

The sample of the qualitative text analysis was small. Future studies with larger sample sizes and/or more cases are recommended. The issue of gender representation and stereotyping is important to monitor continuously to keep a close eye on the matter. Balanced gender representation in news media is an important step to gender equality, as stated in the UN Women Beijing Declaration and proved in research (Djerf-Pierre, 2011).

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Conflict of Interests

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References


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Managing Super-Diversity on Television: The Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Flemish Non-Fiction Programmes

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Abstract
This study examines and evaluates the representation of ethnocultural diversity in non-fiction TV programmes broadcasted by the Flemish (Belgian Dutch-speaking) public service broadcaster VRT in the 2016–2017 TV season. A qualitative content analysis of a sample comprising 36 clips and episodes of 14 non-fiction programmes was supplemented by four focus group interviews with a total of 12 participants belonging to different ethnocultural minorities. The findings suggest that despite several measures undertaken by the VRT, the representation of ethnocultural minorities is still unbalanced and biased in at least three ways: first, in presenting minorities as homogeneous groups rather than highlighting intragroup differences; second, in ‘typecasting’ people with a migration background thematically, i.e., for items on topics and issues related to their ethnocultural identity; and, third, in portraying and approaching minorities from a dominant group perspective. The article ends with the recommendation for public service media to further improve ethnocultural diversity in the workforce and to encourage their journalists and TV producers to reconsider their ‘professional pragmatics’ in order to increase their ethnocultural sensitivity and better manage the representation of super-diversity in their programmes.

Keywords
ethnic minorities; ethnocultural diversity; media representation; non-fiction programmes; public service media; super-diversity; television

Issue
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1. Introduction
In today’s digital age, most people still rely heavily on mainstream media content to inform themselves and learn about society. According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report, also in high-choice media environments, television is the main source of news for many, and while people are increasingly consuming news on the Internet, the online news sources they use are often websites and apps of legacy newspapers and television channels (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2017). As mainstream media remain key sources of information, they carry a great responsibility in the mediated construction and representation of society in its diversity. This is particularly the case for public service media (PSM), which for many “still represent a normative vision of what mainstream media ought to strive to achieve in terms of pluralism and societal representation” (Horsti, Hultén, & Titley, 2014, p. 3). PSM therefore tend to reflect dominant political and social discourses on cultural diversity. In Europe’s contemporary migration societies this means that PSM have been given an important role in promoting and supporting the ‘integration’ of immigrants and social cohesion among ethnic majority and minority groups (Horsti et al., 2014; Titley, 2014).

In Flanders, the Dutch-speaking northern part of Belgium, the public service broadcaster VRT signed a Diversity Charter in 2003, which “signalled the official start
of cultural diversity policies at the VRT” (Dhoest, 2014, p. 112). In the same year, a Diversity Cell was established, consisting of two staff members tasked with monitoring and stimulating diversity both in the TV and radio programmes and within the workforce of the VRT. An important initiative of the Diversity Cell was the creation of a Diversity Monitor to measure the portrayal of persons with different ability levels, gender, ethnocultural and religious backgrounds in TV programmes of the VRT. While this quantitative monitoring of the mere presence of minorities on television has helped the VRT to achieve government-imposed targets (Dhoest, 2015), the Diversity Cell is aware that quantitative measures do not show the whole picture. Therefore, in 2017, the VRT commissioned a qualitative study to analyse and critically evaluate the representation of ethnic minorities in its television programmes. Whereas the study, independently conducted by the authors of this article, included a sample of both fiction and non-fiction programmes, the article at hand only focuses on the data and findings concerning the VRT’s news, current affairs, documentary and talk show programmes. More specifically, the study employs a multimethod research design in which a qualitative content analysis of a selection of 14 non-fiction programmes broadcasted by the VRT in the 2016–2017 TV season is combined with focus group interviews with 12 expert members of different ethnic minority groups. The combination of content analysis and focus group interviews allows us to provide a nuanced and profound description and evaluation of the way in which the journalists and programme makers at VRT account for and deal with ethnic diversity in the process of TV production.

Before discussing our findings and recommendations, we situate our study within the current body of literature on (public service) media and diversity. We argue that the debate on PSM’s role in representing ethnic diversity is shifting from a paradigm focused on the ‘recognition of multiculturalism’ to one focused on the ‘management of super-diversity’, which urges us to pay more attention to the production context in which the ‘politics of diversity’ are, can and should be translated and integrated into the norms and work practices of TV professionals.

2. Literature Review

2.1. Media, Multiculturalism and Super-Diversity

Debates on the role of (public service) media should always be considered within the broader policy context and political discourse. When democracies in Europe and elsewhere began to develop policies on ‘multiculturalism’ from the 1970s onwards, the ‘paradigm of diversity’ also entered PSM debates. Struggling with their legitimacy in an era of increased access to information technologies and fierce competition from commercial media, public service broadcasters became more aware of the distinctive role they could play in the recognition of multiculturalism (Horsti et al., 2014). This resulted in multicultural programming and efforts to include marginalised voices in media representations of diversity (Leurdijk, 2006). By the end of the twentieth century, the notion of ‘multiculturalism’ began to be replaced by the broader idea of ‘cultural diversity’ (Malik, 2013). Instead of focusing on programmes that explicitly addressed ethnic voices and topics, a more inclusive approach was taken to produce programmes with rather than about members of minority groups. Also, PSM began to broaden their attention from on-screen diversity to diversity behind the screen (cf. Ofcom, 2017). As a result, within PSM in Europe, diversity is nowadays “understood as a series of commitments to ‘diversify’ across three key areas: in programming (questions of representation and plurality of voice), in employment, and in organizational development (training people to appreciate/learn from diversity)” (Horsti et al., 2014, p. 10, italics in original).

Literature on the representation of ethnocultural diversity in television programming points out three major problems or concerns. First, study after study has shown an under-representation of certain minorities in media content, which may lead to their ‘symbolic annihilation’ (Gerbner & Gross, 1976). If certain groups are less visible on television, they and their concerns are more likely to go unnoticed by society. In the past, media and policymakers have responded to this issue by imposing diversity targets to ensure the recognition of the ethnocultural diversity within society. While it remains important to strive for a statistically accurate reflection of reality, such quantitative strategies have possible side-effects, including ‘box ticking’ (Leurdijk, 2006) and ‘tokenism’ (Hodkinson, 2011). Some authors also suggest that quantitative strategies are insufficient to address the ‘burden of representation’, that is, the expectation placed on members of minority groups to stand for the entire community they are supposed to represent. Although this burden of representation is likely to decrease if it is spread over a larger number of ‘role models’, individuals who appear on television may still feel pressured to adhere to certain role expectations that come from both their own minority community and the dominant group(s) in society (Dwyer, 1998, p. 60; Hodkinson, 2011).

A second problem in media representations of diversity is that media’s portrayal of minority groups and minority-related issues is characterised by stereotyping and a negativity bias. Hodkinson (2011) notes that “stereotypical depictions of ethnic minorities have been a constant feature of the history of media content” (p. 201). One of the most recent forms of stereotyping in European media reporting is how people with origins in Africa and the Middle East are often associated with Islam, extremism and terrorism. Stereotypes and one-sided negative images of ethnic minorities lead to stigmatisation and us/them polarisation (Shadid, 2005), which relate to the phenomena of ‘everyday racism’, xenophobia and Islamophobia (Essed, 1991; Saeed, 2007; van Dijk, 2000). The negativity bias also results in the ‘ghet-
toization’ of ethnic minorities, i.e., the tendency to report on minorities in relation to problems and threats (Haynes, 2007, pp. 175–176). A large body of research shows that media coverage about ethnic minorities emphasises topics such as violence, crime, drugs, unemployment, poverty, and, more recently, religion and fundamentalism (ter Wal, d’Haenens, & Koeman, 2005).

A third concern regarding the media’s representation of ethnicultural diversity deals with the implicit normativity of ‘whiteness’ in media discourse. Dyer (1997) introduced the concept of ‘whiteness’ to indicate that in Western societies, most social and political issues tend to be approached from the perspective of white people, implying that ‘people of colour’ represent the ‘other’ whereas whiteness constitutes the taken-for-granted, invisible norm. Several authors have shown how media tend to adopt this us/them dichotomy to distinguish between the white majority and ethnic minorities, thus reflecting and reinforcing the cultural inequalities in society (Blommaert & Verschueren, 1998; Ferguson, 1998).

It should be noted that media, and particularly PSM, are increasingly aware of the problems of underrepresentation, stereotypical portrayal and white normativity in media coverage on ethnic minorities. In reaction to these issues, they engage in efforts to pay more attention to ‘diversity within diversity’. This points at a paradigm shift away from the concept of ‘multiculturalism’, that has repeatedly been criticised for its tendency “to flatten thinking about cultural heterogeneity” (Cottle, 2000, p. 29), towards new paradigms that give more room to thinking about ‘intersectionality’ and ‘interculturality’. These concepts highlight the multiple identities of people, urging media to acknowledge that members of minority groups never belong to just one social group. Media should therefore pay more attention to different ‘intersections’ between ethnicity and other identity factors such as age, gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc. (Crenshaw, 1989).

To account for the internal heterogeneity between and within different ethnic minority groups, Vertovec (2007) proposes a framework of ‘super-diversity’, suggesting that policymakers and practitioners should “avoid the conventional trap of addressing newcomers just in terms of some presumably fixed ethnic identity” (p. 1048) and acknowledge the intra-cultural “plurality of affiliations” (p. 1048) among migrant and ethnic minority groups. Whereas the politics of multiculturality encouraged media to focus on ‘collective identities’ and on commonalities rather than differences between majority and minority groups, the concept of ‘super-diversity’ accepts and emphasises the cultural heterogeneity and voice plurality within and among ethnic minority communities. Moreover, super-diversity requires (public service) media to shift away from the mere ‘recognition’ of the multicultural character of social reality towards an increased awareness that ethnicultural diversity needs to be managed. This relates to what Horsti et al. (2014) refer to as ‘organizational development’, suggesting that actions need to be taken to raise awareness and train people within the organisation to develop a sensitivity for diversity within their daily work practices.

2.2. The ‘Professional Pragmatics’ of TV Production

In political discourse, diversity is often regarded as a problem that needs to be managed. According to Blommaert and Verschueren (1998), two forms of diversity management can be distinguished: on the one hand, governments and public services, including PSM, are tasked with the goal of containing diversity by stressing unity, cohesion and collective identities, while, on the other hand, they also have to develop strategies to promote tolerance. Both management strategies still underlie current diversity policies of PSM. However, applied to super-diversity, one can argue that further strategies are needed to ensure that ethnicultural minorities are not being disadvantaged in their access to and presence in TV programmes. One way to do so is by training TV professionals to develop a greater awareness of and sensitivity to ‘diversity within diversity’. As Dreher (2009) suggests, such trainings in cultural sensitivity could focus on skills for ‘listening across difference’ to minority voices, thus “shifting some of the responsibility for change from ‘ethnic communities’ and on to the institutions and conventions which enable and constrain receptivity and response” (p. 456).

To increase sensitivity to super-diversity requires media to reconsider the ‘professional pragmatics’ that shape the process of TV production. The concept of ‘professional pragmatics’ was developed by Cottle (1998) to refer to the practices and strategies used by professionals to deal with organisational goals and government-imposed targets in the daily work context—i.e., by articulating, rationalising, mediating and circumventing them. Accounting for the role of ‘professional pragmatics’ allows researchers to see “how unintended as well as intended consequences flow from the ways in which producers respond to, and professionally mediate, difficult internal institutional and external cultural-political circumstances” (Cottle, 1998, pp. 312–313). In other words, to fully understand media representation, we should be aware of the resources, strategies, routines, norms and skills that shape the decisions which practitioners take during the TV production process (see also Cottle, 2000; Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011). Indeed, as the idea of media as ‘managers of diversity’ (d’Haenens, 2006) implies the recognition that media professionals play an active role in the selection and portrayal of minorities, it is important to take into account the production context. Hence, this study focuses on the (re)presentation practices of TV journalists and programme makers, and ends with recommendations of how the VRT, and PSM in general, can improve these practices by influencing the ‘professional pragmatics’ that both enable and constrain the representation of super-diversity in TV non-fiction programmes.
3. Case Description: The Flemish Public Service Broadcaster

Flanders presents an interesting case for the study of ethnocultural diversity in PSM, not only because Belgium, like most European countries, has a colonial past (in Congo and Ruanda-Urundi) and became a migration society in the second half of the twentieth century, but also because the region is a stronghold of PSM, with the VRT still taking a market leader position (Dhoest, 2014). Because of its reach and impact, politicians are well aware that the VRT can play an important role in promoting values of inclusion, integration and social cohesion. Therefore, the VRT has been urged to develop diversity policies. As mentioned above, a milestone in this respect was the launch of a Diversity Charter in 2003 and the subsequent creation of a Diversity Cell. In the following years, the Diversity Cell undertook different actions to monitor and stimulate diversity in the VRT’s programming and organisation.

Despite the undeniably good intentions, the efforts were not immediately successful or visible in the output and organisation of the VRT. Reflecting on the VRT actions concerning ethnic and cultural diversity up to 2010, Dhoest (2014) found that the VRT still fell short of its ambitions regarding the presence of ethnic diversity on and behind the screen. Similarly, a study on the impact of the Diversity Charter on ethnic minority reporting in the newscasts of the VRT concluded that, seven years after its implementation, working within the charter had not resulted in more balanced ethnic minority reporting, due to journalists’ and programme makers’ unwillingness or incapacity to change their work routines or question their professional norms (Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011).

However, in recent years, significant progress has been made. After a renewal of the Diversity Charter in 2012, the VRT intensified its efforts to diversify its staff, which has led to an increased number of journalists and programme makers with different ethnic backgrounds behind and on the screen. Also, the VRT decided to avoid usage of the generalising and increasingly stigmatising term ‘allochthon’ (meaning ‘born elsewhere’) to refer to persons of foreign origin (Dhoest, 2014). Furthermore, the annual Diversity Monitor shows that since 2012, the VRT has been successful in meeting the diversity benchmarks set out in the Management Agreement between the Flemish government and the public service broadcaster. In the most recent Management Agreement for the 2016–2020 period, these benchmarks stipulate, for instance, that the VRT should strive for 7.5% of ‘new Flemings’ in its total TV output (VRT/Flemish Government, 2016). The term ‘new Flemings’ refers to people born or with at least one parent born outside the EU-15. Recent figures show that 10% of the Flemish population fits this definition, with 2% of the population having origins in Turkey and about three percent in countries of the Maghreb (especially Morocco) (Noppe et al., 2018).

Despite the positive reports on the VRT’s performance in attending to ‘new Flemings’ in its programmes, the Diversity Cell is aware that quantitative measures do not allow for much reflection and contextualisation. Therefore, the cell has begun to organise workshops for journalists and programme makers to assess and reflect on their practices and strategies in relation to ethnocultural diversity. In preparation of these workshops, the Diversity Cell commissioned an independent study to critically evaluate its TV programmes and develop recommendations for how the VRT’s media professionals can further improve the representation of super-diversity on the Flemish television screen. As mentioned above, the article at hand discusses the findings and recommendations based on the analysis of the non-fiction programmes broadcasted in the 2016–2017 TV season.

4. Research Design

This study employs a multimethod research design to investigate and evaluate the construction and representation of ethnocultural diversity in non-fiction programmes of the Flemish public broadcaster VRT. First, in order to describe how ethnocultural diversity is represented on television, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of a sample of non-fiction programmes broadcasted in the 2016–2017 TV season. Second, in order to interpret and evaluate these representations, we organised focus group interviews with 12 expert members of ethnocultural minority groups.

4.1. Qualitative Content Analysis

For the qualitative content analysis, we created a non-random sample of 36 clips and episodes from 14 non-fiction programmes broadcasted in 2016–2017 on one of VRT’s three TV channels (één, Canvas and Ketnet). The programmes selected include the seven-o’clock news programme Het Journaal (8 items), the youth news programme Karrowiet (2 items), the current affairs programmes De Afspraak (4 items) and Terzake (4 items), the investigative programme Pano (2 episodes), the talk shows Van Gils & Gasten (4 clips) and Alleen Elvis Blijft Bestaan (1 episode), the satire show De Ideale Wereld (3 clips), the daily human-interest programme Iedereen Beroemd (3 clips), and one episode from the docu-reality programmes Goed Volk, Topservice, Op Weg met Jan, De Klas and Radio Gaga.

We used purposive sampling to select clips and episodes reflective of the variety of ethnic minorities and contexts in which they appear in the totality of the non-fiction TV programmes produced by the VRT in that period. This way, we ensured that our sample also covered those (rare) items in which different ethnic groups—covering the entire range of ‘new Flemings’—appear in less typical (or stereotypical) roles and contexts. Consequently, the findings presented below may not be representative for the overall TV output by the VRT, but we...
believe they provide a representative picture of the different ways in which journalists and programme makers at the VRT manage ethnocultural diversity when producing television content.

A systematic qualitative content analysis was performed to describe and interpret how the selected programme items represent ethnic minorities. We analysed their thematic scope and focus (what is the topic of the item, and which aspects of the topic are emphasised or downplayed?), the visual representation of ethnic minorities (which actors are shown, whose voices are included, and how are the actors and voices portrayed?), and the textual representation (how are minority topics and persons talked about, in what wordings and what tone?). The descriptive part of the analysis was carried out by the first author of this article, but discussion between the three authors informed the further interpretation of the findings.

4.2. Focus Group Interviews

To deepen and validate the interpretation of the findings of the content analysis, we decided to organise focus group interviews with expert members from different ethnic minority groups. Two criteria were used to identify ‘expert members’: the participants had to belong to an ethnic minority and they had to work for either a media or a minority group organisation. The expert members were invited to one of four focus group sessions organised in October 2017. In total, 12 people participated, of whom seven were women, all were between 22 and 55 years old, and all had different ethnic origins (including the Far and Middle East, Northern and sub-Saharan Africa, and Eastern Europe).

The focus group sessions had a duration between 1.5 and 2 hours. Each session started with a general and open discussion on media representations of diversity, during which each participant was asked to share his/her own experiences and perceptions. Next, we showed the participants up to seven short clips chosen on the basis of the content analysis and representative for the variety of ways in which TV journalists and producers deal with ethnic minority persons and topics in non-fiction programmes. We did not explain why we had selected those items, but neutrally stated that these were either typical or rare examples of how TV programmes approach and represent ethnocultural diversity. As we had expected, the clips elicited rich and nuanced conversations between participants on the pros and cons of diversity representations on Flemish television. The data derived from the focus groups helped us to further interpret the findings from the content analysis.

5. Findings and Discussion

Given that the results of this study are based on triangulation of findings derived from the content analysis and focus group interviews, we present our findings and insights in an integrated way. Following the structure of the above literature review, our analysis is organised around the three themes of under-representation, stereotypical and negative representations, and ‘white normativity’ in ethnic minority coverage, leading us to a critical reflection on VRT journalists’ and TV producers’ sensitivity for super-diversity.

First, in relation to under-representation, it is important to note that the appearance of ethnic minorities on television is related to important events and debates in national and international politics. In the period of our study, events such as the Turkish coup attempt, the Syrian civil war, ISIS terrorism, and Europe’s migration crisis have drawn much of the Flemish media attention to ‘new Flemings’ with origins in Turkey, the Maghreb countries, and the Middle East. Although our qualitative content analysis does not allow us to quantify this claim, data from the VRT’s Diversity Monitor do confirm it, as does the overall perception of our focus group participants that minorities with roots in these regions dominate TV representations of ethnocultural diversity. Because of this observation, the first clips we showed in our focus groups featured ‘new Flemings’ with Moroccan and Turkish roots, leading one participant to state:

It’s quite logical that people of Moroccan and Turkish origin begin to surface on television if you consider that the first generation of these communities immigrated fifty years ago. You may wonder how long it will take for the media to include the new migrant communities such as the Chechens or the Sudanese people.

In general, participants agreed that certain minorities, especially Muslims and people from the Middle East and (both Northern and sub-Saharan) Africa, seem to be more present on Flemish television, as compared to other ethnocultural minorities which tend to be under-represented, such as Jews, migrants from Eastern European countries and people with origins in Asia except the Middle East. Some participants remarked that people belonging to under-represented groups still carry a ‘burden of representation’. This was apparent in the content analysis as well, among others in a serene observational portrayal of an Orthodox Jewish family living in Antwerp. Despite the programme being 55 minutes long and several members of the Jewish family being interviewed on different topics, it stayed limited to one family. A focus group participant remarked that this particular family was ‘an easy choice’ made by the producers:

This man and his family are famous in Antwerp. This is one of the few Jewish families that often appear in the media, so they now somewhat stand for the entire Jewish community. You know, it’s always him.

The issue of under-representation also persists when we focus on expert voices in news and current affairs programmes. The content analysis shows that ethno-
cultural minority members still rarely appear in non-fiction programmes as experts on topics unrelated to their ethnocultural background. This was only the case in a few of our 36 analysed clips and episodes. However, there seems to be a difference between news and current affairs programmes, on the one hand, and talk shows and documentary programmes, on the other hand. For the latter genres, we found two examples of programmes centred around an ethnic minority person that went beyond identity-related topics, such as the glamorous portrayal of the Belgian-Iranian business women Attoesa in the programme Topservice or presenter Danira Boukriss (Greek-Moroccan roots) teaching a class about love in De Klas. Similarly, the youth news programme Karrewiet contained items in which ethnic minority voices are included in relation to ‘non-ethnic’ topics, such as a young reporter covering the Dutch elections. In other news and current affairs programmes, we found that ethnocultural minority members occasionally appear in vox-pops or as celebrities, but not as expert voices, unless the item or programme focused on an issue related to their ethnocultural background. This finding aligns with the perception of the focus groups participants, one of whom stated:

When are you, as a Moroccan or Turk, contacted by the media? When they have an item about the festival of Eid al-Adha or some other typical Muslim phenomenon. But I never see, for instance, a Moroccan biologist on TV.

Another participant was surprised when she recently saw an IT-specialist of Turkish origin being interviewed in a TV news report about a worldwide cyber-attack, which to her shows that the VRT’s diversity efforts start to pay off. Yet, she and other participants stressed that there is still much progress to be made in terms of representing ‘diversity within diversity’. This is supported by our content analysis: looking at ‘intersectionality’, we found that ethnic minorities in non-fiction TV programmes rarely intersect with minority groups such as LGBTQ people, elderly people and people with disabilities. Little attention is also paid to religious diversity within ethnic groups (or to ethnic diversity within religious groups). Yet, these intersections are not completely absent. For example, the current affairs programmes Terzake carried a report of a Syrian homosexual refugee studying in Brussels. Regarding the intersection between ethnicity and age, men older than 60 years old appeared in a report of Terzake, as well as in the investigative programme Pano and the docu-reality programme Goed Volk, whereas the oldest ethnic minority woman in the 36 analysed programmes and clips was 50 years old. Further, the human interest programme Iedereen Beroemd carried an item about a blind person, while De Afspraak also had an ethnocultural minority interview guest with a visual disability. Although these exceptions were appreciated by the focus group participants, the lack of recognition for intragroup differences within ethnocultural minorities remains a point of concern, as reflected in the following quote, which focuses on the intersection between ethnicity and religion:

If you look at the TV coverage of Islamic topics, journalists don’t see the difference between a Moroccan Muslim and a Persian Muslim. Yet, as a Moroccan, I have more in common with ethnic Belgians than with Iranian Muslims. A newsroom should be aware of the cultural and religious diversity within Islam.

Other participants criticised the VRT’s current affairs programmes for always inviting the same experts, or as one participant put it, “there is more than just one scientist with Congolese roots who can give their opinion about what I call ‘African-Flemish’ topics or people”.

The under-recognition of intragroup differences creates the image of ethnic minorities as rather homogeneous groups, which opens the door to stereotypical and negative representations, our second theme. Here, however, the qualitative content analysis and focus groups provide nuanced insights into the biases in media representations of ethnocultural diversity. For instance, by including different non-fiction genres and by purposively selecting items in which ethnic minorities appear in different roles and in relation to different topics, we were able to identify different examples that nuance the idea that ethnic minorities are commonly associated with ‘bad news’. The negativity bias is clearly still dominant in the news coverage of politics and events related to ethnic minorities, but, as also indicated in the focus groups, most of these issues such as unemployment rates or discrimination, can and should not be ignored. What is more problematic, according to the participants, is that journalists and TV producers seem to struggle with avoiding clichés and stereotypes. The participants gave several other examples, many of which were in line with what our content analysis shows. One example of stereotyping in our sample was a report in the seven o’clock news about a training initiative to help recent immigrants find a job, that unnecessarily shifted the focus to the broader issue of unemployment among ethnic minorities by confusing the terms ‘newcomers’ (people who recently arrived in Belgium) and ‘allochtones’ (an unproductively broad category and a term to be avoided). Another news report, about the tendency among teenage football players to shower with their underwear on, included interviews with four young ‘new Flemings’, insinuating that this ‘new puritanism’ is primarily related to ethnicity, even though a sexologist interviewed in the same report argued that it had probably to do with the omnipresence of smartphone cameras.

Stereotyping does not only occur in textual representations, but also in visual representations of ethnic minorities in non-fiction programmes. One participant stated it explicitly:
I still see much too many cliché representations of black people on television. You can see images of them happily dancing or hanging around in the street, but you seldom do see them in an intellectual role.

Although other participants agreed with her, our content analysis shows that the VRT programmes do also show ethnic minorities in less typical or stereotypical roles. For instance, a news item about Chinese New Year carried an interview with a westernised Chinese-Belgian woman instead of only showing exotic images of traditionally dressed Chinese people. Another news report, focusing on how people in a park enjoyed the first warm days of the season, started with interviews with white parents and their kids around the swimming pool, and then moved on to a Turkish-Belgian family taking a picnic elsewhere in the park, thus showing, in a unifying rather than differentiating way, how ‘old’ and ‘new Flemings’ spend their leisure time in the sun. Further, we observed several politicians with a migration background as voices in non-fiction TV programmes, as well as a dentist, a police agent, a business woman, and a writer. Again, our selective sample does not allow generalisation, but the examples show that the VRT does make efforts to move beyond stereotypes. These efforts and the good intentions were also acknowledged in the focus groups, although participants added that there is still considerable room for improvement.

Our third theme and an important remaining point of concern is the dominant group perspective. In our content analysis, this was for instance illustrated in the above-mentioned news item about unemployment among new migrants using the polarising term ‘allochthone’, ignoring the VRT’s editorial guidelines suggesting avoidance of the term and generalising the problem of unemployment to all ethnic minorities. Another example concerns a news report about a day care centre for disadvantaged children. While most of its employees have a migration background, only ‘white’ employees were interviewed, and the journalist emphasised that the migrant employees lack a proper knowledge of the Dutch language. In the focus groups, this prevailing us/them dichotomy, and the underlying white normativity was perceived as a major problem for Belgian television. Apart from the newscasts, participants also directed their criticism at the current affairs programme De Afspraak. This programme regularly invites ethnic minority persons as interview guests to discuss the news of the day, but since they are placed around a table with the other three guests of the day, the ‘new Flemings’ remain a minority voice in the studio. In the focus groups, several participants remarked that often ethnic minority members are overruled by other interview guests or confronted with questions from the white, male TV presenter in such a way that it often puts them, intentionally or not, in the position of ‘the other’. According to some participants, a perfect illustration was the clip we showed in which two black, female ‘new Flemings’ were invited for a discussion about daily racism in Flanders. Although one participant appreciated that the discussion was between two black persons “instead of white against black”, most participants highlighted how it was embedded in a discourse of “us against them”. As our content analysis shows, it already started with the introduction of the two guests as “two ladies, who both grew up in Flanders, both adopted out of Rwanda, both having two kids, you both went to the same school, I hear, yet with a totally different vision”. Some participants interpreted this quote as a perfect example of the white normative perspective that views black people as one homogeneous group of whom ‘we’ thus can expect that ‘they’ would share one uniform vision.

Overall, our study shows that VRT journalists and TV producers seem to be aware of the issues and pitfalls of media representations of ethnocultural diversity, as we did not identify any very problematic (e.g., openly racist or stigmatising) representations. However, our analysis and the interviews with experts also showed that they regularly fall short of avoiding these pitfalls in the daily practices of TV production, making slippages (e.g., the occasional use of the word ‘allochthone’) and falling back on representational patterns (e.g., connecting ethnic minorities to certain themes or ‘othering’ them). At the end of the focus groups, participants were asked what the VRT could do to further increase cultural sensitivity among their staff. All of them underlined that it was crucial to increase diversity within the workforce. As one participant stated:

One of the problems is that the VRT still has ‘white newsrooms’, which makes that people with a minority background are not involved from the beginning of the creative process. Ideas and perceptions are sometimes counterchecked, but this often happens too late, when most decisions are already taken.

Other participants agreed by saying that ethnocultural sensitivity should become “a natural reflex” in every TV newsroom and production team, especially when covering stories with or about ethnocultural minorities. They stressed that a public service broadcaster should play a leading role in this process.

6. Conclusion

As argued in the literature review, the debate on PSM’s role in representing ethnocultural diversity has shifted from the ‘recognition of multiculturalism’ towards the ‘management of super-diversity’. Despite a growing awareness of this in newsrooms, the representation of ethnocultural diversity on television continues to be a permanent challenge and complex, multi-faceted issue for PSM. To critically evaluate the Flemish public service broadcaster’s implementation of their diversity policies, this study employed a qualitative content analysis of the representation of ethnocultural diversity in
non-fiction programmes, combined with focus group interviews with ethnocultural minorities.

The findings of our content analysis suggest that despite several measures undertaken by the VRT, the representation of ethnocultural minorities remains unbalanced and biased in at least three ways. First, despite some notable exceptions, minorities continue to be represented as homogeneous groups and their intragroup differences are insufficiently highlighted. This fits Cottle’s (2000) argument that (public service) media should pay more attention to different ‘intersections’ between ethnicity and other identity factors such as age, gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc. Second, people with a migration background still largely appear in topics and issues related to their ethnocultural identity. This thematic ‘typecasting’ is in line with existing literature, and the focus group participants acknowledged that this is partly due to current affairs—often bad news—hence enforcing the negative stereotyping. However, journalists can counterbalance this bias by including ethnocultural minorities more often in non-ethnic-related topics, including expert roles. Third, minorities often continue to be portrayed and approached from a dominant group perspective, so they are ‘othered’ rather than included in Flemish society.

We do not want to suggest that the examples discussed are representative for the way in which ethnocultural minorities are being represented on Flemish television, as the qualitative nature of the study does not allow for generalisation. However, we contend that our findings indicate that there is still room for improvement in addressing the needs and interests of all social groups in a context of super-diversity. Yet, our study also makes clear that the VRT is aware of these issues and invests in efforts to improve ethnocultural diversity both in the workforce and in its programmes. The qualitative study at hand forms the basis for a series of workshops within the VRT to increase sensitivity for super-diversity among its employees and within its programmes, which may encourage them to engage more in ‘listening across difference’ and to question the professional pragmatics that shape their practices and strategies towards diversity management.

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Conflict of Interests

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Article

ICT Use and Digital Inclusion among Roma/Gitano Adolescents

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Abstract

This article analyses the way in which the digital divide affects Roma/Gitano minors. This ethnic group is a paradigmatic case among socially underprivileged groups in Spain; excluded from industrial society, they appear to be facing a similar situation in the post-industrial era. We, therefore, sought to explore the digital experiences of minors from this group in order to study social and digital exclusion/inclusion among them. The research strategy took a comprehensive approach, covering both offline and online behaviour. We focused on the results of fieldwork undertaken in Spain during 2017. In all, interviews were conducted with 17 adolescents (aged 11 to 18) as well as with several social workers who were providing support to the minors. Given that the use of technology has become a prerequisite for the welfare of children and for the development of their rights, the issue tends to centre on three main areas, commonly known as the three Ps: provision, participation, and protection. As such, the analysis of inequality was based on these areas. The findings presented in this article illustrate that the use of ICTs can contribute to empowering Roma/Gitano adolescents to improve the position they occupy as a group in the social structure.

Keywords
adolescents; development; digital divide; Gitano; ICT; Roma; social inclusion; Spain

Issue

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1. Introduction

Digital literacy is now an essential factor in the welfare and rights development of children and young people. Increasingly, research into digital inclusion focuses on vulnerable groups, on the assumption that social exclusion can contribute to digital exclusion (Salemink, 2016). The debate on digital inequality encompasses both material and social inequalities (Van Deursen & Van Dijk, 2013). However, the discussion extends beyond the classic vision of the “digital divide” between those who do and do not have digital devices and Internet access, given that such access is now a given in western societies, except in remote rural areas (Townsend, Sathiaseelan, Fairhurst, & Wallace, 2013). This assumption of ubiquity means that it is now socioeconomic factors which play a dominant role in the non-use or limited use of digital applications (Salemink, 2016). This is one of the key issues in this regard. The “digital divide” is no longer marked by the possession of digital devices or Internet access; rather the inequality centres on the user’s digital skills. It places the core of the issue with the user; that is to say, with their skill in accessing digital applications, being able to use them creatively and for their benefit (Mariën & Prodnik, 2014). In this regard, gender, race, ethnicity, and social class can all be considered influential factors, determining individuals’ resources and their capacity to access and use many digital appliances. Ethnic minorities, for example, face major limitations in accessing and using new devices due to linguistic and economic problems, among
others (Gilbert, 2010; Halford & Savage, 2010). The analysis of digital inequality, therefore, focuses on the digital inclusion of vulnerable and socially-excluded communities (Gilbert, 2010; Van Dijk, 2005).

1.1. Roma/Gitanos as an Outsider Group

Although civil servants, politicians and academics have highlighted the diversity of Romani groups, Matras (2014, p. 29) emphasizes the fact that “they share a sense of solidarity and common destiny. They are aware of similarities in language, customs and values, and in attitudes to family, work, shame and honour”. Persistent stigmatization and hostility from established groups have contributed to the reinforcement of their sense of shared culture inside the community as well as disidentification from those on the outside (Powell, 2013; Wacquant, 2012). Moreover, spatial separation such as ghettoization and educational segregation has reinforced the maintenance of physical, social, and emotional distance (Powell, 2013; Wacquant, 2012).

Powell (2016) describes Roma as an outsider group for whom stigmatization and a perceived inferiority from the outside are almost perennial and universal aspects of their asymmetrical established-outsider relations; as he remarks, “how the relative lessening of power differentials experienced by many outsider groups over time, through functional democratization is much less apparent in the case of Roma” (Powell, 2016, p. 136).

Indeed, the European Union’s efforts to promote Roma integration and “inclusion” have actually had unintended negative consequences in the form of “back-door nationalism”, whereby “old nationalist ambitions” are more openly expressed in some Central and Eastern European countries (Fox & Vermeersch, 2010). According to De Swaan (1997), rather than identifying, Gypsy-Travellers/Roma tend to disidentify from the wider society, experiencing others as different from themselves. This attitude has caused fear and mutual avoidance strategies on the part of both the established communities and the outsiders: “the Gypsy-Travellers/Roma, in a bid to avoid harassment, contamination, and to preserve cultural practices central to their self-image; and the majority society which has attempted to avoid contamination and interaction with supposedly deviant, lazy, criminal, ‘uncivilized’, and inferior group” (Powell, 2016, p. 141).

The nature of the relations between the two groups has led to a peculiar functional interdependence, historically based on the traditional economic practices of Gypsy-Travellers/Roma which need the wider population as customers (Gmelch, 1986; Okely, 1983; Sibley, 1987). As Matras (2014, p. 58) states, therefore, “work provides the principal and often exclusive environment where Roms have contact with non-Roms”. Sibley (1998) calls this “mixing without integration” and argues that Gypsies adapt in order to stay the same (see also Sibley, 1987).

The family is central to the internal social organisation of Gypsy-Traveller/Roma society. The extended, intergenerational family grouping performs specific and important functions in terms of socialization, cultural transmission, and protection from stigmatization. Many Gypsy-Travellers/Roma stay within their extended family groupings their whole lives, with young women being expected to join their husband’s extended family group on marriage (Powell, 2016).

1.2. ICTs for Development

As this article’s intention is to explore the role of ICTs in an outsider group’s everyday life we need to avoid any ethnocentrism which would likely attribute the mainstream perception of social development to their development. Therefore, as Kleine (2013) emphasizes when referring to “technologies for development”, development is the aim and ICTs are the means of achieving that aim. Drawing on Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach, Kleine emphasizes that development should be seen as a process rather than an outcome; it is therefore necessarily ongoing and dynamic rather than fixed and static. It also implies freedom of choice in the personal, social, economic, and political spheres. This approach also “explicitly puts people at the centre of the development idea”. Thus, people themselves should be the ones to define what type of life they value. This approach requires an open-ended process of deliberation which puts the views of the people whose lives are affected at the heart of the development process (Kleine, 2013, p. 4).

Although modernization theorists and policy-makers have traditionally tended to equate development with economic growth, on the assumption that wealth generated by economic growth would automatically trickle down to poorer segments of society over time, new discourses from welfare economists and ecologists among others tend to focus on social (Wilkinson & Picket, 2009) or ecological sustainability (Nerfin, 1977). Consequently, Agenda 21—for instance—emphasizes the need for a balance between environmental, social, and economic aspects in order to achieve “sustainable” development (UN, 1992).

Kleine (2013) frames development within a people-centred approach, putting disadvantaged individuals—such as those with low-incomes, women and indigenous peoples—and their voices at the centre of her analysis. In Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach, the focus of development is increasing a person’s set of capabilities or their substantive freedom to lead a life that they have reason to value. Sen rejects so-called rational choice theory for its “simplicity of ignoring all motivations other than the pursuit of self-interest” (Sen, 2009, p. 187) and insists that choices are reason-based. Therefore, Sen’s approach seems particularly suitable for exploring the ways in which ICT can contribute to increasing Roma/Gitanos’ substantive freedom to lead a life they value.
1.3. ICTs for the Development of Roma/Gitanos

Adolescents

Roma/Gitanos are the largest ethnic minority group in Spain. Although no census breakdown is available for ethnic minorities, the Ministry of Health’s registry suggests that there are between 570,000 and 1,100,000 Roma individuals in Spain (Oleaque & Moreno, 2017). This community has been living on the Iberian Peninsula since the fifteenth century. Contrary to popular belief, it is a relatively diverse community, and despite some large pockets suffering social exclusion, there is also a significant Roma/Gitano presence in modest or medium-level socio-economic layers. Nevertheless, Roma/Gitano people continue to be characterised by a situation of marginality, to such an extent that most belong to the poorest and most underprivileged social groups in Spanish society. Roma/Gitanos are a paradigmatic case among socially underprivileged groups; they were excluded from industrial society and the situation appears to be continuing in the post-industrial era (Granados, 2008). Most settled during the second half of the twentieth century when public policy promoted settlement as the first step towards their social integration (Leblon, 1993).

As stated in the Seventh Report on Exclusion and Social Development in Spain (Fundación Foessa, 2014, p. 188), an alarming percentage of the Roma/Gitano population are affected by social exclusion (72.3% as compared to 23.5% among the non-Gitano population). Amongst Roma/Gitano households, this exclusion translates into income levels which are well below the overall average, higher unemployment, and major educational deficits.

The Spanish Roma/Gitano population joined the education system 30 years ago. Figures from the Roma Secretariat Foundation (Fundación Secretariado Gitano, 2013) show that in 2011, among Gitano students aged between 16 and 24, 64% did not finish compulsory education as opposed to 13% among the wider student population. Moreover, 8.6% of the Roma population in Spain could not read or write and only 2.3% had post-secondary studies. Furthermore, the economic crisis has hit this group particularly hard, resulting in a decline in the level of household amenities. In a study by the Roma Secretariat Foundation carried out in collaboration with the National Drugs Plan, 22% of young Roma/Gitanos surveyed said they had had to dispense with home Internet connections for economic reasons.

The research presented here sought to discover the role played by digital technologies in Roma/Gitano children’s everyday life, placing their voices at the centre of the analysis and seeking to determine how these technologies contribute to their personal and social development. Using Sen’s (1999) approach, we defined development as increasing an individual’s set of capabilities, or their substantive freedom to lead a life they have reason to value. We sought to explore how digital technologies contribute to providing these children with a wider set of capabilities or choices. What are the choices they make when using these technologies? Who do they make contact with? What are their purposes when using these devices?

Given that the use of technology has now become necessary for the wellbeing of children and young people, as well as for the development of their rights, this analysis will focus on Internet access and use as a right. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNICEF, 2014) outlines the fundamental rights of children in three key areas—provision, participation, and protection—and this study, therefore, examines the relative capabilities of Roma/Gitano children and young people in these three domains.

2. Research Method

Our fieldwork also covered some other ethnic/nationality groups such as migrants from Latin-America, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, refugees, and children in foster care (UNICEF, 2018). Altogether, nearly one hundred people were interviewed, mostly children or adolescents but also a few community workers. Sampling was performed through different institutions providing support to social integration of these groups. Attempts were made to interview children from diverse socio-economic backgrounds in all the groups, however, it was not possible to achieve full representation in this sample. It must be noted that the findings of this article cannot be generalised to any of the entire populations concerned since those who are better off will presumably have little contact with such institutions.

This analysis of children’s interaction with ICTs will focus on the situation of the members of the ethnic Roma/Gitano community as a particular case among those socially underprivileged groups. Mainstream research tends to focus on the capabilities of the individual user and has resulted in a somewhat narrow view of digital inclusion, insofar as it tends to individualize the issue. As Marién and Prodnik (2014, p. 35) hold, “digital inclusion policies tend to individualize problems that are in fact social in their nature”. Therefore, we decided to focus on Roma/Gitano children in view of their specific ethnic group traits which may influence their use of ICTs and their subsequent development of digital skills, such as their lack of involvement in secondary education and the control they set on young girls’ behaviour.

We have opted for a contextualized and participative approach, centring on children. The fieldwork was conducted using a qualitative methodology enabling an in-depth examination of these children’s digital experiences in the context of their everyday life.

In order to ensure that all relevant themes were covered, the comprehensive interviews were based on a semi-structured conversation guide. Seventeen adolescents aged between 11 and 18 from an ethnic Roma/Gitano background were interviewed at different loca-
tions in the autonomous communities of Madrid and the Basque Country. We also interviewed two educators and one officer from institutions working with the group—some of them belonging to the same ethnic group—to obtain a more complete overview of the social context of these children’s interaction with digital technologies. All interviews were recorded in audio and transcribed.

3. Main Findings

As stated, our analysis of the information compiled from the interviews focuses on the three Ps—i.e., the three key areas of children’s rights: provision, participation and protection. The Roma/Gitanos’ rights to digital provision are basically related to having Internet access and using different devices in their everyday lives. Their rights to digital participation, on the other hand, are more related to the type of activities they perform online and their ability to communicate either within their community or outside it. As for digital protection, although theirs is a very supportive community, their parents usually lack the abilities to mediate their online activities effectively.

3.1. Digital Provision

Practically all the Roma/Gitano children interviewed have their own mobile phones/smartphones. Nevertheless, girls share their phone terminal with one of their parents more frequently than boys—in almost all cases, with the mother. Some girls said that if one of their parents’ device were broken or lost, they would share their own phone with the parent. This is very unusual among adolescents from other ethnic groups, as there is ample evidence showing that privacy is highly valued at this age. Moreover, non-Roma children do not share mobile devices with their parents and tend to evade their surveillance (Haddon, 2015; Mascheroni & Cuman, 2014). Nevertheless, insofar as far as girls are the ones who share their device, this seems to be one of the mechanisms used to control their behaviour, others will be mentioned in later sections of this article.

Despite having smartphones, Roma/Gitanos children frequently have no Internet plan or data connection (or only have one on a sporadic basis). Many do not even have a Wi-Fi connection at home. They may have to share their parents’ data allowance or go to the homes of friends or relatives in order to use their Wi-Fi network. They also used a variety of locations (such as community centres) where they could access free Wi-Fi:

Interviewer: So you don’t have Wi-Fi then?

No. We only have the Wi-Fi on my father’s mobile. He has the Internet and he lets us use his data [allowance]. (Boy, 15 years)

As for access to other devices, those that said they had a computer or tablet at home were the exception. Many mentioned “old” or “broken” computers that could no longer be used. Some children cited economic reasons for lack of access to such devices at home, freely admitting that their families could not afford to have a computer at home.

The absence of desktops or laptops in the home is a major impediment to doing normal schoolwork, especially among the older children who attend secondary school. As a result, they have to use the computers in the support classrooms at their schools, various social support centres (such as those run by the Fundación Secretariado Gitano), and even cyber-cafes to do their homework:

The school asks them to send in a lot of their work by e-mail, all the exercises they do at home….So many of them can’t hand in all of their homework. That does interfere quite a bit with their studies. (Educator at the Fundación Secretariado Gitano)

However, Primary Education students seldom use computers at school. Most say they go to the computer room once a week where they are allowed to play or do whatever they want to; only a few say they use a word processor (for tasks such as writing recipes or stories) and only one boy mentioned looking up information online for schoolwork. Therefore, neither the frequency of the children’s use of digital devices at school nor the type of activities they pursue appear to contribute much to the development of their digital skills.

We have ICT [class] once a week at my school and they let us do whatever we want—look for games and play them and things like that. They don’t let us use social media, but we can search for games and music. And in English class, if we’ve been good for two days, on the third day the teacher lets us do whatever we want on the computer. (Girl, 11 years)

On the one hand, their online activity at school cannot be said to contribute much to developing new Internet skills. On the other, the children’s discourse shows their lack of involvement in the education system, especially beyond puberty, reflecting the traditional aversion to institutionalised education among this ethnic group (Powell, 2016). As a general rule, they show little interest in formal education. Some freely admit that they have repeated a year more than once, not only for poor performance but also for bad behaviour. Moreover, among those who are of an age to have completed compulsory secondary education, a relatively large number acknowledge that they dropped out of school long before completing this cycle. None of them have a diploma and only a few are taking (or plan to take) complementary educational cycles and those who are, are following them somewhat erratically.

I’ve been doing cooking at high school for two years now….I started in first year and I had to repeat for bad
were committed to their school performance and as-

benefit-dependent, and in order to receive their

An educator at the Fundación Secretariado Gitano also

This excerpt shows a very important change in attitude

There seems to be a clear association between the inter-

viewees’ school performance, their father’s job or profes-

sion (or lack of it) and, as a consequence, the availability

of ICTs in the home. As mentioned, lack of involvement

in education is common among benefit-dependent fam-

ilies where the father is either unemployed or an itiner-

ant trader who lacks sufficient devices and an internet

connection. Indeed, nearly all the interviewee’s families

were benefit-dependent, and in order to receive their

benefit allowance, such families are required to send

their children to an educational institution. These young

people will, therefore, have to attend school until they

are 18 years old even if they have no interest whatsoever

in the training on offer.

At the same time, there were a couple of boys who

were committed to their school performance and as-

pired to gain the diploma in order to be eligible for vo-

cational education cycles. In both cases, their fathers

had a job and Internet skills. Among the interviewees,

there was also one girl who said she planned to go on

to post-compulsory secondary education. Although still

very young, she was willing to work hard at school in or-

der to have a career.

I’d like to become a hairdresser, but my mother wants

me to become a lawyer.

Interviewer: Do you think there is any similarity be-

tween one and the other?

In all cases, you need some studies, and you have to

pass all the subjects...

Interviewer: That’s true.

And work hard. (Girl, 13 years)

This excerpt shows a very important change in attitude

among some female members of the Roma/Gitano com-

munity. On the one hand, the girl’s mother wants her
daughter to get a university degree, and on the other,
the girl was willing to work hard at school to gain a ca-

erre. The type of degree the mother wanted her daugh-
ter to take is also significant; she wanted her to be able
to provide professional support to other members of their

ethnic group, just as her husband (the girl’s father) does

in his spare time (working in local government and collab-

orating with a foundation supporting Roma/Gitanos).

An educator at the Fundación Secretariado Gitano also

noted a major change among some young Gitano boys

and girls who were outperforming their peers at univer-
sity and taking an active part in these institutions. These

young people are acting as ambassadors for their com-

munity and trying to solve its problems.

3.2. Digital Participation

The purposes for which Roma children use their mo-
biles/smartphones are quite similar to those of any other
children of their age. They mentioned WhatsApp as a ba-
sic tool for chatting to friends and relatives; as Boyd

and Ellison (2007) found, teenagers use their mobile devices

and social media to coordinate and activate their offline

social life. The interviewees’ social life is limited to their

extended family and ethnic group. Some of them men-
tion they may have friends at school, but most of their

relationships take place among their community mem-

bers, reflecting their strong group orientation.

Recreational use clearly predominates: playing
games, listening to music, and watching videos. Many

follow popular YouTubers such as ‘Auronplay’ and

‘El Rubius’. Their activity is very restricted, and their

searches focus almost exclusively on entertainment-

related themes, such as fashion and beauty, football,

and music.

Mostly for listening to songs. Reggaeton and all that,
you know? The stuff that’s popular at the moment.
Apart from that, I don’t know….For example, you can
get stuff on how to make your hair grow or how to
make it stronger, or funny videos and things. (Girl,
12 years)

Their use of other applications is very limited, and they

seem to use social media (except for WhatsApp) sub-
stantially less than average when compared to other

Spanish children of their age group (Garmendia, Jiménez,
Casado, & Mascheroni, 2016). This is especially true of

the girls, as very few use social media and many freely ac-
knowledge that their parents and brothers do not allow

them to have a profile on Facebook or Instagram—a very

common situation in Roma/Gitano communities which

strongly regulate young girls’ behaviour (Matras, 2014).

Most interviewees say their level of knowledge when

it comes to mobile phone use is “normal”, but much

more limited in the case of computers. They accept

not having a computer at home places them at a disad-
vantage vis-à-vis other children who have one. Most of

them are not aware of the potential advantages of de
voping digital skills or possible uses of the Internet other

than those related to communication and entertainment,

confirming Toyama’s theory of the Law of Amplification

in technology, which holds that people’s use of tech-

nology tends to reinforce their own interests (Toyama,
2015). Therefore, if Roma/Gitanos are not committed to

their school activities they will show no interest in using

technology for learning.
I don’t know what help it would be to use the mobile well; I’m happy with the way I’m using it now. The only thing I use it for, now, is WhatsApp; I don’t even log on to Instagram any more. (Boy, 16 years)

Thus, the children generally do not have digital skills and do not value them; as a result, they have no interest in developing them. However, there are some exceptions; some of the older children said they would like to “learn a bit more about computers”. Some even say that technology will be very important in the future, but this discourse appears to be somewhat empty as it lacks a connection with their own future actions.

Interviewer: And in the future, when you’re older, maybe when you’re in work, do you think it will be important to know about these things?

Yes, I do think it’s important.

Interviewer: And would you like to find out more?

Well yes, a bit, because I don’t know much. To be honest I don’t know much about computers. And I’d like to learn a bit more. (Boy, 16 years)

In general, when asked about themselves compared to their non-Gitano peers they are quite reluctant to acknowledge differences in social or economic terms; on the contrary, they tend to stress the similarities as far as their rights are concerned. They emphasize that they do not like comparing their ethnic group with others and claim they do not like to “differentiate” among people. In contrast, however, they often proudly state they are culturally different. They claim to be similar in terms of rights, yet culturally different.

3.3. Digital Protection

Most Gitano children say they have accessed the Internet with little or no supervision. They generally say their parents have little or no knowledge of the Internet, although they are warned frequently of the potential dangers. However, these warnings are not often accompanied by clear guidelines. In the long term, some prohibitions could end up simply keeping them off the Internet rather than helping them to avoid or cope with possible risks. Parents who lack digital knowledge or skills may end up restricting or even forbidding their children’s use of ICTs.

They think they have to work on security with their children. But I think they don’t have the tools they need. They don’t know to what extent the Internet is or isn’t harmful for kids. We recently heard about one father who wouldn’t let his daughter come to an IT course because he said the computer was the devil. (Educator at the Fundación Secretariado Gitano)

The lack of mediation frequently translates into a lack of any restrictions on mobile phone use, which can result in excessive and uncontrolled use. The most immediate consequences of overuse may be that the children neglect their schoolwork or even spend less time with their friends. A few young girls openly stated that they spend ‘all day’ online and another boy said his father had to switch off the Wi-Fi because otherwise, he would not go to sleep.

The lack of mediation may be related to an absence of digital skills among parents, especially in the case of mothers. Many mothers only have a simple (non-data) mobile phone. Others have a smartphone but do not know how to make the most of it.

In any case, all but a very few of the children said they were more skilful than their parents at using technology. This absence of skills among their parents means that many of the interviewees are self-trained. They often mention using online tutorials for learning as well as getting help from friends or older siblings.

However, it is striking that despite this lack of digital skills among parents, all the children unhesitatingly say that in the event of a serious problem, they would turn to their parents and the rest of the family. In their discourse, all interviewees displayed great respect for their parents and their extended family and said they were willing to comply with all the rules related to the use of phones at mealtimes and girls’ offline behaviour and online self-image.

With regard to potential online risks, those most frequently cited by the children were attempts by strangers to make contact with them. They are usually very cautious and do not accept friend requests other than from people they know well.

They also mentioned different forms of harassment. On occasions, episodes of bullying may come from among members of the same community.

Although hate speech against the Roma/Gitano community is widespread on the Internet, the children mentioned hardly any cases of encountering online content that offended them as Roma. Nonetheless, some children did mention situations in which they had been insulted for this reason:

Once I was in a group from my class and one of them called me a fucking gypsy. He said it a few times on the mobile. I didn’t pay any attention, I just let him talk. But the next day he said it again and we had a fight.

Interviewer: Does that often happen to you and other Roma friends of yours?

Yes. (Boy, 16 years)

Although this section is primarily concerned with child protection regarding their digital habits, specific mention should also be made of the protection and regulation of the behaviour of girls in the Roma/Gitano community. As
previously mentioned, most families restrict young girls’ behaviour on social media and even their access to smartphones as they tend to keep them from having contact with non-Gitanos and arranged marriages are still common within the community. The boys’ discourses contained ample evidence of their attitude and behaviour towards their sisters, with extensive references to protecting them both online and offline. On the one hand, they tend to try to prevent the girls from contacting people from outside their community; on the other, they regulate the type of images or pictures they share online. Pre-marital sexual activity is a strict taboo for young women and would bring shame on them and their family (Powell, 2016), with boys taking an active part in the control mechanisms applied to girls’ behaviour.

Interviewer: Have you said anything to your sister about how to use the mobile or the Internet?

Yes, I have. Because she’s a girl and I’d be worried; there are some really crazy people out there. I’m afraid of her going on Instagram or Facebook....I’m afraid she’d run into that stuff. (Boy, 16 years)

They also discourage contact with other girls who are not members of their own community. Some boys even mention that their sisters are never allowed to leave the house on their own. Some girls are only allowed to go straight from home to school and vice versa.

Here, one observes certain problems related to new communication technologies which also exist in society as a whole, but which are more accentuated among the Roma/Gitano community. For example, both children and educators mention the way in which husbands and boyfriends control their partners’ mobiles and their passwords on social media. Although these situations are clearly far from being exclusive to the Roma/Gitano community, they need to be highlighted in order to target interventions for empowering Roma women.

As soon as the woman got married, her husband had a sort of control over her mobile. He’d have physical control over her mobile and there were a lot of cases of sharing Facebook accounts. They just had the one account. In other words, they weren’t individuals any more. There was a lot of control. They need to know what their wives are doing so they shared the password. It was a shared account. (Educator at the Roma Secretariat Foundation)

The girls themselves criticize many non-Gitano girls for posting inappropriate pictures and for their sexual behaviour online. They see them as being “easy” for “doing whatever they want and uploading it”. They say that neither they nor any other girls from their community would ever behave that way. In this way, they adhere to their communities’ shame-related rules and disidentify themselves from the behaviour of non-Gitanos.

Another striking feature, in keeping with the general lack of interest in job seeking, was that very few girls expressed any intention of finding a job in the future. Those who did tended to mention occupations closely related to traditional female roles, such as teaching or caring for small children and hairdressing. It was also interesting to note the importance some girls gave to the idea of romantic love, mentioning the potential of running away with a boy they liked so that their families would force them to get married.

4. Conclusions

In developed countries, the “digital divide” has changed from referring to a lack of access to technological devices to the lack of digital skills in the use of such devices. This has important consequences when it comes to using and getting the most out of the Internet, particularly in areas of education, personal and professional training, and future employment. Although most of the children interviewed had a smartphone for their own use, in terms of digital provision, few had laptops or desktop computers at home. As a result, their use of such devices, which are more closely associated with creativity and learning processes (Vincent & Haddon, 2018), is limited to the school environment. This absence of computers in the home is a significant barrier to their school work. The education system does not appear to be well positioned to stimulate the development of digital skills among these children; the use of devices during the years of mandatory schooling is very limited; moreover, this group has a very high early school drop-out rate. The general lack of commitment to formal—particularly secondary—education among these children should be a cause for concern given the likely consequences for their vocational development and subsequent social inclusion. Nevertheless, some Roma/Gitano young people are performing outstandingly well at university and are very active among institutions supporting their communities.

Regarding participation, smartphones are used predominantly for recreational purposes. The interviewees’ most frequent activities focus on the more common applications and platforms. However, these activities are very limited and their searches centre on fashion/beauty, football, and music. School resources have been shown to be insufficient to motivate or help the majority of Roma/Gitano children develop digital skills that might allow them to become expressive and active creators of their own online content. In short, although these children have access to devices, inequality essentially takes the form of an absence of digital skills that could allow them to benefit from other opportunities provided by the digital environment.

As for protection, this group displays a striking level of digital vulnerability in relative terms, with families rarely regulating their use of technology. Most parents lack the digital skills to be able to supervise or mentor their children’s online activity. In short, their incipient
digital literacy has basically been self-taught, since they lack support from adults with skills in this area. Although the use of interviews and the focus on the three Ps have helped to focus our attention on the children as individuals, it is also important to bear in mind that, the girls certainly, are all affected by gender inequality. On one hand, it takes the form of control exercised by families over girls, who sometimes have to share their devices, are often prohibited from having a presence on social media in order to “protect them”, a prohibition which is subsequently maintained by their husbands. On the other hand, there is an evident lack of interest among most girls in vocational education. Both issues highlight the need to empower Roma/Gitano girls to allow them to develop as autonomous individuals within online and offline environments. Unless this gender gap is bridged, women may become excluded from the increasingly digitalized societies and economies in the near future. As stated in The Mobile Gender Gap (GSMA, 2018) report, concerted action is needed to reduce and ultimately eliminate the gender gap in mobile ownership and use. Successfully doing so will provide substantial benefits to women, their families and their communities, and will be an effective way of contributing to achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We need to keep in mind that the mobile phone also has the power to transform lives. It can empower women by making them feel safer and more connected, by providing access to information and services, as well as life-enhancing opportunities such as health information, financial services, and employment opportunities. In fact, there is evidence showing an increasing number of Roma women participating in the labour market in the UK (Greenfields, Ryder, & Smith, 2012) as well as being involved in Roma activism (Powell, 2016). As far as our findings are concerned, we also gathered some evidence showing some women’s awareness of their own need for self-empowerment. In any case, the most significant element is the position they occupy as a group in the social structure. As Salemink (2016) argues, the families’ social position—gender, ethnic background, and social class—determines the digital capacities and skills of the individuals. The families of nearly all the interviewees were in receipt of welfare benefits, underlining their economic and social vulnerability. Given the evidence that these elements can hold back the development of digital skills among families at risk of social exclusion, Salemink argues that there is a particular need for digital training and empowerment. This process of empowerment is an urgent necessity requiring the provision of resources and a clear commitment from government to digital literacy, in order to minimise inequality and the knowledge divide and to foster greater social justice (Stoilova, Livingstone, & Kardefelt-Winther, 2016). If such action is not taken, the relative disadvantage suffered by Roma children in respect of their digital and social insertion is likely to increase.

The authors fully share the broad social consensus regarding education as being one of the essential pillars of the knowledge society, as well as education’s influence on social inclusion and progress (Granados, 2008, p. 440). In the future, more funding should be allocated to promoting educational activities outside the formal school system. As stated in Save the Children (2017, p. 4) report regarding increased emphasis on life-long and non-formal learning:

The widespread recognition that much education is delivering neither on the employment needs of economies, nor the social and cultural needs of young people will lead to much greater emphasis on life-long learning and the full continuum of education including non-formal learning. The important objective for childhood learning will be to give children the foundational skills to be able to learn creatively for themselves in the future. Non-formal learning and learning that takes place out of school will become increasingly recognised, with new types of certification being developed to measure and reward this. Young children will have the potential to learn wherever they are, not only in schools but also in the fields where they help sow and harvest, or on the streets where they work for a living. This kind of initiative could take a similar form to the mentorship experiences mentioned by Toyama (2015, p. 200), whose main purpose is to nurture intrinsic growth among mentors as well as mentees: “Mentorship would help people meet the substance of the aspiration. It would help people increase their knowledge, self-confidence, earning power or social influence”. Obviously, these non-formal learning initiatives could contribute to developing the Roma/Gitano children’s digital skills and, therefore, provide them with better chances to join the labour market and self-employment; as the flexible occupations they traditionally preferred are becoming more and more difficult to pursue (Powell, 2016).

We believe that effective digital inclusion initiatives for Roma/Gitano boys and girls should focus on families, outside the school environment, where people of different ages with shared needs or interests from the same community or family could learn together. A number of interesting experiments are being developed in certain autonomous communities in Spain, where the careers and achievements of people from the Roma/Gitano community are showcased and praised in order to provide children with successful role models from their own community. Therefore, ICTs can provide them with more suitable accommodation that should meet their cultural preferences (Powell, 2016).

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Risk and Culture of Health Portrayal in a U.S. Cross-Cultural TV Adaptation, a Pilot Study

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Abstract
Because media portrayal can influence adolescents’ health, we assessed the health-related content of a popular telenovela—a Spanish-language TV soap opera genre—and its widely watched English adaptation. To test our “culture of corruption” hypothesis, which predicts that the English-language adaptation of telenovelas will “Americanize” their content by increasing risky and reducing healthy portrayal on screen, we coded the depictions of five risk variables and five culture of health ones in ten episodes each of “Juana la Virgen” (2002) and its popular English-language counterpart, “Jane the Virgin” (2014). A significant increase was found between the Spanish and English-language shows in the risk category of sexual content and a marginally significant increase was found in violence. “Jane” also had larger numbers of characters modeling alcohol consumption, sex, or violence. Across culture of health variables, “Juana” and “Jane” did not exhibit significant differences in the amounts of education-related content, social cohesion, and exercise at the episode level. However, “Jane” had significantly more unhealthy food content (specifically, fats, oils, and sweets and takeout food) and more pro-health messaging than did “Juana.” “Jane” also had a larger amount of modeled food/beverage consumption. While “Juana” modeled several instances of characters involved in exercise, “Jane” had no exercise content across the sample. Overall, “Jane” portrayed more problematic health content than “Juana.” The increase in worrisome content in “Jane” may adversely affect the health of adolescent Hispanics, who make up a large part of the show’s audience.

Keywords
adolescent; content analysis; health; Hispanic; media; risk; telenovela; television

Issue
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1. Introduction
Media exposure in the United States remains high, particularly among U.S. adolescents who consume up to nine hours a day of screen-based media (Lauricella et al., 2016). Despite the increasing use of smartphones, tablets, and other digital platforms, television remains popular with U.S. audiences, who watched an average of five hours of television per day in 2016 (Nielsen, 2016). The U.S. Hispanic population has become a highly coveted demographic for the television industry. Not only has the U.S. Hispanic population increased six-fold since the early 1970s, but its expansion accounted for more than half of the country’s population growth between 2000 and 2014 (Krogstad, 2016).

The majority of Hispanic television viewing is made up of telenovelas—a Spanish-language TV soap opera genre widely viewed across Latin America, as well as in the U.S. where Hispanics watch them on major Spanish-language television networks like Univision and Telemundo. A 2016 Federal Communication Commission (FCC) study concluded that Hispanic viewers in the U.S. watched more telenovelas than any other programming (Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis, 2016). Viewership of such programs has surged both across audience age groups and within the demographic
most valued by advertisers, 18–34 year olds (Jacobson, 2012). Notably, U.S. networks are beginning to target the “billennial” audience—millenials who grow up speaking and consuming media in both English and Spanish, a demographic with growing purchasing power (Villarreal, 2015).

Major U.S. television networks began to see marketing potential in adapting the already-popular telenovela format following the success of ABC network’s “Ugly Betty” (2006). That adaptation of the hit Colombian telenovela “Yo Soy Betty, la Fea” (1999) was the first TV migration of a narrative from a Spanish-language program into a major English-language show. While a few short-lived attempts at telenovela adaptations occurred after the four-season run of “Ugly Betty”, it was not until the premiere of “Jane the Virgin” in October 2014 on the CW network that a U.S. network once again found commercial success in adapting a telenovela storyline for a U.S. audience. “Jane the Virgin” is an adaptation of “Juana la Virgen”, a 2002 telenovela series that enjoyed a highly rated run both in Venezuela on Radio Caracas Televisión and on Univision in the United States. The premiere of “Jane the Virgin” reached an audience of 1.6 million (Bibel, 2014) and the series averaged 1.2 million total viewers across its first season. To date, “Jane” not only has run for four seasons, with a fifth and final season slated to air in 2019, but has also received numerous accolades including a Golden Globe win for actress Gina Rodriguez in the role of Jane Villanueva.

TV adaptations from one culture to another, such as “Jane the Virgin”, are of particular interest because they undergo “textual changes to fit in with the prevailing values, preferences, viewing habits, and local sensibilities of the adapting culture” (Joye, Biltereyst, & Adriaens, 2017, p. 356). The process of adapting telenovelas for foreign markets is most successful when the programs have relatable global archetypes and elements in the narrative that can be localized, ultimately allowing the narrative to fit within the social fabrics of the new media landscapes they enter (Miller, 2010). In the case of “Jane the Virgin”, media flow South-to-North culturally (Miller, 2010) lends itself to potentially problematic changes, as the narrative structure transforms in order to meet American media norms.

Studies have found that the amount of portrayed risk in American media, such as television and movies, has increased in recent decades, specifically in the categories of violence (American Academy of Pediatrics, 2009), gun violence (Bushman, Jamieson, Weitz, & Romer, 2013), sex (Kunkel, Eyal, Finnerty, Biely, & Donnerstein, 2005), and alcohol use (Breed & De Foe, 1981; Russell & Russell, 2009). Adaptations, such as “Jane the Virgin”, which cross into American mainstream media could be influenced by what we refer to as a “culture of corruption”, as they interact and respond to a media landscape that features increasingly problematic content. According to uses and gratifications theory, TV audiences may be exposed to, demand more of, and subsequently watch riskier content (Rubin, 2009). Indeed, media audience members generate expectations of mass media and, in turn, engage in the selection of media to satisfy needs or desires (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973). This “audience self-selection” not only affects the types of content media producers choose to create, but also ultimately manifests itself in behavioral responses to the portrayed content that filter through relationships, personality, and social interaction. If audiences select, accommodate, seek out, and view more of such content, this theory would predict that problematic content would increase over time. Accordingly, in order to make the show marketable and increase audience share, “Jane the Virgin” would be expected to undergo narrative changes to fit the current societal standards for American media content.

Higher levels of problematic content on screen are also cause for concern because, as Bandura’s (2009) social cognitive theory of mass communication (SCTMC) suggests, after a media-portrayed act is observed and coded into memory by an audience member, it can be recalled and transformed into a re-enacted action or behavior. Meta-analyses have found that behavioral outcomes are affected by risk-taking behaviors portrayed on screen (Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Vogrincic, & Sauer, 2011). The media portrayal of alcohol (Dai Cin, Worth, Dalton, & Sargent, 2008; Hanewinkel et al., 2014), sex (Hennessy, Bleakley, Fishbein, & Jordan, 2009), and violence (Bushman & Huesmann, 2006) have been found to predict corresponding problematic health behaviors.

Cultivation theory (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2009) posits that when individuals are exposed to a consistent set of messages on television, they integrate these messages into their perception of reality. Consequently, “culture of health” content modeled on primetime television may affect perceptions and behaviors involving issues such as healthy eating or receiving medical treatment. For example, Signorielli and Lears (1992) found that television viewing, including exposure to food and beverages embedded in show narratives, was a strong predictor of poor nutritional eating habits as well as misconceptions about what constitutes a healthy meal for adolescents.

The importance of cultivation of health-related messages on television (Lee & Niederdeppe, 2011) is magnified by the finding that Hispanic audience members often rely on media-based health and medical information. Although 71% of Hispanics reported that in the past year they had obtained health information from a doctor, with a similar percentage receiving information from sources such as family, friends, and churches, 83% were found to have gained health information from media sources, predominantly television. Furthermore, 79% reported acting on media-based health information (Livingston, Minushkin, & D’Vera, 2008). As a result, telenovelas have become a stage for education-entertainment initiatives, including health-related storylines illustrating the importance of actions such as rou-
tine cancer and STD screenings. Such narratives can increase health knowledge and behavioral intent in their audiences (Forster, Allem, Mendez, Qazi, & Ungar, 2016; Wilkin et al., 2007). The quality and frequency of media-based health modeling is of importance as well because it may explain why Hispanics who have lived in the U.S. for some time are more at-risk for medical problems including obesity and heart disease (Domínguez et al., 2015) than are newly-immigrated Hispanics.

The potential contribution of a “culture of corruption” to higher levels of problematic content on television is worrisome, especially for at-risk adolescent Hispanics. Young Hispanic viewers make up a significant portion of the audience for “Jane the Virgin”. The first season of “Jane the Virgin” had about twice the rate of Hispanic viewers in the 12–18 age category as the composite audience (Nielsen, 2015). Concern is warranted especially for adolescent female Hispanic TV-watchers who may identify with the study sample’s adolescent female Hispanic protagonists, Jane and/or Juana. Young adults can engage in wishful identification with fictional television characters, especially those who are similar in gender and attitudes (Hoffner & Buchanan, 2005).

The susceptibility of Hispanic TV watchers to media’s problematic modeled content may be magnified by the fact that Hispanics are more likely to binge watch TV. In a recent study, the majority of Hispanics (60%) reported that they had watched the entire season of a TV show during a single weekend compared with 49% of non-Hispanics (Carrasco, 2015). Importantly, the serial nature of telenovelas, which often air daily and frequently contain more than one hundred episodes, could combine with binge watching to heighten problematic effects from media modeling.

Research on telenovela adaptations has been limited, in part because the number of these adapted cross-cultural shows so far is still small, especially in the United States. Studies have focused primarily on international adaptations of “Yo Soy Betty, la Fea” (McCabe & Akass, 2013) with attention to aesthetic differences (Mikos & Perrotta, 2012), the portrayal of specific national identities in those adaptations (Adriaens & Blitereyest, 2011), and how industrial logics govern the circulation of telenovelas in the English-language market (Conway, 2012). The importation of themes from Spanish telenovelas into U.S. television has been studied (Bielby & Harrington, 2005), as has how telenovela content is linked with cultural identity (Meryao, 2013; Pérez, 2005), and the production and reception of sociocultural issues in telenovelas (Acosta-Alzurru, 2010). Research has also been conducted on U.S. prime-time programming for the frequency and quality of depictions of Latinos (Hoffman & Noriega, 2004; Mastro & Behm-Morawitz, 2005; Monk-Turner, Heiserman, Johnson, Cotton & Jackson, 2010).

This pilot study aims to make a novel contribution to the literature by hypothesizing and testing whether the process of adaptation into American mainstream media is associated with more problematic health-related content in “Jane the Virgin” than in the show from which it was originally adapted, “Juana la Virgen”.

2. Method

2.1. Sample

The CHAMPION (Culture of Health and Media Project in Our Nation) content analysis project codes risk and culture of health variables in popular TV shows, including dramas, sitcoms, and telenovelas. From this latter category, ten episodes were sampled for this pilot comparison of “Jane the Virgin” and “Juana la Virgen”. Eight of these episodes were randomly selected across the 2002 airing of “Juana” and eight from the first season (2014–2015) of “Jane” (the only season available at the time of coding), with the first and last episode of each coded as well, for a total of 15 commercial-free hours of TV programming.

2.1.1. Coding

Four coders participated in this study and were blind to the study’s hypotheses. TV episodes were unitized into and then coded as 5-minute segments (i.e., a 40-minute long episode was coded as 8 segments). All four coders were trained on about 11.3 hours of content covering risk variables. The coders then completed a separate training on culture of health variables, consisting of about 10.5 hours of content. All coders met a Krippendorff’s \( \alpha \geq .80 \) for all reported study variables (Krippendorff, 2018). In order to account for the cross-language application of the study definitions (as some study variables capture verbal as well as visual content), after completing the English-language training, a subset of coders with native fluency in English and Spanish completed additional training on Spanish-language TV content for risk and culture of health variables, for a total of about 8 more hours of training. These coders also met a Krippendorff’s \( \alpha \geq .80 \) on all reported study variables. All materials used to train coders were comparable to the study content and not included in the study’s TV sample.

2.1.2. Measures

When a risk or culture of health variable was evaluated for each TV episode 5-minute segment, a code of 0 vs. 1 was recorded to indicate “any such content” present in the segment, including verbal references for some coded categories. In an effort to determine the number of characters participating in modeling a behavior (implied or shown), instances were captured for the risk categories of alcohol, drugs, sex, and violence; for culture of health variables, the coders counted instances of consumption of food and beverage as well as participation in exercise. Instances were not captured for the categories of social cohesion, education, and pro-health messaging, as...
these measures were not easily quantifiable by participant behavior and instead were captured at the 5-minute segment level as “presence of” variables. Number of instances were also coded for each portrayal per character and summed per 5-minute segment. For example, drinking a soda and then opening a second can would count as two instances. When a character simultaneously or concurrently engaged in multiple behaviors, each was counted separately (e.g., punching a character and then using a gun to wound him would count as two separate instances). A distinct interruption of scenic location or timeframe for study content within the 5-minute segment (e.g., the same character drinking at a bar and then drinking later at home) was counted as two instances in that segment. Instances for the study variables were summed for each 5-minute segment per show. T-tests were conducted for variables with “any such content” as the 5-minute segment level. Instances were described as sums and in figures.

2.2. Risk Variable Definitions

2.2.1. Alcohol

Alcohol use was defined as direct or implied consumption of alcohol by a character in a 5-minute segment and also captured verbal references to drinking. A Krippendorff’s alpha ($\kappa$) $\geq .80$ was achieved for any such content. Alcohol instances per show had an $\alpha$ reliability $\geq .83$.  

2.2.2. Drugs

Drug use included verbal references to drugs and was defined as direct or implied consumption of a drug or drug-related product. Direct consumption included characters injecting, smoking, inhaling, or snorting a drug. Indirect consumption was coded when a character was involved with or preparing drugs, for example prepping a syringe. Types of drugs coded for included marijuana, cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, acid, opiates, and inhalants. A $K_\alpha \geq .81$ was met for any such drug. Drug instances per show was $K_\alpha \geq .80$. 

2.2.3. Sexual Content

Sexual content was defined as explicit nudity or behaviors such as kissing, groping, fondling, or implied or explicit sexual intercourse. $K_\alpha$ for any such content $\geq .81$. Sex instances per show had an $\alpha$ reliability $\geq .82$. When sexual content was present, a subcategory variable captured whether intercourse was portrayed and if so, whether it was implied (i.e. characters waking up together in bed) or shown (simulated intercourse, with or without nudity). $K_\alpha$ for the intercourse subcategory was $\geq .86$. 

2.2.4. Violence

Violent content was defined as “intentional acts where the aggressor makes or attempts to make some physical contact that has potential to inflict injury or harm” and was adapted from a previously published measure (Yokota & Thompson, 2000). It excludes accidents and natural disasters. $K_\alpha$ for any such content was $\geq .83$ and for violence instances was $\geq .82$. 

2.2.5. Gun Portrayal

Gun portrayal was coded for any such content in a 5-minute segment and included situations in which a character brandishes a gun but does not fire it and scenes in which guns are visible in a non-use context, such as holstered or hanging on a wall, $K_\alpha \geq .80$. 

2.3. Culture of Health Variable Definitions

2.3.1. Food and Beverage

Food and/or beverage consumption was defined as the direct or implied consumption of food or beverage by a character and was adapted from a previously published measure (Bell, Berger, Cassady, & Townsend, 2005). Implied consumption was defined as characters not shown directly consuming food or drinking a beverage but involved with such content (i.e., holding a beverage but not seen sipping from it). $K_\alpha \geq .82$ was met for “any such food/beverage content”. Instances of food and beverage consumption also met $K_\alpha$ reliability $\geq .82$. Subtypes of food captured included: grain, fruit, vegetables, protein, dairy, and fats/oils/sweets. For beverages, these categories included: water, milk, juice, soda, coffee/tea, or alcohol. Another category captured whether food/beverage was homemade as opposed to takeout/food purchased outside the home, $K_\alpha \geq .85$. 

2.3.2. Exercise

Exercise was defined as direct or implied participation of a character in a physical activity with the shown, implied, or verbally stated purpose of fitness. $K_\alpha \geq .84$ was met for presence of any such content and $K_\alpha$ reliability $\geq .87$ for instances of modeled behavior. 

2.3.3. Social Cohesion

Social cohesion captured the portrayal of characters participating in activities which promote a shared identity specific to one of four categories. These included participation in: religious organizations/worship services or cultural practices, political organizations or community organizations, volunteer and charity organizations, and extracurricular groups including sports, $K_\alpha \geq .87$. 

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2.3.4. Education

Educational content was operationalized as students shown in a classroom receiving instruction, students shown doing homework or studying, parents reading to children, or characters casually reading, K× ≥ .81.

2.3.5. Pro-Health Messaging

The pro-health messaging category included situations in which characters were shown receiving care from a medical professional, encouraging others to seek medical advice, following medical advice/instructions, engaged in self-treatment for minor ailments, or seeking help for mental health or substance abuse problems, K× ≥ .91.

2.4. Data Analysis

SPSS 24 was used to aggregate the study variables, was used for conducting statistics, and all statistical tests were two-tailed. Because the number of episode segments compared was the same, we did not control for the length of episodes. IRB approval was not sought because the study did not involve human subjects.

3. Results

Within the ten episode sample for each show, “Jane the Virgin” had 42 “any alcohol” 5-minute segments while “Juana la Virgen” had 45 segments. Total instances of alcohol consumption in “Jane” were 128 vs. 84 in “Juana” (Figure 1). “Jane” had 43 segments of “any sexual content” and “Juana” had 12. Instances of participation in sexual behaviors were 146 in “Jane” and 47 in “Juana” (Figure 1). Of the segments featuring sexual content, “Jane” had 11 segments with intercourse implied and 3 segments with intercourse shown, while “Juana” had 6 segments with implied intercourse and no segments of shown intercourse. In the segments which featured sexual content, no mention or portrayal of safe sex practices were noted within the random sample for either show. In the drug content category, “Jane” had 7 segments with “any such content” while “Juana” had 2. No instances of drug consumption were found for either show. For the violence category, “Jane” had 20 segments with violent content and “Juana” had 7 segments. Within the segments containing violent content, “Jane” had 17 instances of characters modeling violent behavior versus 8 in “Juana” (Figure 1). Gun portrayal was featured in 13 segments in “Jane” and in 6 segments for “Juana.”

Paired-sample t-tests were conducted to compare the means of each of the five risk categories at the episode level between “Jane the Virgin” and “Juana la Virgen” to determine statistically significant differences (Table 1). Of the reported categories, a significant difference was found for sexual content (Mean = −3.10, 95%CI = (−4.47, −1.73), t(9) = −5.13, p = .001). Also, the between-show difference in violence was marginally significant (Mean = −1.30, 95%CI = (−2.73, 0.13), t(9) = −2.05, p = .070). There were no significant differences between alcohol content, drug content, or gun portrayal (Table 1).

For culture of health variables, “Jane” had 78 five-minute segments with any food or beverage content and “Juana” had 71. “Jane” had 77 instances of characters consuming food vs. 25 in “Juana” (Figure 2). For beverages, “Jane” featured 257 instances of beverage consumption while “Juana” had 121 instances (Figure 2). Of the food portrayed, “Jane” had 22 segments featuring unhealthy food content subcategories (specifically “fats, oils, and sweets”) and “Juana” had a total of 11 segments with unhealthy food content. The adaptation “Jane” also featured 22 segments with takeout/restaurant food vs. 4 segments with such content in “Juana.”

Educational content was featured in 7 segments in “Jane” and 12 segments in “Juana.” The random sample for “Jane” did not

![Figure 1. Risk variable instances summed per TV show.](image-url)
Table 1. Risk categories for “Jane the Virgin” v. “Juana la Virgen” (paired t-tests).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Std. error mean</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol content</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>−1.21</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>.664</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual content</td>
<td>−3.10</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>−4.47</td>
<td>−1.73</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>−5.13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug content</td>
<td>−.50</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>−1.20</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>−1.63</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td>−1.30</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>−2.73</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>−2.05</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun portrayal</td>
<td>−.70</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>−1.87</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>−1.35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Culture of health variable instances summed per TV show.

Table 2. Culture of health categories for “Jane the Virgin” v. “Juana la Virgen” (paired t-tests).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture of health variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Std. error mean</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Upper</th>
<th>p-value</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food/beverage</td>
<td>−.10</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>−.34</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.383</td>
<td>−.92</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall portrayal</td>
<td>−.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>−.24</td>
<td>−.00</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>−2.28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fats/oils/sweets</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.28</td>
<td>−.12</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>−5.53</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takeout food</td>
<td>−.20</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.02</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>−.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.660</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>−.04</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.220</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-health messaging</td>
<td>−.17</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>−.33</td>
<td>−.01</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>−2.35</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

include any segments with exercise. “Juana,” however, had 7 segments featuring exercise content and a total of 35 instances of characters modeling exercise on screen (Figure 2). A nominal number of segments was found containing social cohesion content for both shows: 2 segments in “Jane” and 4 segments in “Juana.” Pro-health messaging was present in 25 segments in “Jane” and in 10 segments for “Juana”.

Paired sample t-tests were also conducted on culture of health category variables between shows (Table 2). “Jane” had significantly more fats/oils/sweets as a food subtype than “Juana” (Mean = −.12, 95%CI = (−.24,
“Jane the Virgin” had significantly more 5-minute segments with sexual content and marginally more violence than “Juana la Virgen” (Table 1). “Jane” also had more total instances of characters modeling alcohol consumption, sex, and violent behavior (Figure 1). Across several of the culture of health variables, “Jane” and “Juana” had amounts of content that were not statistically significant in their differences (education, social cohesion, and exercise) with the exception of pro-health messaging and the negative “culture of health” food subcategories fats/oils/sweets and takeout food (Table 2). “Jane” exceeded “Juana” in total instances of characters consuming any food or beverage. “Juana” had 35 instances of characters modeling exercise while “Jane” did not portray any exercise content (Figure 2). Hence, “Jane the Virgin” had more negative health content overall than “Juana la Virgen”. The difference in problematic content in “Jane the Virgin” could indicate the influence of American audience expectations on the narrative. Adapting a show, like “Jane the Virgin”, to fit within a media landscape that is already saturated with increasingly problematic portrayals may ultimately lead to negative health consequences for the at-risk populations viewing such content, leading to reenactment of risky behaviors such as alcohol consumption, drug use, sex, and violence or other negative culture of health behaviors such as unhealthy eating. However, if TV shows model more positive behaviors such as promoting social cohesion and prosocial interactions (Mares & Woodard, 2005), or reinforce the importance of education or healthcare (Brodie et al., 2001), these positive behaviors and attitudes could also be cultivated in TV audiences.

Plot and character changes that occurred during the process of cross-cultural adaptation may explain why more risk and fewer positive culture of health portrayals exist on screen in “Jane the Virgin” than in the original telenovela “Juana la Virgen.” In order to complement the study’s analysis of health content per 5-minute segment, these changes are explained at the narrative level. Both programs share a similar overarching plot—a religious, sexually inexperienced young woman is accidentally artificially inseminated as a result of a mistake by a gynecologist during a doctor’s appointment. However, Juana and Jane, the main protagonists in the telenovela and its adaptation, differ significantly in their on-screen portrayal. Juana Perez is a 17-year-old academically accomplished high school student and the star of her high school’s soccer team. As a result, Juana’s character and situation in the Spanish-language telenovela are more suited to depictions of education (as Juana is seen frequently at her school), as well as exercise and social cohesion as a result of Juana practicing for and competing in soccer matches with her team. Juana’s mother, Ana Maria, is a physical education teacher at the high school as well, a factor that opens the plot to more frequent portrayal of exercise and education. This is evident in the study’s sample, which featured 35 instances of characters modeling exercise in “Juana” while “Jane” included no such content. This is consistent with the “culture of corruption” hypothesis, which would predict less positive health content in the later TV adaptation as a result of the narrative migration.

In contrast, Jane is a 24-year-old college student studying English and aspiring to be a romance novelist. Not only does her character’s older age make it appropriate for her to drink and serve alcohol, but Jane is also featured working part-time as a waitress at the Marbella to pay her way through college. The Marbella, a ritzy Miami hotel known for its lavish large-scale parties, becomes a central fixture for the show. Jane frequently works these parties, which feature large amounts of alcohol consumption on screen. As the primary backdrop for the show, Jane’s presence at the Marbella also likely led to the disparity between the telenovela and the adaptation in portrayal of unhealthy eating, because much of the food consumed on screen is from the hotel restaurant.

The English-language adaptation also introduces into the plot a boyfriend for Jane—Michael Cordero—who is a gun-carrying Miami police detective and involved in investigating a drug ring and several murders that take place at the Marbella. These plot changes entailed higher levels of risky content on screen, particularly in the categories of sexual content, drugs, and violence related to the crime narrative. In contrast, Juana abstains in the original program from romantic relationships of any sort in order to keep herself from being distracted from her goal of receiving a scholarship to study photography in the United States.

Variations between the two stories may also account for differences in the pro-health messaging content between “Jane” and “Juana.” Specifically, the two programs approach the unexpected pregnancy narrative in different ways. When Juana discovers that she has accidentally become pregnant, she attempts to hide it from her family and friends. Indeed, to avoid the social stigma associated with teen pregnancy, she even flees from her home. Thus, Juana is not shown receiving regular medical care for her pregnancy, a fact that decreased the likelihood of pro-health messaging on screen. In contrast, Jane finds out about her pregnancy with her mother present. Rather than hiding her pregnancy from others, she actively seeks the support of her family and the child’s father and is shown regularly attending doctor appointments and following prenatal advice. These exam-
plas make it evident that risk and culture of health content on screen can be increased or decreased depending on the deliberate choices made when changing the narrative structure or character profiles in a show adaptation.

It is important to consider the potential effects of the heightened problematic content in “Jane the Virgin” on the Hispanic adolescent population, which is a majority of the show’s audience. Television programming that depicts alcohol consumption may promote an increase in drinking by the target audience; (Dal Cin et al., 2008; Hanewinkel et al., 2014). While Hispanics are less likely to drink alcohol than are non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics who do engage in drinking are more likely to consume more alcohol than other demographic groups (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 2015). Importantly, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism recognizes acculturation as a major factor in predicting drinking patterns in the U.S. Hispanic community (NIAAA, 2015); this acculturation includes exposure to Americanized media. In light of recent research indicating that the safest level of alcohol consumption is no consumption (GBD, 2016; Alcohol Collaborators, 2018), concern is warranted especially when a show, such as “Jane the Virgin”, models significant instances of characters drinking on screen, even within a ten episode sample. While arguably Jane’s character is of appropriate age and can be shown both consuming and handling alcohol, modeling alcohol use to the adolescents who make up the audience of the show may promote underage drinking, an undesirable outcome.

The show “Jane the Virgin”, which models three times the amount of character engagement in sexual content than its originating program, also may promote adolescent audience engagement in similar behavior without mitigating these risks by depicting the use of safe sex practices. TV portrayal also predicts sexual-related health (Hennessy et al., 2009). Adolescents who view more sexual content on television have been shown to be more likely to progress in the participation of non-coital activities and to have sex earlier (Collins et al., 2004). Moreover, exposure to television programming that only talks about or mentions sex and sexual activities as opposed to showing intercourse actively on screen is associated with the same risks (Collins et al., 2004). Sexually transmitted diseases and unplanned pregnancies are also more common among individuals who begin sexual activity early (Koyle, Jensen, Olsen, & Cundick, 1989). Sexually transmitted infections are prevalent among adolescents ages 15–24 and account for half of almost 20 million annual infections (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2016). In 2014 alone, U.S. Hispanics averaged almost two times the rates of gonorrhea, chlamydia, and syphilis cases as non-Hispanic whites. And while Hispanics make up around 17% of the U.S. population, they accounted for about 23% of HIV diagnoses in 2014 (CDC, 2014).

Violent content and gun portrayal in “Jane the Virgin” may also promote acceptance of violence and predict reenactments of such behaviors (Bushman & Huesmann, 2006). This is important because violence continues to be a major public health problem for U.S. Hispanics in general and Hispanic adolescents in particular. Despite indications of a decline in overall violent crimes in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017), between 1999 and 2015, nearly 54,000 Hispanics were killed by guns, with 3,300 Hispanic victims of gun violence in 2015 alone (Violence Policy Center, 2018). Of these, 66% were homicide-related and the rates of Hispanic homicide victimization were almost double that of non-Hispanic whites. Importantly, homicide is the second leading cause of death for Hispanics age 15–24 (Violence Policy Center, 2018). A media landscape with frequently portrayed violent content may be detrimental to at-risk youth viewers. The well-documented weapons effect (Anderson, Benjamin Jr., & Bartholow, 1998; Berkowitz & LePage, 1967; Leyens & Parke, 1975) indicates that the mere presence of guns, whether in use or non-use settings, can increase aggression in audiences. Hence, care should be taken to reduce the amount of gun portrayal on television, both in “Jane the Virgin” and in other shows targeting youths and Hispanic adolescents specifically, given their population’s already-elevated risk of victimization from violence.

Because Hispanic adolescents are at an elevated risk for obesity, the role and frequency of unhealthy eating content in “Jane” is of concern as well. According to the CDC (2017a), the prevalence of childhood and adolescent obesity is higher among Hispanics than among non-Hispanic whites (21.9% vs. 14.7%). This is important because of the link between being overweight and developing diabetes. An estimated 30.3 million people across all ages in the U.S. have diabetes. From 2011–2014, diagnosed and undiagnosed diabetes cases were higher among U.S. minority groups, particularly Hispanics, compared with non-Hispanic whites (CDC, 2017b).

Despite this increased problematic content, there may be positive effects on the audience from the increased pro-health messaging depicted on screen in “Jane the Virgin”. This includes scenes modeling regularly attending doctor’s appointments, following medical instruction and advice (especially as related to pregnancy), and seeking support from social networks to deal with health consequences. Ultimately, producers of television programming should be informed that adolescents in general, including adolescent Hispanics, may be negatively affected by increases in the portrayal of negative health content on shows such as “Jane the Virgin”, achieved through both plot devices and set design choices. Conscious helpful decisions can be made when preparing a narrative for adaptation to decrease the amount of negative health content on screen and increase positive and healthy depictions.

This pilot study has strengths and limitations. A strength is that it evaluated a novel popular sample and coded it with high reliability (i.e., $\alpha \geq .80$) for both risk and culture of health content in Spanish and in English.
Its limitations include having a necessarily small sample, 20 total TV episodes (a byproduct of availability at the time of coding), and only drawing from a single genre—telenovelas. Future research should quantitatively test the study hypothesis using larger sample sizes. Whether such results from one telenovela adaptation can be replicated and generalized across other TV adaptations and genres could also be determined. Controlling for age, gender, education, racial-ethnic-identity, SES, various political attitudes, and the use of multiple media, including social media such as YouTube.com, Facebook, and Twitter is important. Future research could also determine how such TV exposure may help or harm the long-term health of at-risk adolescent Hispanic audiences.

In conclusion, although there were some positive health portrayals in “Jane the Virgin”, this study found more problematic health content in the program than in the original telenovela from which it was adapted. The findings provide some initial support for our proposed “culture of corruption” hypothesis, which posits that the “Americanization” of the Spanish-language telenovela may result in increased media portrayal of problematic content, which could in turn adversely affect its adolescent Hispanic audiences.

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Conflicts of interest

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Unpacking Attitudes on Immigrants and Refugees: A Focus on Household Composition and News Media Consumption

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Abstract
This study examines how household composition and news media consumption and trust are related to attitudes towards two minority groups—immigrants and refugees—in a representative sample of the adult population (n = 6000) in Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands. We find that Swedes hold the most positive attitudes towards both groups, while the French are found to be most negative. The Belgians and Dutch hold moderate attitudes. There is also evidence that attitudes on refugees are more negative than attitudes on immigrants in Sweden and France, but not in Belgium and the Netherlands. Using structural equation modeling, we find that household composition is not directly related to attitudes, but indirect effects through socio-economic status and media consumption indicate that singles hold more negative attitudes than couples. Public television consumption, popular online news consumption, and trust in media are positively related to attitudes, whereas commercial television consumption is negatively associated with them.

Keywords
attitudes; household composition; immigrant; media trust; news media consumption; refugees; socio-economic status

1. Introduction
Research has shown that households are hubs of attitude formation, innovation, and diffusion, as household members socialize one another (Roest, Dubas, Gerris, & Engels, 2009; Woelfel & Haller, 1971). This socialization shapes attitudes on a number of ideological domains (e.g., gender, politics, religion) (Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986; Moen, Erickson, & Dempster-McClain, 1997; Sabatier & Lannegrand-Willems, 2005). Different household configurations result in different value orientations as the presence of either one or two parents, or the (possible) presence of (multiple) children in a household context modifies the way in which family members interact and transmit values to one another (Albanese, De Blasio, & Sestito, 2016; Sabatier & Lannegrand-Willems, 2005). Several studies, mainly on adolescents’ attitudes towards family formation, have found diverging attitudes by marital status (Axinn & Thornton, 1996; Trent & South, 1992). Dronkers (2016) investigated the effect of household composition on adolescents’ attitudes on equal rights for ethnic groups in 22 European countries, noting strong differences between adolescents living in two-parent families and those living in other household types. Other literature has shown that individuals who are cohabitating with their partner tend to hold more progressive attitudes in terms of religion, gender, and family roles than partners who are married (Smock, 2000). Despite the increasing importance of the migration issue, there is no research on the
relationship between household composition and attitudes towards minority groups. There is some preliminary evidence of indirect effects, with socio-economic status (SES) playing an important role. SES relates to both household composition (Esping-Andersen, 2016) and migration attitudes (Butkus, Maciulyte-Sniukiene, & Matuzeviciute, 2016; Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015). There are also country differences in both household composition and migration issues. For household composition, we find that nearly 60% of Swedish households in 2016 were either singles or single parents, while this percentage was nearly 20% lower for Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. The share of couples with children in households is also lower for Sweden than for the other three countries (European Commission, 2017). The Swedish population will be transformed by the consequences of migration over the next decades, as a majority of the population is projected to be Muslim or of non-native descent by 2065 (Tarvainen, 2018). Comparable figures for the other countries are below 20% (Pew Research Center, 2017). These country differences highlight the need for cross-country comparison.

News media also play a major role in attitude formation, as they can contribute to or prevent the stereotyping of (sub)groups in the population (Segijn, Bartholomé, Pennekamp, & Timmers, 2014). In the case of immigrants and refugees, many people still have limited face-to-face interactions with these groups. As news media consumption is their main mode of contact with these groups, their attitudes are largely determined by news media's representation of these groups (Bleich, Bloemraad, & de Graauw, 2015; Browne Graves, 1999; Holtzman, 2004; Jacobs, Claes, & Hooghe, 2015; Jacobs, Hooghe, & de Vroome, 2017; Joyce & Harwood, 2014; Norris, 2000; Troyna, 1981). This is not a uniform relationship, as news media differ in their representational preferences. Although neither type of news media is particularly positive in their representation of minority groups (Van Gorp, 2005), coverage on public service media is found to be more positive than on commercial media (Jacobs, Meeusen, & d'Haenens, 2016). This is also reflected in the attitudes of audiences, with more negative attitudes reported by commercial media consumers than public service media consumers (Jacobs et al., 2016).

Closely related to news media consumption is the audience's trust in news media. According to uses and gratifications and media selection theories, people use media to satisfy needs and select media which (in their estimation) can do so (Blumler & Katz, 1974; Williams, 2012). When people mistrust mainstream news media, they will seek out other sources of information such as alternative media (e.g., social media) or real-life information (Jackob, 2010). For the countries in our study, we find that trust in news media is generally high. According to Eurobarometer results of 2016, 77% of Swedes, 73% of the Dutch, and 64% of Belgians believe that their national media provide trustworthy information. However, media trust in France is far lower, as only 34% of the population believe their media is trustworthy (European Commission, 2016). This while the average European trust in news media lies at 53%. Studies have shown that people who consider news media to be credible are more likely to have their personal agendas influenced by media coverage (Wanta & Hu, 1994; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993). Trust also varies by medium, as there is a large variety of conflicting evidence detailing which medium (television, radio, print, or online) is considered more trustworthy (Kiousis, 2001). Radio is considered the most reliable medium in all countries in our study, while television is considered the least reliable medium in the Netherlands and France, and newspapers the least reliable medium in Sweden and Belgium (European Commission, 2016).

With the recent refugee crisis into Europe, scholarly interest in European attitudes regarding minority groups has increased. Studies find that Swedes, along with inhabitants of other Scandinavian countries, hold the most positive attitudes towards minority groups. Other European countries, including Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, occupy a moderate position (Ford & Lymeropolou, 2017; Jacobs, Wuyts, & Loosveldt, 2017). However, attitudes are not the same for all types of newcomers. Europeans are found to be more tolerant of immigrants with the same ethnicity as the majority of the population in the host country and coming from another European country, than they are of immigrants with a different ethnic background and originating from countries outside Europe. Comparative research on refugee and immigrant attitudes is very limited. When it comes to immigrants, the French hold more negative attitudes than the Belgians and the Dutch. However, the French are more positive towards refugees than either the Belgians or the Dutch (Heath & Richards, 2016; Jacobs et al., 2017). For a majority of Swedes, immigrants from non-EU countries provoke fairly to very positive feelings. Belgian and Dutch people hold more negative attitudes concerning refugees than the European average, whereas Swedish and French citizens clearly have more positive attitudes (Jacobs et al., 2017). Therefore, when researching the attitudes on migrant groups, it is important to make a distinction between refugees and immigrants.

In the current study, we will focus on the relationship between household composition, news media consumption and trust on the one hand, and attitudes on immigrants and refugees on the other. In a sample (representative for gender and age) of Belgian, Swedish, French, and Dutch adults, aged 18–65 years old. With the increasing presence of minority groups in Europe, studies have shown that attitudes on these groups are increasingly polarized (Leeper, 2014). Despite this trend, there is no research on the direct relationship between household composition and towards on immigrants and refugees. Following Prokic and Dronkers’s (2009) study of the effect of parental divorce on adolescents’ attitudes, we argue that different household compositions will impact household members’ attitudes on societal aspects such...
as migration. We also want to look at variation between countries. As the literature indicates Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands differ in attitudes on immigrants (Ford & Lymeropoulos, 2017) and refugees (Jacobs et al., 2017), we want to know if this is the case for our sample as well. Thus, we address the following research questions:

RQ1. To what extent does household composition impact attitudes with regard to immigrants and refugees?
RQ2. To what extent do news media consumption and trust in news media influence attitudes with regard to immigrants and refugees?
RQ3. In what way are Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands similar or different with regard to attitudes on immigrants and refugees?

2. Data and Methodology

We distributed an online questionnaire to adults aged 18 to 65 in Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands, in September and October of 2017. The countries in our study were chosen for a number of reasons. Sweden was selected for its reputation of holding the most positive attitudes on newcomers in all of Europe. France and the Netherlands were selected based on their recent history (or lack thereof) with terror attacks, which (in combination with news media coverage on these events) may affect attitudes. France has experienced several terror events in the past few years, whilst the Netherlands has been spared any major attack. Belgium is included because its central location in Europe made it the main country through which refugees attempted to enter the United Kingdom following the closing of the Calais refugee camp. It has also suffered a major terror event, although not on the same scale as France. We conducted online polling as our method because of its (cost) efficiency in cross-country research. Fieldwork lasted for three weeks, at which point we had a sample size of 6,000 respondents—1,500 per country. We cooperated with a Belgian polling agency and its international partners, which drew the sample out of their panels. Respondents were contacted through e-mail with the request to cooperate in a study. To avoid priming, the specific subject of investigation was not specified beforehand. Responses were weighted by gender and age. The questionnaire was distributed in Dutch, French, and Swedish. In Belgium, respondents were given the option to complete the questionnaire in Dutch (n = 905) or French (n = 595), depending on their language proficiency (De Coninck et al., 2018).

Respondents were queried on their gender, birth year, total net household income, educational attainment or current educational enrolment, and country of birth of parents and grandparents. The mean age of respondents was 43.3 years. SES was measured with responses on the total net household income per month (totaling all labor, property and/or replacement income). 11.5% of the sample did not wish to reveal this information, and an additional 4.6% did not know this information. Educational attainment is based on two indicators: the respondents’ highest educational attainment or (if they are still enrolled) their current educational programme. Migration background was constructed from data on the (grand)parents’ countries of birth. If both parents, one parent and at least two grandparents, or no parents and more than two grandparents of a respondent were born outside of the country the respondent currently resides in, they were considered to have a migration background. A descriptive overview of our sample can be found in Table 1.

2.1. Description of the Structural Equation Model and Variable Summary

Our statistical model is a non-normal structural equation measurement model that estimates which elements of household composition, media consumption and trust, or socio-demographic indicators impact attitudes on immigrants or on refugees. Respondents were asked to provide a detailed outline of all individuals in their house-
We relate trust in news media directly to attitudes in our region with several outlets (adapted for the region in question) we adopted four manifest variables on television and were asked about their news media consumption patterns with these minority groups means that news media is adapted from a rotating module of the European Social Survey in round 1 (2002) and round 7 (2014). The scale consists of seven items asking which groups of migrants should be allowed to come and live in Belgium. Answer categories range from “1 = Allow none” to “4 = Allow many”. For our study, we presented the scale in its original form and added an extra item concerning immigrants from Muslim countries because a majority of immigrants and refugees entering Europe in the current refugee crisis originate from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan—predominantly Muslim countries (Pew Research Center, 2017). The parallel version of this scale simply substituted “refugee” for “immigrant”. Prior to completing each block of items, cases were presented with a definition of immigrants and refugees from the United Nations with the request they keep this definition in mind during completion of the questionnaire. The definition of immigrants was as follows:

An immigrant should be understood as covering all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned, for reasons of ‘personal convenience’ and without intervention of an external compelling reason (e.g., war, natural disaster). (UNESCO, 2017, para. 3)

The definition of refugees was:

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. (United Nations, 1951, p. 14)

Following exploratory factor analysis, we find high alpha values for both scales (respectively .94 and .96), which indicates strong internal consistency.

Table 2 shows the reliability, standardized loadings, and mean item scores of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for the three latent constructs.

Prior to estimating the structural equation model, we will carry out a comparison of means between Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands for items on immigrant attitudes and refugee attitudes. Belgium, the country with moderate attitudes towards both groups, serves

hold: no one, a partner with whom the respondent is married, a partner with whom the respondent is not married, children that the respondent has with their current partner, children that the respondent has with a previous partner, children of the current partner from a previous relationship, parents, parents-in-law, grandchild(ren), other family members, or other non-family members. This information was recoded to three dummy variables: living with children, living with a partner, and living with parents(-in-law). We anticipate household composition will be directly related to immigrant and refugee attitudes because literature indicates that numerous attitudes are formed and adapted through socialization by individuals in the household (Sabatier & Lannegrand-Willems, 2005). As household composition is related to SES (Esping-Andersen, 2016), this relationship will also be estimated along with the relationship between household composition and news media consumption.

We also suspect media consumption to directly influence attitudes, since the public’s limited real-life contact with these minority groups means that news media is their main mode of contact (Jacobs et al., 2015; Joyce & Harwood, 2014). Our expectation is that the representational preferences of news media also play a role in this regard (Jacobs et al., 2016), which is why we treat news media consumption in a detailed manner. Respondents were asked about their news media consumption pattern during the past month, with answer categories ranging from “0 = Never” to “7 = Every day”. Both television and radio news consumption were split into two groups: public service and commercial. Based on this division, we adopted four manifest variables on television and radio news media consumption. Newspaper and online news consumption were presented on the same scale, with several outlets (adapted for the region in question) of each print medium presented to respondents. They could then indicate how much they consumed of each brand of written (online) media. From this information, we calculated a mean score of quality and popular (online) news media consumption. This typology is based on Belgian literature that distinguishes quality newspapers from popular ones (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010), and our interpretation of this division in other countries. We relate trust in news media directly to attitudes in our model, as Wanta and Hu (1994) have found that attitude adaptation is related to the degree of trust that individuals have in their news media. We measured trust in news media by means of a five-point scale with answer categories ranging from “1 = No trust at all” to “5 = A lot of trust”. Each item measured trust for the different news media outlets we adopted as manifest variables. This latent construct is reliably measured (alpha = 0.93).

All socio-demographic indicators presented in Table 1 will also be directly related to attitudes, as these indicators have been found to relate to immigrant and/or refugee attitudes in previous literature (Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Eschholz, Chiricos, & Gertz, 2003; Lancee & Sarrasin, 2015). We also suspect that some of these indicators differ by media consumption, and therefore, estimate the relationship between these indicators and media consumption in our model. Age, SES (as measured through income), and educational attainment were included as metric variables. In order to ensure a valid estimation of our structural model, we applied mean imputation to missing cases for SES, educational attainment, and migration background.

The two latent constructs we will use as dependent variables are attitudes towards immigrants and attitudes towards refugees. These are measured with a scale adapted from a rotating module of the European Social Survey in round 1 (2002) and round 7 (2014). The scale consists of seven items asking which groups of immigrants should be allowed to come and live in Belgium. Answer categories range from “1 = Allow none” to “4 = Allow many”. For our study, we presented the scale in its original form and added an extra item concerning immigrants from Muslim countries because a majority of immigrants and refugees entering Europe in the current refugee crisis originate from Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan—predominantly Muslim countries (Pew Research Center, 2017). The parallel version of this scale simply substituted “refugee” for “immigrant”. Prior to completing each block of items, cases were presented with a definition of immigrants and refugees from the United Nations with the request they keep this definition in mind during completion of the questionnaire. The definition of immigrants was as follows:

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The definition of refugees was:

A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. (United Nations, 1951, p. 14)

Following exploratory factor analysis, we find high alpha values for both scales (respectively .94 and .96), which indicates strong internal consistency.

Table 2 shows the reliability, standardized loadings, and mean item scores of the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses for the three latent constructs.

Prior to estimating the structural equation model, we will carry out a comparison of means between Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands for items on immigrant attitudes and refugee attitudes. Belgium, the country with moderate attitudes towards both groups, serves
Table 2. Latent construct measurement overview: confirmatory factor analysis and reliability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item description</th>
<th>Standardized loading</th>
<th>Mean item score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>F1. Attitudes on immigrants (α = .94)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of a different race or ethnicity than most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the richer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the poorer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the richer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the poorer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants coming from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country].</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F2. Attitudes on refugees (α = .96)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the same race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of a different race or ethnicity than most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the richer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the poorer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the richer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the poorer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees coming from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country].</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>F3. Trust in news media (α = .93)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in public service media—television</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in commercial media—television</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in public service media—radio</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in commercial media—radio</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in popular newspapers</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in quality newspapers</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in online newspapers/apps</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as the benchmark. Then we estimate the intra-class correlation coefficient to gauge if there is sufficient variance at the country level to perform multigroup structural equation modelling (Hox, Moerbeek, & van de Schoot, 2010). Depending on intra-class correlation coefficient, we then perform structural equation modeling for all countries combined or for each country separately.

3. Results

The results in Table 3 indicate that there are significant attitude differences between countries. With Belgium as the benchmark, we note that Sweden has significantly higher means on all items for both immigrants and refugees—indicating more positive attitudes. France is more negative, with significantly lower scores on all but one item. Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands seem limited, with fewer significant and smaller mean differences. Despite these descriptive differences, multilevel analysis showed that the intra-class correlation coefficient was below 5% for both immigrant and refugee attitudes, indicating insufficient variance at the country level to warrant multi-level modeling. Contact the authors for more information on the individual country analyses.

Using the Calis procedure in SAS, we estimated a structural equation model—see Figure 1. Our model shows an acceptable fit with a RMSEA of .0491, a Chi-square ratio of 1.46, a goodness-of-fit-index (GFI) of .99, a comparative fit index (CFI) of .98, a parsimony normed fit index (NFI) of .98, and a non-normed fit index (NNFI) of .97.

We now report on the estimated causal paths in our model. We find that SES is significantly related to household composition: living with a partner has the strongest positive impact on SES but living with children and living with parents-(in-law) are also found to relate positively. In terms of media consumption, the presence of children in the household has a significant negative association with public television consumption and a small yet positive association with public radio news consumption. The presence of parents relates positively to all television and radio news consumption, with the strongest association found for public service television consumption. As for living with a partner, we find that this relates positively to both types of television consumption and is negatively associated with newspaper consumption. Household composition does not relate to online news media consumption. Men in our sample consume more news media of all types than women. This pattern is especially pronounced for online news media consumption. Effect sizes also indicate the gender difference is larger for public service and quality news than for commercial and popular news. SES is positively related to all news media consumption (higher SES corresponds to higher media consumption in our sample). This is especially so for public
Table 3. Belgian mean of items on immigrant attitudes and refugee attitudes and other countries’ deviation from Belgian mean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item description</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>F1. Attitudes on immigrants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of same race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>.28***</td>
<td>−.08***</td>
<td>−.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of a different race or ethnicity than most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>−.06**</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the richer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>.24***</td>
<td>−.05*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the poorer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.27***</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the richer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<td>.07**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrants of the poorer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.30***</td>
<td>−.06**</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants coming from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country].</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td>−.06**</td>
<td>.03</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>F2. Attitudes on refugees</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the same race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>−.09***</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of a different race or ethnicity than most of [country]’s population.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.25***</td>
<td>−.11***</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees of the richer countries in Europe.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.23***</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees of the poorer countries in Europe.</td>
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<td>.24***</td>
<td>−.11***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Refugees of the richer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>−.11***</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Refugees of the poorer countries outside Europe.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>.26***</td>
<td>−.11***</td>
<td>.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees coming from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country].</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>.29***</td>
<td>−.08**</td>
<td>.07**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001.

Figure 1. Measurement model for household composition, socio-demographics, news media consumption and trust, and immigrant and refugee attitudes. Note: Only significant relations (p < 0.05) are drawn. Standardized estimates are presented. For full results, please consult the appendix. The reference category for ‘Gender’ = Male, and for ‘Migration background’ = No migration background. Green arrows and circles were drawn to illustrate associations between household composition and media consumption, with the aim of distinguishing them from other relations.
television consumption, radio consumption and quality (online) news consumption. The association of SES with commercial broadcasters and popular written media is much less pronounced. For educational attainment, we note a positive relation only with both types of public service news consumption.

Concerning the results for immigrant attitudes and refugee attitudes, we find significant differences by the respondents’ migration background. People with a migration background hold more positive attitudes towards both immigrants and refugees than those without. No other socio-demographic characteristic relates directly to attitudes in this model. Furthermore, public service television news consumption is positively associated with attitudes, whereas commercial television news consumption negatively relates to both sets of attitudes. Public radio consumption has a limited positive association with refugee attitudes only. These results also suggest that television and radio news consumption have the similar effect sizes for both sets of attitudes. Popular online news consumption has a positive impact on both attitudes, with a larger effect size for refugee attitudes. Finally, trust in news media is found to have a positive impact on both sets of attitudes. Attitudes on refugees are more strongly associated with trust in news media than attitudes on immigrants are. For complete results, see Table 4 (Appendix).

In sum, we find no direct effect of household composition on attitudes. Indirect effects are present through SES, with a strong positive effect for living with partner, and media consumption, with the strongest positive effect found for living with parents(-in-law) (RQ1). Public service television consumption is positively associated with both sets of attitudes, but commercial television consumption is negatively related to both. Public service radio consumption is positively related only to refugee attitudes. In terms of written media, popular online news consumption is positively related to both sets of attitudes (RQ2). When comparing attitudes, we find that Sweden is found to be the most positive of the four countries. Belgium and the Netherlands hold moderate positions, and France is the most negative. In Sweden and France there is also some evidence that attitudes towards refugees are more negative than attitudes towards immigrants (RQ3).

4. Discussion

With the recent influx of refugees into Western Europe, scholarly and societal interest about attitudes towards refugees and other minority groups has increased. Attitude formation is influenced by a number of actors. Literature identifies the household as an important context in this regard, as household members socialize one another and influence attitudes on a number of domains (Roest et al., 2009; Sabatier & Lannegrand-Willems, 2005). News media also affect attitudes of its public. This is especially the case for attitudes on minority groups, as much of the public has rather limited real-life contact with these groups. For many people, attitudes are largely based on news media representations (Bleich et al., 2015). We focused on two minority groups, immigrants and refugees and considered the influence of household composition and media consumption and trust on public opinion on these two groups in the adult population in Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands. This research provides new insights into the relationship between household composition and attitudes on minority groups, as well as a more detailed breakdown of these attitudes (immigrant versus refugee attitudes) by media consumption pattern.

Our results indicate significant attitude differences between the four countries. Swedes hold the most positive attitudes towards both immigrants and refugees. The French have the most negative attitudes, with Belgians and the Dutch maintaining intermediate positions. This pattern echoes prior studies of attitude differences between these countries (Ford & Lymeropoulos, 2017; Heath & Richards, 2016; Jacobs et al., 2017). Some previous evidence suggests that French citizens hold more positive refugee attitudes than Belgians and the Dutch (Jacobs et al., 2017), but this does appear in our results. This may be related to recent terror attacks in France, perpetrated by individuals who posed as refugees. Belgium and Sweden were also affected by this phenomenon, but attacks occurred more frequently and were more severe in France. For both Sweden and France, we also find more negative attitudes towards refugees than towards immigrants—which may again be related to the specter of terrorism by supposed refugees. The negative attitudes may also have to do with the large numbers of refugees that citizens have been exposed to ever since the height of the 2015 European refugee crisis, especially in cities and through sustained media exposure. Nevertheless, the fact that people mentally separate refugees from terrorists may be due to exposure to a nuanced and diverse news media coverage.

Our data contained insufficient variance at the country level to justify multilevel analysis. Belgium and the Netherlands in particular hold very similar attitudes, and although France proves to be consistently more negative, it does not deviate from Belgium much in terms of item means. This makes Sweden the country with the most distinct attitudes, but this differential may be insufficient to impact the intra-class correlation coefficient. The SEM-model indicates that household composition is strongly associated with SES, as indicated by literature (Esping-Andersen, 2016). The presence of a partner is found to have a stronger (positive) association with SES than living with children and living with parents(-in-law). This is no surprise, as cohabiting or married partners benefit from an economy of scale due to the pooling of their (financial) resources (e.g. wages). Living with children sometimes has the opposite effect and puts a strain on the household income, while respondents who live with their parents are mostly young people who are still
studying or have not yet been employed for a long time. In terms of media consumption, the presence of a partner positively impacts television news consumption and negatively relates to newspaper consumption. A reason for this may be that individuals become unintentional news viewers when they cohabit with a partner. If one’s partner is watching the news on television, then they may follow suit, even if they initially did not intend to do so. After some time, it may become a habit or routine to watch the news with a partner. Living with parents is positively associated with traditional media consumption, with larger effect sizes for public news consumption than for commercial news consumption. A possible explanation for this may be that these (mostly young) respondents live with their parents and are therefore consuming much of the same media their parents are consuming. As noted in the results, age is positively associated with traditional media consumption, and public service news consumption in particular. These results point to a large consumption of public service media in households where young people older than age 18 are living with their parents. The presence of children is associated with decreased public television news consumption only. Previous studies have found that children consume more commercial broadcasting than public broadcasting. When parents then observe their children watching commercial television, they may be less likely to actively change the channel to a public broadcasting station, but rather leave it as is. The fact that the children’s channel of many public broadcasters is not on the same channel as the main public broadcasting programming may also contribute to this relationship, as parents would have to actively change back to their main public broadcasting channel when they see the children’s channel in use. We find no direct relationship between household composition and attitudes towards immigrants or refugees. We find that it is mostly through indirect effects (in this case via SES and news media consumption) that household composition relates to such attitudes.

In addition to household composition, we find that age, gender, SES, and educational attainment all relate to media consumption. Age mainly relates to traditional media consumption, with the largest (positive) associations with public service news consumption. For print media, age has a significant positive impact on (particularly quality) newspaper consumption only. Women are generally found to consume less news media than men. This is most pronounced for public service media consumption and quality (online) newspaper consumption. SES is positively related to both television news consumption, with this association more pronounced for public service consumption than commercial consumption. There is a positive association with radio consumption also, with the impact almost equally strong for both broadcasting types. Educational attainment only marginally relates to overall news media consumption, because it relates positively to public service television consumption and negatively to commercial television consumption. The reason for this may lie in the fact that public service media is aimed more at delivering international and political news, whereas commercial media pays more attention to toward human-interest stories and entertainment.

The migration background of the respondents is found to be the only socio-demographic indicator to directly impact attitudes on immigrants and on refugees. People with a migration background hold more positive attitudes than respondents without one. The association is slightly more pronounced for immigrants than it is for refugees. Television news consumption is strongly related to attitudes, with public service consumption positively and commercial consumption negatively relating to immigrant and refugee attitudes. Public radio news consumption relates positively only to refugee attitudes, but the effect size is very limited. These associations provide some evidence that the consumption of positive migrant representations [on public service media (Jacobs et al., 2016)] is positively related to immigrant and refugee attitudes, and the consumption of less positive migrant representations [on commercial television] is negatively related to attitudes. The reason why television has the strongest association with attitudes may be related to the fact that television is—in the adult population—still the most frequently used medium for consuming news media. Popular online news media consumption is the only predictor of attitudes for written media, with a positive impact found on both sets of attitudes. This type of consumption is found to be more strongly associated with refugee attitudes than with immigrant attitudes. This result is somewhat surprising because as popular news media are often less positive in their representations of migrant groups. However, it is also possible that consumers of popular news media do not always perceive this medium as delivering news. In some cases, the line between news and entertainment on these popular online media is blurred. Since this medium can sometimes be perceived as entertainment by the public, it is possible that a selection effect is present due to the frequency of young people (who hold more positive attitudes than older people) consuming this type of popular media. Trust in news media is also positively related to both sets of attitudes also, with the association being more pronounced for refugee than for immigrant attitudes.

Although our research is innovative in several ways, we do note some limitations. Despite the fact that we attempted to ensure a high degree of anonymity, some respondents may still have provided socially desirable answers on sensitive items for attitudes. The large number of missing values on the income-indicator is also unfortunate. Furthermore, in the definition of refugees that we provided to our respondents there was no explicit mention of being forced to flee one’s home country due to climate change. The number of people entering Europe for this reason, however, will grow in the coming decades. It is therefore important for future conceptualizations of refugee status to highlight this group and provide a def-
initiation which applies to all contemporary societal challenges. We recommend that future research on attitudes collect data from more countries, particularly Southern and Eastern Europe, and the United Kingdom. The lack of country variance in attitudes in our sample may be due to the similarities of some of the countries included here. While our modeling of the relationships between attitudes, news media consumption and trust, and household composition are quite detailed, many caveats remain. Qualitative research by way of focus groups or in-depth interviews could shed additional light on the link between the home environment, including respondents’ media consumption patterns and family relationships, and the development of attitudes. Experimental studies studying the influence of specific news media exposure to attitudes towards refugees and immigrants may also reveal new insights into the complex interplay between media input and public opinion formation.

We did not uncover a direct relationship between household composition and immigrant and refugee attitudes. Indirect effects are found through SES and news media consumption, with the presence of a partner having the strongest positive impact through SES, and the presence of parents has the strongest positive impact through media consumption. Media consumption relates to attitudes in several ways. Television news consumption proves to be the most influential. Both public service news and online news are positively associated with both sets of attitudes, whereas commercial television consumption has a negative impact on attitudes. Trust in news media also relates positively to both sets of attitudes. Women and people with a migration background are also found to have more positive attitudes than respectively men and people without a migration background.

5. Conclusion

In this article, we have attempted to uncover some of the complex associations between household composition, media consumption and trust, and immigrant and refugee attitudes. The attitudes under study were chosen for their academic and societal relevance, as migration issues are increasingly prevalent in the public domain, and public opinion on this issue is polarized. Families and news media were identified as two important institutions that influence attitudes. Whilst our results may point to a larger influence of media consumption and trust than of household composition at face value, it is important to consider indirect effects. Household composition significantly relates to SES and news media consumption, which in turn affects attitudes on immigrants and refugees. We also find that television news consumption proves to be the most important news medium in terms of attitude formation. In terms of country differences, we observe limited variance, but do find that Swedes are the most positive in their attitudes towards both minority groups, whilst the French are the most negative.

Acknowledgements

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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Sabatier, C., & Lannegrand-Willems, L. (2005). Trans-


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Leen d’Haenens is Full Professor of Communication Science at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven (Belgium). Her current research focuses on adolescents and media use, with a focus on youth with a migration background, on digital media analysis, making use of multi-site comparisons, and linking online and offline media uses. She also conducts research on the relative salience of several possible sources of societal disruption such as Islamophobia, discrimination, and radicalization, their global and local dimensions, including mediated forms of communication.
### Table 4. Structural equation model of household composition, socio-demographics, media consumption and trust, and immigration and refugee attitudes with standardized beta’s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes on immigrants</th>
<th>Public television news</th>
<th>Quality newspapers</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>−0.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>−1.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parents(-in-law)</td>
<td>−1.13</td>
<td>Parents(-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>−6.84</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
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<td>Educational attainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration background</td>
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<td>Public television news</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial television news</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in news media</td>
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<td>Commercial radio news</td>
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<table>
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<th>Attitudes on refugees</th>
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<th>Quality newspapers</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Partner</td>
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<td>Parents(-in-law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational attainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust in news media</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>Trust in news media</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Fit statistics: RMSEA = 0.0491, GFI = 0.7999, BBNFI = 0.9798 *: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p < 0.001. The reference category for ‘Gender’ = Male, and for ‘Migration background’ = No migration background.
Article

**Immigrant Children and the Internet in Spain: Uses, Opportunities, and Risks**

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Abstract

This article describes the use made of the Internet by immigrant children living in Spain and the opportunities and risks it involves. Specifically, it deals with children from the Maghreb, Ecuador, and Sub-Saharan Africa, three regions which account for a quarter of Spain’s foreign-born population. A qualitative methodology was used, based on in-depth interviews with 52 children from these countries and educators from their support centres. Immigrant minors usually access the Internet via their smartphones rather than via computers. They have a very high rate of smartphone use and access the Internet over public Wi-Fi networks. However, they make little use of computers and tablets, the devices most closely associated with education and accessing information. Internet usage is fairly similar among immigrant and Spanish teens, although the former receive more support and mediation from their schools and institutions than from their parents. The Internet helps them to communicate with their families in their countries of origin. As one educator puts it, “they have gone from sending photos in letters to speaking to their families every day on Skype”. Some teens, particularly Maghrebis, sometimes suffer from hate messages on social networks.

Keywords

children; cyber-bullying; immigrant; Internet; media risks; Spain; youth

Issue

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1. Introduction

The use of personal communication technologies is becoming ever more commonplace among minors. In Spain, children as young as seven are now beginning to use mobile phones (Garmendia, Jiménez, Casado, Garitaonandia, & Mascheroni, 2017). Mobile devices (smartphones and tablets) provide opportunities for communicating with family and friends, socialising, learning and performing schoolwork, accessing information, being creative, and in general for leisure and entertainment (Goggin, 2010; Goggin & Hjorth, 2014; Hjorth & Goggin, 2009). Even aside from these benefits, however, the Internet has become a tool they can use to exercise their rights. Although Internet access is not in itself a right, it has become a basic tool for exercising such rights, given that children relate to the world over the Internet (Third, Bellerose, Dawkins, Keltie, & Pihl, 2014).

Nonetheless, despite improvements in Internet access, many children are still unable to go online or can only do so in a very limited way. Such situations are to a great extent related to their families’ socio-economic status and the resources they can spend on Internet access (Livingstone, Haddon, Görzig, & Ólafsson, 2011;
Mascheroni & Ólafsson, 2014). In other cases, although they do have access to the Internet, the potential advantages of its use are restricted by their families’ educational limitations (Garmendia, Garitaonandia, Martínez, & Casado, 2012). As Salemink (2016, p. 1170) has remarked, this has led to a situation in which: “Research on digital inclusion increasingly focuses on vulnerable groups, with the prevailing idea that social exclusion leads to digital exclusion”.

This article sets out to analyse the relationship of vulnerable children with the Internet. Within this group, the article centres specifically on the situation of minors from immigrant families in Spain. There are two reasons for this focus. On the one hand, internationally, members of the immigrant community suffer much higher rates of inequality and exclusion than the social average (Borjas, 1985; Massey & Eggers, 1990; Portes, 1995); in the specific case of Spain, this situation has been further aggravated by the economic crisis (Godenau, Rinken, Martínez de Lizarrondo, & Moreno, 2014; Mahia & de Arce, 2014). Secondly, immigrant families might display different or more intense use of social media and communication tools in order to maintain contact with their home countries (Buckingham & de Block, 2005; De Leeuw & Rydin, 2007).

The article is divided into four sections: an initial review of the research on minors in situations of inequality and the Internet and the context of migrant children in Spain; a second section setting out the objectives and methodology of this study; a third section describing the main findings of the field work and, finally, our conclusions.

2. Theoretical and Contextual Framework

2.1. From Digital Divide to Digital Inequality

The term “digital divide” was coined in the early years of the Internet, when it was associated with varying rates of access to communication technologies among different regions (Bindé, 2005; DiMaggio & Hargittai, 2001; Norris, 2001; Van Dijk, 2005). Although still an issue in terms of the major differences in access1 between certain countries, the concept has evolved with the spread of communication technology, and today there is more talk of digital inequality than of digital divide, since digital inequality is not a simple dichotomy of ‘access’ versus ‘no access’.

In the adoption of communication technologies, there are two opposing points of view. The hypothesis of standardization asserts that communication technologies have the capacity to reduce social inequalities. The hypothesis of stratification, on the other hand, indicates that this process of the adoption of communication technologies ends up reinforcing existing inequalities (Mesch, 2012). In this context, there are many studies which point to the difficulties the lower classes have in accessing and using digital devices.

Katz, Gonzalez and Clark (2017) have shown that although over 90% of economically underprivileged families had Internet access, most complained that they were unable to make full use of the Internet because of low speeds, the need to share devices or the existence of just one mobile connection, resulting in data overload (Katz et al., 2017). As Robinson (2009, p. 489) remarked, it is necessary to examine “how digital inequality is related to larger social inequalities”.

Digital inequality also has very important implications for the personal development of children and teens, their relationship with family and friends, their education, and their upbringing. Children who use the Internet at home and school have a higher level of “self-efficacy” than those who do not, and such online efficacy is associated with better school results (Jackson, Eye, & Biocca, 2003; Katz et al., 2017). Clark (2005) has shown that providing digital technologies to young people from minorities and those in precarious economic situations can increase their skills (i.e., their self-efficacy) in areas such as mathematics and science.

In addition to the reduced opportunities, these minors are more vulnerable to online risks. Although they may be exposed to similar levels of risk, such hazards may be more damaging to them (Paus-Hasebrink, Ponte, Dürager, & Bauwens, 2012, p. 267). At the same time, families from low socio-economic backgrounds tend to have more restrictive parental mediation styles, which can also result in fewer opportunities for the child (Garmendia et al., 2012). This lack of opportunity must be looked at from a broad perspective, not only considering information and communication technologies as tools for academic development but also as tools that allow minors to participate in social life in many ways and to have access to a multitude of content that can be potentially positive for them (Livingstone & Helsper, 2010).

A number of recent studies have shown that in many countries there are still major differences in access highlighting the importance of the rural-urban variable in these differences. In Taiwan, Wang (2013) notes that these differences impact urban schoolchildren’s experience and preferences in the use of digital technologies for learning. Venkataswamy and Vidyapeetham (2015) show that in India, ownership of such devices has created new hierarchies of inequality; iPads and other tablets are associated with status and prestige. An extreme case is China (Yang et al., 2013), where 80% of urban students have a computer and 73% have Internet access, as compared to just 6% and 2% respectively among students from minority groups. In Brazil, 98% of minors aged between nine and 17 years from higher socio-economic groups had connected to the Internet in the previous three months, as opposed to 23% from lower socio-economic backgrounds (TIC Kids Online Brasil, 2017).

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1 While 88.1% of North Americans and 77.4% of Europeans are Internet users (as of 2017), in Africa and Asia the figure is only 28.3% and 45.2% respectively. See more at www.exitoexportador.com/stats.htm
In Europe, where Internet use among children is broader, some research has focused on children in vulnerable situations due to their families’ economic situation. As Paus-Hasebrink, Sinner and Prochazka (2014, p. 8) note:

The educational background of the family (which correlates highly with the economic well-being of a family) plays the major role influencing the different ways the internet is used. Children of lower educated parents are often left alone when dealing with the internet.

Several studies have explored differences in the development of digital skills between minors from underprivileged contexts and others. In Italy, levels of digital literacy were found to be greater among children from more privileged socio-economic backgrounds (Gui, 2007). In the Netherlands, no major differences were detected in the use of technologies among young people from different socio-economic environments. However, there were differences in the activities they pursued: children from higher socio-economic backgrounds spent more time searching for information and less on entertainment than those from lower-income backgrounds (Peter & Valkenburg, 2006). Other studies have also shown the importance of intervention policies designed to provide underprivileged children with access and equipment. A study in Portugal by Simões, Ponte and Jorge (2013) has shown only a small-skills gap between underprivileged children supported by a household equipment programme (Escolhas) and other children. In Spain, a qualitative study by Cabello (2013) has shown that associations and institutions that facilitate access to communication technologies among such children play an important role in raising their awareness of online risks.

In addition to the socio-economic aspects, different studies have also pointed out the importance of taking into consideration ethnic origin in the use that is made of the Internet. Thus, for example, the works of Mesch (2012) point to the different objectives that different communities can have when using the Internet and the possibilities of Internet communication to overcome social barriers and segregation (social diversification hypothesis).

Within the general context of underprivileged children, some studies have focused more specifically on immigrant families.

D’Haenens and Ogan (2013) made a comparative study of Internet usage among European children of Turkish origin in various EU countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands), autochthonous children in those countries and Turkish children living in Turkey. The children from the Turkish diaspora stood in an intermediate position between their native European counterparts—the most assiduous Internet browsers—and Turkish children living in Turkey, who use the Internet least. In general terms, the same is true for online skills and activities. As for exposure to online risks, the native European children send and receive images and messages related to sex and have more face-to-face encounters with online contacts than the other two groups. On the other hand, children from the Turkish diaspora suffered from cyber-bullying more frequently.

Among immigrant households, especially second-generation members, children can play an important role in helping their parents with digital technologies. In Dutch-Moroccan families, girls know more about digital technologies and their use than their parents and are able to help them stay in touch with relatives at home; this knowledge can also help the girls create a space of their own, unmonitored by their parents. The use of digital technology by girls helps to create lines of connection and support for their grandparents, mothers, aunts, and sisters (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2013).

Also in Denmark, results of the Danish survey clearly indicate that ethnic minority youth are more active than the youth of Danish descent in practising key aspects of media and information literacies (Drotner & Kobbernagel, 2014, p. 15).

Some immigrant ethnic minorities in Europe, such as Asian Muslims, retain lower social and economic levels (Abbas, 2008) and are hampered by having relatively less access to ICT (Khan & Ghadially, 2010). These inequalities may be further accentuated by their schools. Islamic faith schools, in particular, sometimes reinforce the restrictions (on access to social media, messaging apps, posting of videos on Youtube or Facebook, access to common areas, etc.), rather than compensating for such shortfalls (Hardaker, Sabki & Iqbal, 2017).

Regarding the risks, Strohmeier, Kärnä and Salmivalli (2011, p. 255) examined first- and second-generation immigrants in Finland (who are less numerous than in other European countries and mainly of Caucasian origin), finding that “both first- and second-generation immigrants were more often victimized by peers compared with native youth. Thus, we can conclude that immigrant youth are at higher risk of being victimized by their peers in Finland”.

2.2. Migrant Children in Spain

Spain has 4.6 million foreign-born residents, who make up 10% of the total population (INE, 2016). Immigrants suffer higher levels of social vulnerability and precariousness than the local population (IOE, 2012). From the outset, the recession hit the foreign population particularly hard, with the incidence of exclusion amongst these households doubling to 44.5% in 2009. Since then, the situation has continued to deteriorate, with a significant increase in the rate of severe exclusion among this group (22.4%) and a rise in the index of exclusion to 2.76 (Foessa, 2014, p. 30). In educational terms, a recent joint study by UNICEF Spain and the Autonomous University of Barcelona also shows that being from a migrant background is one of the most significant factors contributing
to educational exclusion (UNICEF, 2017). The findings of the PISA report also show that migrant pupils have worse grades (Calero & Escardíbul, 2016).

The three immigrant groups covered by the study—Maghrebis, Ecuadorian, and Sub-Saharan—account for nearly a quarter (24.8%) of Spain’s foreign-born population. Rates of labour and social vulnerability and precariousness are highest among Maghrebis (the largest group, accounting for 14.2% of foreign nationals [INE, 2017] and Sub-Saharaners (Domingo & Sabater, 2013; IOÉ, 2012b; Iñiguez, 2011; Mullor, 2011). These groups (especially Maghrebis) also suffer from a higher degree of rejection by the local population (Cea D’Ancona, 2016; Ikuspegi, 2017; Rinken, 2015). Young people of Maghrebi origin have the lowest Internet usage levels (46.6% compared to 55.1% among immigrants as a whole). However, this does not appear to be due to their lack of interest, rather than the greater difficulties they experience in accessing the Internet: FUNDACC figures show that this group uses the greatest variety of connection locations (in order of frequency: home, call shop, or cyber café, workplace and school; Huertas, Martínez, & Moreras, 2013).

Ecuadorians tend to have spent a considerable time living in Spain and as native Spanish-speakers, have fewer difficulties with integration. The children have often been born in Spain or have at least spent much of their lives living there. Most have Spanish nationality or long-term residency permits, a key factor in social integration (Martínez de Lizarrondo, 2016). However, they also suffer high unemployment and low levels of income (Iglesias et al., 2015). Nonetheless, as Lara (2014, p. 546) points out, in Spain, “it is remarkable that, despite the difficulties associated with the immigration process, immigrants showed equal levels of life satisfaction as natives”. Among other causes, she attributes it to the fact “that immigrants show better adaptation despite their poorer economic status” (Lara, 2014, p. 546).

In any case:

Foreign nationals do not renounce their identities constructed before their arrival in Spain, and in this sense, the media are one of the links that allow them to keep these identities alive; it is the strongest sociocultural link uniting them with their country of origin. (Lobera, Arco, & Giménez, 2017, p. 47)

3. Purpose and Methodology

The aim of this article is to analyse the relationship that children from immigrant backgrounds and in situations of economic vulnerability have with communication technologies. We shall essentially consider two aspects. On one hand, we shall examine access by these minors to new communication technologies, looking at the devices they use, the way they use them, and the activities they perform. On the other hand, we shall assess their exposure to online risks, considering their perception of the risks and their capacity to cope with them.

These three aspects are considered in the light of the possible influence of the children’s socio-economic background and origin.

The research is qualitative, based on in-depth interviews using a semi-structured conversation guide. A total of 52 children of different origins resident in Spain were interviewed. 30 were of Maghrebi origin, 11 Ecuadorian, and 11 Sub-Saharan. The children interviewed were between the ages of 10 and 17. Most interviews were individual, except for a small number in which two people participated simultaneously. In the first case, the duration of the interviews was almost always between 30 and 40 minutes. The interviews in which two children participated lasted about an hour. As explained below, the groups were selected to reflect their representation among the immigrant community in Spain. In order to take into account the variable of socio-economic vulnerability, minors were contacted through collaboration with a number of organizations running projects providing support to children at risk of socio-economic exclusion.

All the children in the sample were in situations of exclusion or risk of exclusion, in most cases due to their family’s lack of financial resources. The families of these children came to the centres mentioned in this study in search of economic and educational support. The interviews were conducted on the premises of these collaborating associations and were based on a semi-structured questionnaire that included issues related to access, use, risks, opportunities and mediation received in the use of the Internet. Permission to conduct all interviews was received from the minors’ families or guardian institutions. To try to provide a greater variety of cases and situations, the interviews were conducted in six Spanish provinces: Madrid, the Canary Islands, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, and Biscay. The interviews were conducted in the capitals of the four Autonomous Communities with the largest populations in Spain (Andalusia, 8.4 million inhabitants; Catalonia, 7.5 million; Madrid, 6.5 million and the Valencian Community, 5 million), and in addition in the Basque Country and in the Canary Islands, both of which have a combined population of 2.1 million.

As well as the children themselves, a further five interviews were held with educators from the centres attended by some of the minors, to obtain another opinion regarding their relationship with communication technologies.

4. Migrant Children in Spain

4.1. Access and Usage

Generally speaking, children from these immigrant groups often have mobile phones and use them to access the Internet. This device has become a basic tool for them. Indeed, educators from the schools agreed that it has become an essential device, even in the case of families in extreme economic situations:
Their parents might not have money for food or upkeep, but they still come in with a mobile. They get presents of the sort of tablet even I wouldn’t have, even when they can’t afford to cover their basic living needs like food, clothes and so on. (Director of a centre for minors)

Some have data packages on their phones or Wi-Fi at home, but frequently need to resort to using Wi-Fi at their friends’ or relatives’ homes or in public places. However, it is less common for them to have a computer at home. Many children only have access to computers in the classroom and in support centres. Some said they did their schoolwork directly on their mobiles:

It’s no problem, you don’t need a computer. For example, when I have an assignment, I can do it on my mobile. (Boy, 15, Maghreb)

The principal activities mentioned were viewing videos and listening to music on Youtube and Musical.ly; using WhatsApp and social media (particularly Instagram and, to a lesser extent, Facebook). The use of these platforms matches the general trends among children in Spain (Garmendia et al., 2017). Where children have such devices and an Internet connection, they also use them for activities that are useful for their personal development and education:

I keep a blog and I make videos of handicrafts. For example, I did a handicrafts video for Mother’s Day and another for Father’s Day, to show people how to make presents for their father and their mother. I do handicrafts, mandalas, things like that. (Girl, 11, Ecuador)

What is different in the case of migrant children is that as well as communicating with family and friends, social media offer them the possibility of keeping in touch relatively simply with their countries of origin.

Instagram is more for your circle of friends. I have relatives on Instagram too, but mostly I use it for my friends. With Facebook, it’s the opposite. I use it more for my family. Because my father’s family is in Ecuador, I use Facebook to communicate with them and to keep up with what’s going on. (Girl, 16, Ecuador)

I normally use Facebook and Instagram to talk to my friends in Morocco and here, but more with my friends in Morocco. (Boy, 10, Maghreb)

In the particular case of unaccompanied minors being looked after in specific programmes or centres, regular everyday access to ICT is even more important. The director of one such centre described how the situation of such children has changed in a very short space of time, saying that they have gone from seeing “how their siblings were growing up through photographs sent in letters” to “having a daily relationship by video conference over Skype”.

In general, children learn to use and master the applications from older friends and relatives, often cousins or siblings:

I began using social media because I saw that my cousins and relatives had it, so I started too. I’ve gradually learned how to use it….So, for example, I saw that my cousins had Instagram and they taught me how to use it. (Girl, 13, Ecuador)

In practically all cases—except for younger interviewees—the children said they knew more about these tools than their parents. Because of this lack of knowledge among parents, they tend to develop very restrictive mediation strategies:

I used to have another mobile, but it broke. It wasn’t my fault. My mother dropped it and it broke. (Girl, 14, Maghreb)

Alternatively, some parents go to the other extreme, with no clear rules on the use of mobile phones. As the children themselves recognise, this results in excessive use. Among the most significant effects mentioned were extended night-time use of the phone in their bedrooms and subsequent loss of sleep time.

If I go home right now, I might be on the phone for an hour. Then I’d do something else and I’d be on my mobile again for half an hour or so. I might spend up to three hours per day on the mobile. (Boy, 16, Maghreb)

There’s no one there when you go to bed, so you get distracted by the mobile. You might be on it for a few hours without realising. (Boy, 15, Sub-Sahara)

Sometimes I get less sleep because I’m on the mobile. That’s true. And it’ll be more now that the holidays are starting. (Girl, 16, Sub-Sahara)

Regular use of ICT helps children develop many communication skills, but not other digital skills that are essential for building a complete and competent digital personality. As users, they cope well with social media but they have not developed a mature criterion for finding basic information and services on the Internet.

These kids can do things that really freak me out. One guy hacked into my photos from his phone, which is something I’d never see anyone do in my life. Then another one hacked the Wi-Fi password. They know how to do loads of things. But when it comes to logging onto a website or looking for information on citizen services that are available to everyone, they don’t know where to start. (Educator at children’s support centre)
4.2. Perceived Risks

As regards the hazards of Internet use, the risks most frequently mentioned by the children involve control of information; possible consequences of posting certain images; use of false profiles to obtain information or trick them; and the possibility that their accounts are being hacked into.

A: It happened recently to two friends of mine: someone hacked into their Instagram account and created another account with their photos.

B: That happens a lot on Instagram, they steal your account or create another new one, put another name on it and upload your photos and your information or whatever. Just to piss you off. (Girls, 17, Maghreb)

In this respect, the gender component is especially important, especially in the case of sexual images. In cases of "sextortion", the images can be used to humiliate or blackmail the victim. Such incidents occur with the same frequency among native Spanish children.

Yes, she was stupid. This guy told her he wanted to get to know her. She sent him a photo showing lots of cleavage and her schoolmates started teasing her about it. (Girl, 16, Maghreb)

I stopped answering him because he asked me for a quite explicit photo, you know? I stopped replying to him and he started calling me fat and things like that. I got pissed off and just ignored him. (Girl, 14, Maghreb)

I take explicit photos. Though of course, I don’t show my face. I don’t know most of the people personally, because they’re not usually from the same country. (Girl, 14, Maghreb)

In terms of risks, the main difference mentioned compared to native children is their exposure to Internet hate speech. This is particularly true among children of Maghrebi origin. They find that in situations of conflict, their ethnic or migratory origin is often used against them.

Specifically on Instagram. They upload doctored photos and put phrases on them like “go home” or “fucking Arab [mora]”. Those are normally the keywords. (Girl, 17, Maghreb)

You see it, especially on Instagram and Facebook. They’re not people who actually promote these ideas, but they have this black humour, you know? And if it wasn’t so hurtful, perhaps it would be funny. (Girl, 14, Maghreb)

At the same time, some children are upset when they find Internet contents linking Islam—which they identify with—to terrorism—which they don’t. This is especially relevant because of the negative effect it has on the children’s integration, given the impact these messages have on their host environment and on the way they themselves feel. The Internet has become another reflection of the Islamophobia detected throughout Spanish society (Cea D’Ancona, 2016).

All this business about terrorists and so on annoys me—the way people generalise; the way they consider all Muslims to be terrorists rather than just the Jihadists. (Boy, 16, Maghreb)

5. Conclusions

All children should have the right to Internet access. This right should be guaranteed, particularly for those who are excluded due to their country of origin, economic situation, or any other form of discrimination (religion, sex, ideology, disability, etc.). It should extend, not only to Internet access but also to ensuring that such access is safe and allows them to benefit from all online opportunities. In the specific case of immigrant children, the participation of minors on the Internet is particularly important. Involvement with and an active role in the digital environment can make the Internet a powerful tool to help overcome social barriers and to contribute to personal development. Moreover, the Internet can provide children with access to content and realities that they would be unable to access in the precarious environments in which they are growing up and also give them the opportunity to discover and develop new skills.

The penetration rate of smartphones and the uses that immigrant minors make of them are, to a large extent, very similar to those of Spanish minors. In this context, communication tools such as WhatsApp or Instagram take precedence over all others. This intensive use of communication can have a positive effect in respect of the social diversification hypothesis of Mesch (2007) since it allows the creation of networks and contacts that can be very useful for minors and that can help them to progress socially. Nevertheless, the opportunity for social progress may be curtailed by the subsequent reduction in the use of computers and tablets; devices that are most closely linked to creativity and information. These difficulties point more to the perpetuation of inequality than to a possible egalitarian effect. In this sense, it seems important to have public policies that provide immigrant homes with equipment and connections to the Internet.

The absence of digital skills and computer devices in the home hinders young people when performing some school tasks. As they rise through the school structure, there is an increasing number of activities that require digital equipment and skills. A deficit in this area will hold them back, perpetuating the situation of inequal-
ity and exclusion. Immigrant children connect to the Internet from their homes less often than their Spanish peers; connection from the school and other support centres helps to reduce that gap. As with previous studies (Cabello, 2013; Simões et al., 2013), this study shows the importance of initiatives providing Internet access to underprivileged children, to allow them to acquire the necessary skills and follow their academic career.

Because of their particular circumstances, immigrant children are especially vulnerable to online risks. Given the important role played by parental mediation in preventing and managing Internet risks and improper usage, specific actions are required where such mediation is lacking. As Paus-Hasebrink et al. (2014) mention at a European level, nearly all children from socially disadvantaged groups have a limited knowledge of online risks and tend not to weigh up the information they receive from the media. At the same time, their parents are not always capable of explaining the origin of such risks. Our study confirms this conclusion. It also shows that while general education regarding ICT and bullying has increased, contact with strangers and other problematic situations is still important for all children and is particularly essential for these groups. Deficits in this area were detected among nearly all the immigrant groups studied. In most cases, the children mentioned either very restrictive mediation strategies by their parents or, conversely, the absence of such measures, normally as a result of their parents’ lack of digital literacy. Where family intervention is lacking, schools and child support centres must attend to this issue.

Digital tools for socialisation can be useful in facilitating integration: Whatsapp and Instagram—to mention only the most widely used platforms—allow them to interact with family and friends as well as fashion and cultural influencers, just as their Spanish peers do. In particular, the democratisation of Internet access and the simplicity of smartphone use has facilitated contact between immigrant children and their home countries. Although physically removed from their immediate or extended families, the technology allows them to retain their cultural heritage and social capital which helps cultivate a sense of transnational belonging in accordance with their preferences, which can combat their sense of rootlessness.

Among children who might otherwise risk remaining bound to very insular communities, technology allows them to access new ideas, interests and hobbies, opening up new possibilities for future employment and personal development. Access to such opportunities is unquestionably positive. The risks mentioned by immigrant children do not essentially differ from those of their native peers (Smahel & Wright, 2014), the main difference being the existence of easily accessible xenophobic online content which might be classed as hate speech. As well as preventing the development of healthy coexistence, such content has a negative effect on immigrant children by perpetuating stereotypes and victimisation, further hindering integration and preventing them from overcoming pre-assigned limitations.

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Conflict of Interests

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EU Kids Online.


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Diversity in Western Countries: Journalism Culture, Migration Integration Policy and Public Opinion

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Abstract
Earlier research has shown that public opinion and policy lines on the topic of immigrant integration are interrelated. This article investigates a sample of 24 countries for which data are available in the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the World Values Survey (WVS), as well as in the Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS). To our knowledge, this is the first time that these data are connected to one another to study journalists’ views on their role to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in societies with diverging immigration policies. The WJS presents an analysis of the role conceptions of professional journalists throughout the world, including a variable measuring the extent to which journalists conceive promoting tolerance and cultural diversity as one of their tasks. Our findings show that journalists (as measured in the WJS) mostly tend to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in countries with more restrictive immigration policies (measured by MIPEX) and less emancipative values (measured by the WVS) Promoting tolerance and cultural diversity is associated with a so-called interventionist approach in journalism culture. Furthermore, we used cluster analyses to attribute the countries under study to meaningful, separate groups. More precisely, we discriminate four clusters of the press among the 24 countries under investigation.

Keywords
cultural diversity; immigration; integration policy; journalism culture; public opinion; tolerance

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adjusted based on the better-developed migration policies of the ‘more’ developed countries. ‘Policy’ does not operate in a cultural vacuum, so it comes as no surprise that researchers have sought and found links between the public opinion of nation states on the one hand and the latter’s migration and integration policies on the other (Callens, 2015; Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015; Schroyens, Meuleman, & Galle, 2015). The aforementioned researchers have weighed the importance of two conflicting hypotheses. The first hypothesis states that liberal immigration policies foster competition, and hence public attitudes that oppose increased immigration. The second hypothesis that was already vindicated in research prior to ours stresses a positive correlation between a more welcoming public opinion and policies in migrant-friendly countries.

Welzel (2013)—a key specialist of the WVS—developed a theory of human development according to which social-economic development, emancipative cultural change, and democratization constitute a coherent entity of social progress. The author classifies countries according to their cultural values and the extent to which opportunities for emancipative values are on offer.

Communication scientists (see, e.g., Vliegenthart, 2015) have stressed the importance of a third sphere alongside cultural attitudes and policy orientations, where political issues get constructed: the media sphere. There are important agenda interactions between political actors, the general public, and the media. McCombs (2011, p. 1) argued that: “The power of the news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key public issues, is an immense and well-documented influence”. Nevertheless, the impact of the media on the public is currently assessed as important, but not as unilaterally and predominantly as has been suggested by early communication scholars.

When it comes to the influence of the media on politics, most of the relevant literature confirms the existence of media effects on the political agenda (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2016), although contingency—depending on specific circumstances—has also been observed. Agenda’s and values have been shown to be interrelated (Valenzuela, 2011). The emancipative values in national public opinion cultures and political cultures may very well go together with similar journalistic values. Investigating the extent to which this holds true is the goal of our study.

Although comparative communication research offers several merits such as revealing patterns and problems left unnoticed in a specific socio-cultural and geographical milieu, or widening the scope beyond the familiar contours when drawing attention to macro-societal developments, until recently relatively little communication research has engaged in comparative media analysis. As a result, and notwithstanding noteworthy examples, media and communication scholarship continues to remain fragmented and often nationally, geographically or case-bound (Puppis & d’Haenens, 2012; Sarikakis, 2008). Yet, in the last two decades, more scholars are purposefully taking a comparative angle (Hanitzsch, 2008; Hanitzsch & Altmann, 2007). The demand for cross-country comparison is even bigger in a field that is expected to deliver evidence and ideas instrumental to media policy-makers, who can learn from experiences and good practices abroad.

One of the earlier attempts of cross-national media research that developed a typology of media systems was the “Four Theories of The Press” model by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956). This classic work of reference identified the libertarian theory, the authoritarian theory, the communist theory and the social responsibility theory. Although the research in this chapter is mainly devoted to Europe, we paraphrase the four theories of the press in our development of different four cluster solutions comparing data from different empirical sources.

A particular angle we put to the fore is the comparison of media in Europe using cultural values research. This angle of research has not been adopted widely but research suggests this method can be adopted fruitfully (Obijiofor & Hanusch, 2011, p. 57). Western journalism (Deuze, 2005) is guided by an age-old occupational ideology that includes values as truth and accuracy, independence, fairness and impartiality, humanity and accountability (Ethical Journalism Network, n/d). This ideology influences journalism across the world, although different interpretations of journalism emerge on a global scale, as international research in the “Worlds of Journalism” initiative clearly proves (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018).

Another seminal work on comparative media systems, “Comparing Media Systems” by Hallin and Mancini (2004) identifies three models of media and politics, i.e., the liberal model, the democratic-corporatist model and the polarized pluralist model. These models appear in different regions of the western world, with Anglophone countries prevailing in the first model, continental European countries in the second model and Southern-European countries in the third category. Notwithstanding the differences between the models, Hallin and Mancini (2004) identify an underlying trend of de differentiation. The largest differentiation between media and politics occurs within the liberal model. Precisely this model is gaining influence, shifting journalism towards a detached position, focused on reporting reality rather than wanting to change it.

Yet current journalists find themselves in a twisted position. On the one hand, journalism is analyzed as evolving towards detachment, as propagated by the liberal model in the typology by Hallin and Mancini (2004). On the other hand, journalists operate in an increasingly multicultural environment and some journalists see it as their duty to promote tolerance and cultural diversity, while others associate diversity with an unwanted degree of political correctness (Müller & Frissen, 2014; Vandenberghe, d’Haenens, & Van Gorp, 2014). Research among journalists in six European countries (Bennett, ter Wal, Lipinski, Fabiszak, & Krzyzanowski, 2013, p. 261)
proves this ambiguity, because systematic standards about diversity remain absent:

From the interviews it emerged that media professionals operate in an environment, either because of their own awareness, position in the political debate or their audience/readership profiles, where political correctness is either supported or shunned, resulting in different thresholds for what is seen as acceptable in terms of terminology and the definition of news.

The twisted position journalists have to face might also be influenced by the political climate journalists are living in. Research shows that across Europe (Callens, 2015) countries with a lenient policy towards immigration are also characterized by a tolerant public opinion climate. Recent migration policies in Germany for instance seem to confirm that a positive political discourse tends to foster a more accommodating media coverage: for instance “solidarity”, ‘responsibility’ and a welcoming culture are central themes in the German response to the crisis, especially in the German-language press” (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016, p. 8).

Hence, the key question that emerges is the degree to which journalists also support tolerance and cultural diversity if particular societies and policies support tolerance and cultural diversity. Answering this key question is the aim of this article, by adopting a comparative approach through the integration of data from different sources that have not yet been connected in a multifocal intercultural comparative analysis up till now.

We studied the relationship between the media and other spheres based on data from the WJS international research study. These data contain information about the way journalists in 67 countries around the world view their professional roles. The empirical goal of this chapter is to compare the degree to which emancipative values in the WVS coexist with MIPEX policies (as reflected in prior research results) as well with journalistic role perceptions (a less explored domain so far). Our analysis will focus on countries for which data on the three research dimensions under study are available: the MIPEX policy index, the international WVS and the WJS international journalists study, resulting in a set of 24 countries.

2. The Three Databases

MIPEX shows an integrated score on eight policy areas in 40 western countries (MIPEX, n/d). The eight domains are labour market mobility, family reunion, education (since 2010), political participation, long-term residence, health, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination. An integrated score is calculated based on assessments of experts involved in a peer-review process. Although theoretically each domain has independent index scores (from 1 to 100), we refer to the integrated score, leading to an overall score out of 100. The experts who score the different dimensions are independent legal scholars and practitioners within the domain of migration law (Niessen, 2009, p. 7). The consulted experts rely on in-depth knowledge of the national legal and regulatory provisions on legal policy within their own country, and are also able to assess the regulatory frameworks of other countries from a comparative perspective. In order to achieve optimal objectivity in scoring, a second opinion of an extra expert is always requested to peer-review the scores of the individual expert assessments.

The MIPEX database is the only database used in this study that is derived from judgments by experts. The other two databases are based on survey research input. Current WVS data (WVS, 6th wave, 2010–2014) gathered in 60 countries made it possible to construct a set of different scales (World Values Survey, n/d). The WVS targets a representative adult population sample (at least 1,200 respondents per country) in different countries with the same survey questionnaire, aimed at providing essential insights into political and social-cultural change.

Especially relevant for research on immigration opinions is the Emancipative Values Index. Emancipative values emphasize freedom for everyone. Based on these values a scale is constituted ranging from 0 to 1. The Emancipative Values Index is based on four sub-indices: autonomy, equality, choice and voice. The institutional spheres from which these four indices are derived are widely different. Autonomy mainly points at the autonomy of children in the family context. Equality refers to gender equality whereas choice is an indicator of ethical matters such as homosexuality, abortion and divorce. The last index, voice, refers to political participation. Previous research has shown that these core values (Welzer, 2013) are related with important concepts such as well-being, democracy and environmental sustainability. Our study thus wants to advance the scientific knowledge of the interrelational connections between values in policy (MIPEX), public opinion (WVS), and journalism (WJS). The third database integrated in this intercultural media study consists of journalism variables. Journalism (Deuze, 2005) is, among other professions, known to have an ideology of its own, this ideology has been interpreted in many different ways across the globe. The WJS brought together researchers from 67 countries. In an unprecedented collaborative effort, more than 27,500 journalists were interviewed between 2012 and 2016, based on a common methodological framework (Worlds of Journalism, 2017). The WJS questionnaire deals with many dimensions of the occupational ideology. One of the questions raised was the degree to which journalists see it as their professional role to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in the countries where they work, although this conception conflicts somewhat with the universal ideal of ‘objectivity’ (e.g., Broersma, 2015), which implies that journalists should not take sides in public debates, not even when ideals such as cultural diversity are at stake. Since immigration issues policy and public opinion are interrelated (Callens, 2015), we
will study whether journalistic culture has been following this trend.

The question about journalistic roles relates to a wider set of questions regarding journalists’ perceptions of professional roles (Worlds of Journalism Study, n/d). The items under question will be grouped under four headings: the monitoring role, the interventionist role, the collaborative role, and finally, the accommodative role of journalism. The monitoring role implies that journalists want to provide political information, monitor and scrutinize political and business actors, and motivate people to participate in politics. The interventionist role refers to journalists’ advocating for social change, influencing public opinion, setting the political agenda and supporting national development. The collaborative role of journalism concentrates on supporting government policy and conveying a positive image of political leadership. Finally, the accommodative role of journalism refers to the provision of entertainment, news that attracts the largest audience as possible, and offers advice for daily life. In our study, we will investigate how the role promoting tolerance and cultural diversity relates to the other perceived roles.

Obviously, this analysis cannot answer questions on causality. It is most likely that journalism, cultural values and policy will influence each other in a constant intermingling of causes and effects. Each one of these databases has had a large influence on research, so that it is interesting to test whether their items correlate, although the databases are based on different theoretical frameworks. A large-scale multi-country study of values, policy and journalism measured with a unified theoretical background is lacking, and is practically unfeasible. Therefore, it is most necessary to compare these existing databases with different backgrounds to get a clearer idea of how culture, policy and journalism are intertwined.

3. Hypotheses and Research Questions

The links between MIPEX and public opinion (as expressed in the WVS) have been explored in earlier research. However, the links with journalism culture have not been extensively investigated yet. Nevertheless, it is logically consistent to assume that the degree to which journalists see it as their professional role to promote tolerance and cultural diversity is connected with integration-friendly options in policy and public opinion. This leads to the following hypotheses:

**H1:** In countries with high MIPEX values, journalists will view promoting tolerance and cultural diversity as an important professional role.

**H2:** In countries with high emancipative values, journalists will view promoting tolerance and cultural diversity as an important professional role.

Furthermore, logical assumptions on the resonance between policy, public opinion dimensions and other dimensions of journalism culture are less derivable from earlier research. Therefore, we formulated open research questions here rather than hypotheses.

**RQ1:** Is there a correlation between (a) MIPEX and the role perception on promoting tolerance and cultural diversity and the four other journalistic role perceptions (i.e. monitoring, interventionist, collaborative, accommodative roles), and (b) emancipative values and the role perception on promoting tolerance and cultural diversity and the four other journalistic role perceptions?

**RQ2:** Are the different role perceptions of journalists correlated among each other?

To test these research questions, a database of countries was compiled that consisted of the data of 24 countries (see Table 1) that were included in all three central databases. The countries for which data are available are all Western countries, except for South Korea, the only non-Western country that met the criteria for inclusion in this study.

In addition to the study of the interrelations, we aimed to examine whether these countries group together on the dimensions specified in these three databases. Focusing specifically on the role perception that journalists would like to promote tolerance and cultural diversity, we ran analyses of the clustering of countries on three dimensions, combining each dimension with this particular role perception. These three dimensions are the MIPEX data, the WVS and the four other role perceptions borrowed from the WJS.

**RQ3:** How do Western countries cluster together when it comes to the role perception that journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity in correlation with data on integration policy, emancipative values and other journalistic role perceptions?

### Table 1. Countries under study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4. Methods

4.1. Method 1: Correlation Analysis

We used a data set of 24 countries that met the abovementioned inclusion criteria. Each country was entered as a case, and each dimension from the chosen databases was entered as a variable. The scores have a value between 0 and 100 for each country on each dimension. These values are percentage scores in the case of the WVS, and the WJS, and Evaluation by Experts scores in the case of MIPEX. The constructed dataset is available upon request by the authors of this study. Pearson’s correlations were calculated. Tables are presented with the dimensions from the four used databases on the horizontal and the vertical axis, indicating their interrelations. The cells of the tables are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, representing the degree to which the different dimensions are intertwined. We calculated significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels. The higher (.10) level of significance is included because we are dealing with a statistically small sample of mainly European countries (N = 24).

4.2. Method 2: Cluster Analysis

We ran a cluster analysis with four clusters to identify countries with similar or dissimilar profiles, while focusing on the role of journalism to promote tolerance and cultural diversity and combining each of the three databases with this role perception. We went through several exercises in dividing the map of Europe (plus some non-European countries) to come up with “four clusters of the press” when it comes to promoting tolerance and diversity, paraphrasing the seminal work of Siebert et al. (1956) on media models across the globe.

This allowed us to didactically evaluate the impact of each database on the specific role perception we focused on. The clustering method used is the furthest neighbor method, which tends to produce compact clusters of similar size. This method allows us to explain differences and similarities between groups of countries more didactically, compared to other methods that create a large center cluster and a few smaller clusters containing a few countries or containing only one. Graphically the clusters are presented using dendrograms, i.e., tree-like structures to visually present how countries group together and using maps of Europe, developed using the tool of Phil Archer (2013).

5. Results

5.1. Correlation Analysis

Emphasis (see Table 2) on the importance to promote tolerance does not significantly correlate with the MIPEX scores (r = −0.133, p = .534), nor does this role perception significantly correlate with emancipative values (r = −0.331, p = .114). In other words, the hypotheses on MIPEX (H1) and emancipative values (H2) are not confirmed.

Additional research questions deal with the link between MIPEX and emancipative values on the one hand, and other role perceptions of journalists on the other hand.

The journalistic role perceptions that correlate most strongly with the other databases are interventionism and collaboration. Both these journalistic role perceptions tend to be associated with lower MIPEX values (as asked in Research Question 1a) and lower emancipative values (as asked in Research Question 1b). The correlations are more blatant in the case of interventionism (i.e. MIPEX: r = −0.479, p = .018; emancipative values, r = −0.714, p = .000). The correlations with collaboration, while somewhat lower, follow the same trend (i.e. MIPEX: r = −0.402, p = .052; emancipative values, r = −0.590, p = .002). A correlation (r = −0.355, p = 0.088) is also observed between less accomodative journalism cultures and higher MIPEX values.

Probing further on Research Question 2, the perception that journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity throughout their work co-occurs with the perception that they should monitor society (r = 0.538, p = .007) as well as with interventionism (r = 0.691, p = .000) (see Table 3). Interventionism itself is tied up with collaboration in a high correlation (r = 0.752, p = .000). A last couple of significant correlations to be noted in table 3 indicates that monitoring and accommodating forms of journalism clearly do not go together as indicated by a strong negative correlation (r = −0.532, p = .007).

### Table 2. Correlations between journalistic role perceptions and MIPEX and emancipative values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MIPEX</th>
<th>Emancipative values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>−0.133</td>
<td>−0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>−0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventionism</td>
<td>−0.479**</td>
<td>−0.714***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>−0.402*</td>
<td>−0.590**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>−0.355*</td>
<td>−0.034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01.
Table 3. Intercorrelations among journalistic role perceptions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Monitoring</th>
<th>Interventionism</th>
<th>Collaboration</th>
<th>Accommodation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>0.538***</td>
<td>.691***</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>0.367*</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.752***</td>
<td>−0.532***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventionism</td>
<td>0.752***</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01.

5.2. Cluster Analysis

Only two countries have both a strong integration policy (high MIPEX) and a strong emphasis on tolerance among journalists (cf. Figure 1 and Figure 2). These two countries are Portugal and Sweden. Another small cluster consists of Latvia and Turkey: both on the outside of Europe, these two countries exhibit strong emphasis on

Figure 1. Four clusters of the press based on MIPEX and journalists’ perception of their role as promoting tolerance and cultural diversity.

Figure 2. Four clusters of the press based on MIPEX and the role perception that journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity.
tolerance among journalists, but also a weak integration policy, based on the MIPEX score.

Next to these two small clusters, we identified two larger clusters, which are clearly different regions. The first one consists of Western European countries. These countries have highly developed integration policies, but their journalists do not seem too concerned with promoting tolerance and cultural diversity. Next to the Western European countries, English-speaking Western countries outside Europe join this cluster: Australia, Canada and the United States.

The second large cluster includes only one English-speaking country: Ireland. Iceland is also included in this cluster. In addition to Iceland and Ireland, a large group of Central and Eastern European countries are part of the cluster as well. South Korea also joins this cluster.

The second clustering exercise is a further attempt to classify the data with four clusters using other variables. It resulted in four clusters of the press based on emancipative values measured in the WVS and the journalists’ perception of their role as promoting tolerance and cultural diversity (Figure 3 and 4). This cluster solu-
tion also includes two small clusters and two large clusters. Two countries that already stood out in the first clustering exercise once again confirm their uniqueness. Sweden, high on MIPEX, is also scoring very high on the emancipative values. On the other hand, Turkey is scoring low on emancipative values as well as on MIPEX. Although the clustering method we used does not tend to form small clusters the uniqueness of Sweden and Turkey makes them one country cluster anyhow.

The two other countries—Portugal and Latvia—that belong to the first cluster’s small groups join another, larger cluster. This cluster includes the bulk of countries that were grouped together in the ‘low MIPEX-low tolerance’ cluster. There is once again similarity between the large group of countries in the ‘high emancipative values and low tolerance’ cluster and the ‘high MIPEX-low tolerance’ cluster.

Finally, we produced clusters using interventionism and the journalistic focus on tolerance as input (Figure 5 and Figure 6). Iceland, a country appearing together with very different countries in the earlier cluster analyses, has its very own place in this cluster analysis, characterized by low interventionism and a low focus on promoting tolerance among journalists.

Figure 5. Four clusters of the press based on interventionism and the journalists’ perception of their role as promoting tolerance and cultural diversity.

Figure 6. Four clusters of the press based on interventionism and journalists’ perception of their role as promoting tolerance and cultural diversity.
The combination of high interventionism with a high focus on tolerance among journalists has a clear regional Southern identity in this cluster analysis. Journalism in the Baltic countries has the features found in Southern countries specifically regarding the focus on tolerance and interventionism, making these countries also a part of this cluster.

In this cluster analysis the countries that are in the ‘high-high’ and ‘low-low’ clusters are easily identified from a geographic point of view. In the ‘high-low’ and ‘low-high’ groups, however, we find all the Germanic language-speaking countries, as well as Finland and the Czech Republic, two countries that are geographically close to these Germanic countries. It is however difficult to make a clear distinction between the two groups since the countries mentioned are scattered throughout these two clusters.

6. Conclusion

Our main conclusion is that, contrary to what we expected, countries with a higher focus on promoting tolerance in journalism cultures have less emancipative values and migrant-friendly policies (hence falsifying hypothesis 1 and 2). Promoting tolerance is a value in countries where journalistic culture is interventionist, and hence opposed to the values in policy (as measured by MIPEX, cf. RQ 1) and society (as measured by the WVS, cf. RQ 2). Our results indicate that journalism professionals in countries without a clear migrant integration policy seem to consider it as their explicit task to counterbalance the main policy line set out in their home country when it comes to immigration and openness.

Interventionism—often seen through its political dimension—can also be viewed as a will to actively promote some civic values among the public opinion. This refers to the ‘opinion guide’ role that journalists take on when political or social issues are being strongly debated. During the 2015 migration crisis certain media outlets adopted a welcoming tone towards refugees and tried to counter negative perceptions and stereotypes. Recent research shows that this is far from clear: The UNHCR report on press coverage of the refugee crisis in Europe shows that in many countries refugees have been presented in a negative light, primarily as a problem, and not as a resource that could benefit the receiving country (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2016; Finnish Institute, 2016).

International comparative research on interventionism (Hanitzsch et al., 2011) shows that this role conception of journalism tends to be unpopular in Western countries. The active promotion of particular values, ideas, groups and social change is generally not a characteristic of western journalistic cultures. This analysis shows that within a sample of mainly western countries differences appear, whereby in countries with less developed integration policies and emancipative values stronger interventionism in journalism is seen. Notwithstanding the importance of detachment in Western journalism. Despite the unpopularity of detachment in Western journalism, journalists might also be under pressure to give opinions. In an era where journalism needs to adjust its profile to come up with something new next to the stream of Internet news data, giving opinions might be a fruitful business model, that replaces the classical ideal of detachment. Reunanen and Koljonen (2018) found that at least in one Western country, i.e., Finland, younger journalists adhere to alternative journalism ideals, that support journalists to give their opinions rather than offering merely a mirror of reality. This new tendency in journalism might actually counterbalance the evolution towards increased detachment as predicted by Hallin and Mancini (2004).

Moving on to the results of our cluster analyses (RQ 3), Sweden—one of the most welcoming countries during the recent so-called refugee crisis—typifies countries with both a tolerance-oriented journalism culture and strongly tolerance-oriented policies and public opinion. Nevertheless, Sweden has a journalistic workforce that does not adhere to interventionist ideals.

Our exercise identified different clusters of Southern countries, always including Turkey. Promoting tolerance in these countries is an important journalistic value, and this echoes interventionism in journalism culture, so as to remedy the lack of a tolerance-oriented policy and public opinion.

Clusters including other Northern and Southern countries are less straightforward. Eastern Europe occasionally joins the Southern cluster, but it also stands out of the latter because it has a lower focus on promoting tolerance and cultural diversity in journalism.

Some Western European countries join the cluster which includes Sweden, but not always. They are characterized by a non-interventionist journalism culture and adhere to migrant-friendly values (emancipative values index and MIPEX). However, promoting tolerance and cultural diversity is less important in their journalistic culture.

The Iberian countries Spain and Portugal are special in that they share similarities with Western European countries, especially in developing migrant-friendly policies, but they are also more interventionist in their journalism cultures.

These results raise the question of the specific values and discourses shared by journalism as a distinct field in societies. We see that journalists often claim to defend and promote tolerance and diversity, even in countries where the data point at a weaker culture of tolerance. Cultural and political causes of this particular discourse warrant further study. We must keep in mind that journalists’ discourses ought to be considered in their normative dimension, which has long been developed by journalists themselves and still remains a place of debate and contestation in and outside the field. Discourses about core values of journalists often embrace broad notions such as freedom of speech, respect and tolerance. They are well developed in journalistic cultures and play an identity role that anchor journalism’s autonomy in soci-
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**Conflict of Interests**

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Article

Immigrant, Nationalist and Proud: A Twitter Analysis of Indian Diaspora Supporters for Brexit and Trump

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Abstract

The Brexit referendum to leave the EU and Trump’s success in the US general election in 2016 sparked new waves of discussion on nativism, nationalism, and the far right. Within these analyses, however, very little attention has been devoted towards exploring the transnational ideological circulation of Islamophobia and anti-establishment sentiment, especially amongst diaspora and migrant networks. This article thus explores the role of the Indian diaspora as mediators in populist radical right discourse in the West. During the Brexit referendum and Trump’s election and presidency, a number of Indian diaspora voices took to Twitter to express pro-Brexit and pro-Trump views. This article presents a year-long qualitative study of these users. It highlights how these diasporic Indians interact and engage on Twitter in order to signal belonging on multiple levels: as individuals, as an imaginary collective non-Muslim diaspora, and as members of (populist radical right) Twitter society. By analysing these users’ social media performativity, we obtain insight into how social media spaces may help construct ethnic and (trans)national identities according to boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. This article demonstrates how some Indian diaspora individuals are embedded into exclusivist national political agendas of the populist radical right in Western societies.

Keywords
Brexit; diaspora; Indian; integration; multiculturalism; populism; radical right; Trump; Twitter

Issue

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1. Introduction

This article explores the role of British and American-based Indian diaspora supporters for Brexit and Trump. It begins by introducing how the Brexit referendum to leave the European Union and Trump’s campaign and presidency in the US (both which at times deliberately targeted the Indian diaspora) utilised populist radical right rhetoric to galvanise support on social media. In response, the emergence of pro-Brexit and pro-Trump social media movements based on identitarian membership, such as ‘Sikhs for Britain’ and ‘Hindus for Trump’, as well as the establishment of advocacy organisations such as the Republican Hindu Coalition in the US which openly supported Trump’s candidacy, reveals some diasporic Indians as proponents of populist radical right ideas.

One legacy of Indian diaspora political mobilisation in the West is largely based on Hindutva (or Hindu nationalism), an ideology that promotes the superiority of Hindu civilisation from the threat of Islam and Muslim ‘invasion’. Hindutva resonates amongst a diaspora keen to preserve their Hindu identity by cultivating a long-distance nationalism that foregrounds belonging ‘back home’ whilst still creating a sense of collective identity amongst diaspora communities in the West. Sikh and Christian Indian diaspora groups have likewise successfully mobilised in community building efforts that aim to highlight their religious identities in Western multicultural societies. Consequently, non-Muslim Indian diaspora activism has attempted to distinguish a boundary against the Muslim ‘other’, building on Islamophobic anxiety prevalent in a post-9/11 era. This article thus posits that anti-Muslim
anxiety, and anti-establishment sentiment (who are held accountable for pro-Muslim policies), are core issues that motivate such Indian diaspora communities to support populist radical right agendas.

Following a year-long qualitative study of Indian diaspora Twitter users who express pro-Brexit and pro-Trump views, this article highlights their engagement in political discourse within the Brexit and Trump Twitter-sphere(s). Their interactions help (re)produce key issues and rhetoric within the populist radical right online milieu. Importantly, these users incorporate an ‘integration’ narrative to justify their positioning as ‘good immigrants’ in Western societies (as opposed to non-‘integration’ tendencies of Muslims). By doing so, these diasporic Indians provide insight into how online spaces may help construct meanings of ethnic and (trans)national identities according to boundaries of inclusion/exclusion.

This article highlights online Indian diaspora supporters for Brexit and Trump by situating their expressions of Islamophobia and anti-establishment sentiment in order to embed themselves within the populist radical right agenda of exclusionary nationalism in Western societies. By illuminating what may be assumed as paradoxical political views of an ethnic minority demographic, this article contributes towards understanding and explaining their support for populist radical right ideology in the West.


Ideologically, the populist radical right promotes a combination of ethno-nationalism, xenophobia expressed as cultural racism, and anti-establishment populism (Rydgren, 2005, 2017). National identity is conflated with a distinct cultural identity rooted in an ethnic past; the populist radical right seeks to ‘preserve’ national culture by keeping separate different cultures, i.e., ethno-pluralism. The contemporary threat of ethno-pluralism is the apprehension that Islam—and consequently, Muslims—is the fundamental ‘other’ in Western societies. Therefore, the populist radical right holds “a visceral opposition to, and demonization of Islam” and consequently, “immigrants from Muslim countries”, whom are viewed as threatening to national values (Kallis, 2015, p. 28; Rydgren, 2007, p. 244) in the post-9/11 era. The populist radical right criticises the ‘elite’ political and media establishment for failing to adequately resolve issues such as immigration, integration, and (ethno-)national identity, using Islam as a placeholder to articulate these grievances.

Whilst demand and supply factors help explain the emergence and success of the populist radical right, including political opportunities and increasing discontent and disaffection with governing institutions and parties, the role of mass media is also key in disseminating populist radical right discourses and agendas towards a wider audience (Kallis, 2013; Rydgren, 2005). The transnational diffusion of ideas and practices made possible through media and communication technologies reflects a pivotal shift in populist radical right platforms. The effect is a growing global wave that has taken root across numerous locales:

[5] Strong points of ideological and political convergence have started to crystallize, turning the radical right into a truly transnational European and occasionally trans-Atlantic force...The topicality of a new range of issues, such as immigration, international terrorism, national sovereignty, globalization...have created a political milieu that has allowed the radical right not only to thrive but also to unite its otherwise disparate and fragmented forces. (Kallis, 2015, p. 28)

This noteworthy phenomenon describes the appeal, and at times, success, of populist radical right movements and parties. In the case of the UK Independence Party (UKIP)-backed Brexit campaign and Trump’s election and presidency, both presented issues that resonated with similar demographics, but delivered them according to local narratives.

During the 2016 referendum campaign for Britain’s membership in the EU, UKIP seized the opportunity to combine its Eurosceptic platform with disdain for Westminster. UKIP took a tactical approach by attacking the establishment for failing to address issues of immigration and integration—escalated by sensational media coverage of the refugee crisis. Indeed, then UKIP leader Nigel Farage “blamed state multiculturalism for the rise of home-grown terrorism in Europe” (Kallis, 2015, pp. 34–35), citing the metropolitan elite for enacting policies that created ‘parallel lives’ and hence, Islamist extremism within communities. In doing so, UKIP portrayed Muslims as a ‘fifth column’ within British society who were a threat to national security, but more importantly, national culture. By linking potential extremist activity of future refugees to past integration policy failures, UKIP promoted a discourse of fear in the present. Given UKIP’s stance as the party which claimed issue ownership on immigration (see Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), its referendum rhetoric built upon pre-existing anxieties surrounding uncontrolled borders.

During the campaign, UKIP employed an extensive social media strategy for Vote Leave. The party significantly used Twitter’s infrastructure as an avenue to garner support for Brexit, including the ability to broadcast the party’s platform to users instead of the mainstream media; setting the discursive framing of the Leave camp; building on previous Eurosceptic movements to create a broader coalition; and providing the appearance of democratic representation in the political realm. Yet, there was “substantial focus on mobi-
lization of existing supporters, rather than converting new ones” (Usherwood & Wright, 2017, p. 380). Pro-Brexit Twitter users engaged in diffusing information to ideologically similar users, thus creating online “polarized in-groups” as had also occurred in the 2015 general campaign (Segesten & Bossetta, 2016, pp. 14–15). This phenomenon reflects what are termed “ideological cyberghettoes” (Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2017, p. 4) or “homogeneous affective echo chambers” in which individuals selectively expose themselves to sources that reinforce their political opinions (Himmelboim et al., 2016, p. 1395). The extensive use of Twitter bots by the pro-Brexit side additionally helped generate targeted content (Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). In short, UKIP exercised an impressive social media strategy during the EU referendum that helped ensure its populist radical right message had reached an intended audience.

With parallels in rhetoric and strategy to the UKIP-backed Vote Leave campaign (Wilson, 2017), Trump’s campaign likewise galvanised support employing a populist radical right narrative throughout the US national election the same year. Whilst a majority of Trump’s policy proposals were not radical, the campaign’s rhetoric was outwardly hostile towards governing political institutions (Eiermann, 2016). In a study of Trump’s Twitter following, for example, Wang, Niemi, Li, and Hu (2016) found that attacks on the Democrats (i.e., the incumbent political party) received the most “likes”; in short, anti-establishment sentiment was a motivating factor for Trump supporters who were largely disaffected with the governing status quo. Further, Trump’s use of informal, direct, and provocative language on Twitter helped construct and normalise the image of a homogenous nation threatened by the dangerous ‘other’ (Kreis, 2017). More research on the Trump campaign’s social media strategy is needed in order to effectively evaluate the extent of online support for populist radical right discourse, although it has been noted how Trump disrupted the norms of election campaigning on social media (Enli, 2017).

3. A New, Growing Base?

It seems paradoxical (and rare) that ethnic minorities and/or immigrants would support populist radical right platforms. As such, there exists very little research on these supporters. Two exceptions are case studies in Sweden and the Netherlands.

The Sweden Democrats (SD) is an ethno-nationalist party with roots in Swedish fascism. Pettersson, Liebkind, and Sakki (2016) found that ethnic minority and/or immigrant SD politicians had complex, fluid, and multifaceted identity constructions. Often revealed was a “discursive tension between an assigned immigrant or ethnic minority identity on the one hand, and an asserted Swedish identity on the other” (Pettersson et al., 2016, p. 637).

By presenting themselves as a ‘good immigrant,’ these politicians reinforced the narrative that immigrants need only to work hard to succeed and will ultimately be accepted in society. As such, ‘elite’ liberals were viewed as pandering to immigrants who are assumed to “not think for themselves” and who are, importantly, non-national (Pettersson et al., 2016, pp. 637–638). Mulinari and Neergaard (2018) similarly found that migrant activists in the SD describe individual stories of hard work as a means of successful integration, as opposed to assumed cultural differences or unwillingness of new migrants to assimilate into Swedish culture. Combined with this narrative was opposition to Islam that feared new migrants of Muslim background would create “enclave societies” and foster the “Islamisation of Sweden” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2018, p. 14).

In the Netherlands, Roopram and van Steenbergen (2014) analysed Hindustani2 voters of the Freedom Party (PVV), a populist radical right party with a strong anti-immigration and anti-Islam platform. Whilst some Hindustani PVV voters promoted a “work ethos” discourse citing concerns of immigration as an economic burden on the welfare state, others feared Islam as a cultural threat to the Netherlands (Roopram & van Steenbergen, 2014, pp. 56–57). The latter spoke of Islamist radicalisation and extremism, connecting historical and cultural narratives of past Muslim rule in India to the contemporary threat of “Islamization” of Dutch society (Roopram & van Steenbergen, 2014, pp. 55–56). This is key as it signals how global Islamophobic tropes can operate and adapt to local contexts, and ultimately, bolster support for populist radical right ideology in the West.

If we are to consider how the SD and PVV appeal to ethnic minorities and/or immigrants, then such insight might also apply to pro-Brexit and pro-Trump Indian diaspora supporters. Islamophobic and anti-establishment views promoted by the Vote Leave campaign and Trump’s campaign and presidency likely resonated with some diasporic Indians3. Yet, the articulation of populist radical right ideas amongst the diaspora is grounded within a historical legacy of anti-Muslim sentiment. The next section highlights the evolution of Indian diaspora political mobilisation in the UK and US as framed according to non-Muslim identity building.

4. Building a Minority Identity

The performance of diasporic identity is a way of simultaneously constructing imaginaries of the homeland and of creating a minority identity outside India. For many within the Indian diaspora, the formation of a minority identity in Western societies is construed along religious lines as reflected in the historical and contemporary politics of nation-building on the subcontinent. Although political mobilisation and activism of Hindu, Sikh, and

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2 Hindustani refers to Hindus, Muslims, and Christians who migrated as indentured labourers from India to Suriname, and then to the Netherlands.

3 Based on polling data, 33% of British South Asians voted for Brexit in 2016 (Ashcroft Polls) and 16% of Indian Americans voted for Trump in the US national election (National Asian American Survey).
Christian communities in the West have alleviated these religious tensions carried over with the diaspora, one issue remains stark in the post-9/11 era: their distinct framing as non-Muslim religious identities.

Hindutva (or Hindu nationalism) ideology and its organisations have a historical legacy amongst the Hindu diaspora in the UK, US, Canada, the Caribbean, and eastern and southern Africa (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000, p. 435). Whilst joining in Hindutva activities is a way of building socio-cultural capital with others (Mathew & Prashad, 2000, p. 524), it more importantly provides comfort to a diaspora seeking to define itself in the West (see Bhatt, 2000). The demand from migrants to educate their children in Hindu traditions (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007) reflects an attempt to reconnect with the ‘culture’ of ‘back home’. Hindutva organisations seize upon this opportunity to present a version of Hindutva that can accommodate the diasporic experience.

The shift to multiculturalism as a policy agenda in the West has had a profound impact on diasporic Hindutva organisations, whether serving as ethnic lobbies in party politics, or adopting a human rights discourse in terms of a victimhood narrative (Bhatt, 2000, p. 580; Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007; Kamat & Mathew, 2003; Therwath, 2012; Zavos, 2010, p. 12). In the UK, these organisations regularly feature in British government policies related to diversity, multiculturalism, and community cohesion in the name of religious and cultural plurality (Zavos, 2010, p. 18). Self-described umbrella organisations campaign on issues of Hindu representation in the public sphere, thereby institutionalising (and essentialising) Hindu identity (see Anderson, 2015). In post-9/11 America, Hindutva manifests as a religious lobby to policy makers and legislators, as Hindu advocacy organisations frame their agendas according to US national interest. They distance themselves from the Muslim ‘other’ and exploit anti-Islam sentiments whilst simultaneously proclaim its critics as “Hinduphobic” (Kurien, 2006, 2016). Diasporic Hindutva becomes a mediator of transnational ideological manifestations of anti-Muslim anxiety, albeit adapted to local contexts. It is thus the outcome of a highly politicised agenda that combines transnational and multicultural identity politics.

In addition to diasporic Hindutva, Sikh and Christian diasporas have also played a prominent role in political mobilisation in the West. Of relevance is the rise of some Sikh activism surrounding the narrative of Muslim grooming gangs in the UK, which allegedly target Sikh girls for conversion to Islam (Singh, 2017). For these Sikhs, such cases “often feeds on existing historical narratives and contemporary Sikh/Muslim tensions” which reinforce Muslims as a threat to non-Muslim communities in Western societies (Singh, 2017, p. 6). Indeed, the issue of Muslim grooming gangs (further explored below), has created alliances between diasporic Sikhs, Christians, and Hindus, with counter-jihad organisations such as the English Defence League, to promote an anti-Muslim agenda (Lane, 2012). In a move towards populist radical right support, such ideological connections have expanded to include issues such as immigration. In Thorleifsson’s (2016) research amongst British Sikh Brexiters for example, support for restrictive immigration policies was articulated in order to maintain historic Anglo-Indian links. In the context of the Brexit referendum, not only (dominantly Muslim) migrants from the refugee crisis, but Eastern European migrants from the EU were viewed as not ‘culturally’ belonging to Britain’s national imagined community. Here, British Sikhs evoked a nostalgia for Commonwealth and empire that they perceived as an entitlement for immigrant status.

A lacuna remains in how some diasporic Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians, united by the othering of Islam/Muslims as an approach to integration, translates into support for populist radical right agendas. The following section details a year-long qualitative study of Indian diaspora Twitter users who express support for Brexit and Trump. It posits that anti-Muslim anxiety and anti-establishment sentiment are core issues that motivate such users.

5. Methodology

Unlike a large number of studies conducted on Twitter that mainly incorporate a quantitative approach with data collection (Ampofo, Anstead, & O’Loughlin, 2011; Barbera & Rivero, 2014; Freelon & Karpf, 2014; Froio & Ganesh, 2018; Hartung, Klinger, Schmidtke, & Vogel, 2017; for an exception see Tromble, 2016), this article focuses on a qualitative design that aims to capture the nature of Twitter activity and interactions of users. Thirty-nine Twitter account users were manually chosen of diasporic Indians living in the UK and US who express pro-Brexit and/or pro-Trump political opinions, whether in the form of tweeting original content, retweets, and/or replies to other users. Data collection included diasporic Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians as a way of empirically demonstrating expressions of anti-Muslim Indian identity in the West. At times, Sikh and Christian diaspora users did express disdain for Hindutva, but these users distinguished themselves by explicitly asserting a non-Muslim identity. Their deliberate discourse identification reveals how individuals in the Indian diaspora choose to actively distance themselves from Muslims. Hence, these Hindu, Sikh, and Christian Indian diaspora users help reconstruct the myth of Muslim ‘otherness’ in an effort to politically integrate in Western societies.

The location of accounts collected was determined by listed profile information and/or tweets that originated with British or American content which signaled deeper familiarity of local issues (this ran the risk of assuming knowledge was linked to place of residence). What was certain was that accounts had to contain po-

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The rationale for this selection was to determine how users perform their online political identities. Accounts that had never tweeted, however, were disregarded for the sample. Over time, some account users did change privacy settings to protected tweets and data collection of users ceased unless tweets were made public again. Others had changed Twitter handles or to entirely new accounts, making it difficult to track accounts at times. Table 1 details the type of user accounts, for which two and seven are organisations in the UK and US, and thirteen and seventeen belong to individuals, respectively. The number of tweets for each account type is given rounded to the nearest thousandth, as is the number of followers.

We can already note two characteristics of users. Firstly, a majority of account users comprise of individuals rather than organisations. Second, individuals tweet at a greater frequency than organisations, despite a majority with less than 5,000 followers (yet, it is only individual accounts that have more than 10,000 followers). Based on these characteristics, we can infer that although organisations serve as mobilising agents, it is clearly individuals that act as mobilisers in the Twitter-sphere. The findings discussed below indicate how these individuals establish an online presence which moves beyond quantitative impact, towards performing a discursive political identity.

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From April 2017 to April 2018, NVivo’s NCapture software was used to scrape entire timelines of the selected Twitter accounts, providing the first to most recent tweet of each user. Scrapes were downloaded every two weeks and analysed within four chronological phases, with phase I including tweets collected from April 2017 to July 2017, phase II from July 2017 to October 2017, phase III from October 2017 to January 2018, and phase IV from January 2018 to April 2018. By allowing for a longitudinal study to prevent bias from data collection during one phase, analysing the data according to phases allowed to observe shifts, if any, in issue salience over time.

6. Findings

6.1. Employing Populist Radical Right Discourse

Utilising NVivo software tools, the word frequency of tweets was extracted, inclusive of stemmed words, e.g., ‘vote’ and ‘voting’. Figures 1 to 4, reflective of each phase, display a word cloud generated by NVivo of the most commonly used words in tweets.

Clearly, the word ‘Trump’ (as well as the president’s Twitter handle) was the most frequent word within the tweet collection across all phases. Other frequent words included: ‘people’, ‘vote’, ‘Clinton’, ‘Obama’, ‘Muslim’, ‘election’, ‘Islam’, ‘media’, ‘liberal’, etc. Visualising word frequency in a word cloud is useful as it indicates common topics discussed on Twitter. Word frequency shifted in relation to current political events during the Brexit referendum and subsequent negotiations, as well as Trump’s campaign and administration. However, as indicated in the figures, word usage tended to remain consistent across all phases. This repetition of language is key as it reflects how users choose to display themselves according to what Papacharissi (2011) describes as “a networked self”, whereby users construct a self-identity within “converged mediated environments” (p. 309) such as Twitter. Twitter becomes:

A sense of place...formed in response to the particular sense of self, or in response to the identity performance constructed upon that place. This presents the modus operandi for the networked self, and the con-

Table 1. Breakdown of Twitter account users by type of account, country, number of tweets, and number of followers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Account</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
<th>Followers*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0–1,000</td>
<td>1,000– 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *5 accounts (1 organisation and 4 individuals) were deleted in the period following data collection and the collation of the table. The number of followers for these accounts is unknown.

5 To protect anonymity of account users.
Figure 1. Phase I: April 2017 to July 2017.

Figure 2. Phase II: July 2017 to October 2017.

Figure 3. Phase III: October 2017 to January 2018.
text of newer patterns of sociability and routes to sociability that emerge. (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 317)

Here, we can see that users continue to perform a particular identity over time by engaging in a discourse—or “a semiology that affords connection” (Papacharissi, 2011, p. 317)—as constituted within a Twitter community.

In order to explore how certain words were used in context, however, five themes reflective of populist radical right discourse (as discussed in Section 2), and speculated issues of concern for Indian diaspora users living in the UK and US were selected. These five themes—that were further categorised by subtheme—include: 1) ‘immigration’ (including the subthemes ‘illegal’; ‘refugee’; ‘rape’; ‘multiculturalism’); 2) ‘foreign policy’ (including the subthemes ‘EU’; ‘India’ and/or ‘Modi’ and/or ‘BJP’); 3) ‘establishment’ (including the subthemes ‘Clinton’; ‘Obama’; ‘Democrats’; ‘Labour’; ‘liberal’ and/or ‘left’; ‘media’ and/or ‘BBC’ and/or ‘CNN’); 4) ‘Islam’ (including the subthemes ‘Muslim’; ‘terrorism’ and/or ‘extremism’; ‘ISIS’); and 5) ‘Indian’ (including the subtheme ‘Hindu’). Rather than employing NVivo software to algorithmically determine themes (i.e., codes), the coding scheme was inductively developed by assessing tweets in the preliminary stage of data collection. Given that users tweeted about local political context and/or issues, e.g., refugee crisis in Europe or CNN coverage of Trump, a qualitative coding manual was created to reflect users’ topical interests. Instead of coding all the topics discussed by users, codes pertaining to populist radical right discourse; the exceptions were tweets discussing ‘India’/‘Modi’/‘BJP’, as this indicated awareness of Indian politics, and tweets including ‘Indian’/‘Hindu’ as markers of ethnic identity. Tweets were coded to one or more themes/subthemes, depending on the content of the tweet. Throughout a year of data collection, a total of 185,580 English-language tweets were manually coded.

To examine the nature of the relationship between themes, a NVivo-generated cluster analysis as displayed in Figures 5 to 8 provides a visual representation of themes/codes clustered together based on words in common. NVivo generates a cluster analysis of word similarity using the Pearson correlation coefficient as a metric. The result is a diagram that clusters codes together if they have many words in common. In short, Figures 5 to 8 show that themes which share a branch contain the same words as used in tweets. By conducting a cluster analysis for each phase, we can again observe how conversations shift over a year, but now relating to themes.

Based on the cluster analysis in Figure 5, we can infer, for example, that the theme of ‘multiculturalism’ is frequently used in tweets referencing the British Labour party, as well as the role of the ‘BB’ and the ‘EU’ in relation to ‘Labour’. In Figure 6, this shifts to include the ‘establishment’. This is likely due to the policy mandate of the centre-left political and media establishment on multiculturalism, and subsequently how critics place blame on its failure. In Figure 7, however, tweets about ‘multiculturalism’ and the ‘establishment’ shifts towards conversations focusing on ‘ISIS’, ‘refugees’, ‘Islam’, ‘terrorism/extremism’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘rape’. This indicates that no longer is a single political party being targeted, but all mainstream political parties which are designated as the ‘establishment’. Additionally, anti-Muslim sentiment becomes the primary articulation for criticism of multiculturalism. But, in Figure 8, ‘establishment’ disappears and once again, ‘BB’, ‘EU’, and ‘Labour’ are prominently featured within tweets, only this time in relation to Islamophobic discourse. Thus, the centre-left political and

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6 Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India.

7 The Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist political party, which is the ruling party in India led by Modi.
Figure 5. Phase I: April 2017 to July 2017.

Figure 6. Phase II: July 2017 to October 2017.
Figure 7. Phase III: October 2017 to January 2018.

Figure 8. Phase IV: January 2018 to April 2018.
media establishment remains over time the primary opposition for these Indian diaspora users, who are in turn reinforcing populist radical right ideology.

Similarly, ‘left/liberal’ is often initially referenced in tweets that also discuss ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism/extremism’, which in turn, is also related to the branch of tweets that reference ‘refugee’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘rape’. But again, this shifts after six months as ‘left/liberal’ is then used almost exclusively in tweets that refer to ‘Democrats’, ‘Clinton’, and ‘Obama’ for the last two phases. This change is due to a surge in Twitter activity as the Trump administration increasingly targets the Democratic Party for opposing policy changes.

The relationship between these branches of tweets thus highlight not only how certain populist radical right narratives circulate in online conversations, but also how these conversations shifted over a year-long period in response to current events. Tracing conversation dynamics amongst users provides insight into how their articulation of populist radical right discourse adapts to wider socio-political conditions. Although all tweets were analysed combining UK and US-based accounts—that is, convergently rather than comparatively—these two examples of themes highlighted above indicate country-specific nomenclature. ‘Multiculturalism’ remains primarily a British term, likely due to its popular usage in the UK context, as opposed to ‘diversity’ as is common in American parlance. Similarly, the ‘left/liberal’ theme signals greater usage in US-based tweets, given the greater propensity to identify Democrats as liberals (vis-à-vis Republicans as conservatives) in American popular understanding of the liberal/conservative dichotomy. This is not to suggest all tweets within these two themes fall neatly within national boundaries, however, but serves as an indication based on volume. What is apparent is that anti-Muslim anxiety becomes a continuous refrain within both themes, thus suggesting how these users understand ‘multiculturalism’ and the ‘left/liberals’ in relation to fear of Islam/Muslims. The effect is a transnationalisation of anti-Muslim anxiety as a recurring trope.

Like the word clouds, the cluster analyses provide visual representation of the tweets at a general scale to show the relationship between themes. Repetition once again appears as a trend (e.g., anti-Muslim sentiment), as the cluster analyses indicate that word similarity generally remains consistent between themes, with slight changes taking place over a year’s duration. As such, we can infer that these users tend to hold stable political attitudes in line with populist radical right ideology. The following section explores tweets of the ‘Muslim’ theme in-depth in order to provide insight into how these users conceptualise the notion of ‘integration’ through online discursive performativity.

6.2. A Case of ‘Love Jihad’

By coding tweets according to word usage in conversation, this explores how these Indian diaspora users participate within Twittersphere currency and community. But in order to situate conversation dynamics within themes, this allows us to look in-depth at how issues are framed in tweets. In tweets coded to the ‘Muslim’ theme, for instance, Muslims are often characterised as violent, especially with the aim to cause “destruction” in the UK, US, and/or Europe more generally. Links to ISIS or terrorist activity is frequently cited as a major concern (as indicated in the cluster analyses above). Similarly, Muslims are described as a “cancer” in relation to Islam as a “poisonous ideology”. Further references to Islam include describing the Prophet Mohammed as a pedophile and rapist, and consequently, Western women as targets of “rape” or “sex slaves” by Muslims continuing Islamic practice. Tweets also frequently describe Muslims in reference to immigration. Portrayed as “cockroaches”, Muslims are seen as invaders constantly “breeding” in order to destruct Western/European “civilization”. Consequently, they are viewed as foreigners who must be deported. Following this line of logic, then, tweets usually criticise the left (or “libtards”) and the media (or “presstitutes”) for their failure to see Muslims along these tropes. Depicting Muslims according to these negative representations fits into the populist radical right narrative. By dehumanising Muslims as violent terrorists or ‘criminals’, this reinforces an ‘otherness’ that is foundational towards the ideological projection of exclusionary nationalism. Here, these Indian diaspora Twitter users are consciously embodying an image of non-Muslimness in order to assert claims of national belonging.

Indeed, these Indian diaspora Twitter users choose to emphasise a non-Muslim Indian identity in order to differentiate themselves from Muslims. Users often describe instances of “love jihad” in which not only white Western young women, but also Hindu, Sikh, and Christian girls are targeted by Muslim grooming gangs. For instance, Rohan, a young British man of Hindu background, tweets:

“Horrible sexual grooming of Hindu girls in UK.”

A website link in Rohan’s tweet emphasises that the perpetrators of these grooming—or “rape”—gangs are young Muslim men who have also targeted Hindu diaspora girls. Similarly, another user, Sikhs for Britain, tweets:

“A Sikh group wants politicians to stop describing the Rotherham grooming gang as ‘Asian’.”

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8 Words in double quotation marks are direct usage as they appear across a majority of tweets. However, personal identifying information has not been revealed and/or disclosed in the findings. Twitter user handles have been changed to protect anonymity, unless the account is managed by an organisation. Similarly, any quoted tweets have been changed from the original, but still reflect the meaning of content, unless the tweet has been deleted by the user in which case the original is quoted. Such alterations are necessary to ensure ethical compliance according to the Norwegian Centre for Research Data.
Here, Sikhs for Britain refers to the Rotherham grooming scandal in the UK, in which a group of British Pakistani men had been targeting young girls for sexual exploitation. This tweet highlights the need to distinguish the perpetrators’ religious background (i.e., Muslim) as the rationale for their actions.

Hence, these non-Muslim Indian diaspora users fear being misidentified as Muslim in the West. They push to be recognised for their religious identity and not an all-encompassing ‘Asian’ descriptor. Such tweets are used to justify Hinduism, Sikhism, and Christianity as religions that dictate respect for law and order, tolerance, and peace. The consequent representation is that Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians—as opposed to Muslims who are instinctively intolerant and violent—are well-integrated in Western societies.

Further, many tweets on this issue target the political and media establishment with claims of Muslim “appeasement” rather than protecting “innocent” Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians. Jasjit, a Sikh activist in the UK, tweets:

“Evidence that public officials withheld information of sexual grooming to protect liberalism.”

By presupposing that government officials have a leftist agenda that prevents transparency on the issue of grooming gangs, Jasjit reinforces a populist radical right discourse of anti-establishment sentiment. Other users also express this worldview. Rohan further tweets:

“The left clearly don’t give a s**t about organised Muslim child grooming gangs targeting non-Muslim children.”

Arjun, a young man of Hindu ancestry that converted to Christianity, similarly tweets:

“Wow, lefty white racist lady on Twitter calls me uncivilized for having an opinion on Muslim grooming gangs.”

Lastly, Chetan, a young British Hindu, tweets:

“Grooming gangs prosper under political correctness.”

By denoting the political orientation of the establishment as left-leaning, this serves as the basis for government officials to fail to address grooming gangs. Using terms such as ‘political correctness’ serves to augment the notion that multiculturalism policies promoted by the establishment have failed to address the concerns of non-Muslim Indian diaspora communities who feel victimised but are largely ignored in the public conversation.

Twitter serves as a site for these Indian diaspora users to create a networked self, one simultaneously built by fusing digitally networked action with personal action frames. An opportunity arises on Twitter “in which new public spaces opened up by media technologies are spaces with an implicit potential to frame vigorous, ‘bottom up’ trajectories of autonomous action accompanied by a strong sense of moral legitimacy” (Zavos, 2015, p. 22). Tweeting about Muslim grooming gangs targeting Hindu, Sikh, and Christian diaspora girls provides these users “a strong sense of moral legitimacy” given what they view as the failure of the political and media establishment to protect victims of abuse. By highlighting intercommunity tensions within the diaspora, these users reinforce the populist radical right narrative that Muslims will never be able to fully ‘integrate’ due to their fundamental ‘otherness’. Consequently, these users cultivate their own sense of identity and belonging on multiple levels: as individuals, as part of a collective non-Muslim Indian diaspora, and as members of (populist radical right) Twitter society.

7. Conclusion

This article highlights those in the Indian diaspora who promote exclusionary nationalist political agendas in Western, multicultural societies. It begins by situating how the UKIP-backe d Vote Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum and Trump’s election in 2016 advanced populist radical right discourse—in particular immigration and integration—on Twitter as a strategy to target intended audiences. Populist radical right discourse might alienate ethnic minorities and/or immigrants, yet, case studies in Sweden (with the SD) and the Netherlands (with the PVV) reveal that such supporters do exist to promote these platforms. In particular, the ‘good immigrant’ myth of ‘integration’ remains a constant refrain amongst supporters. Given previous, albeit limited, research on this phenomenon, such insight might apply to pro-Brexit and pro-Trump Indian diaspora supporters in the UK and US. This article then provides a brief overview of anti-Muslim Indian diaspora activism amongst Hindu, Sikh, and Christian communities in the UK and US in order to contextualise how these diasporic Indians, united by the othering of Islam/Muslims as an approach to integration, translates into support for populist radical right agendas. It posits that anti-Muslim anxiety and anti-establishment sentiment motivate Indian diaspora supporters of Brexit and Trump.

This article subsequently presents a year-long qualitative research design of Indian diaspora Twitter users who express support for Brexit and Trump. By exploring users who tweet simultaneously about Brexit and Trump, this allows for a convergent rather than a comparative analysis at a transnational scale. As active users in political conversations within the Brexit and Trump Twitter sphere(s), they help shape ideas, strategies, and agendas within the online milieu of populist radical right discourse. For these users, Twitter serves as a digital third place, a networked media environment that best reflects what McArthur and White (2016, p. 1) describe as “sites
of online sociability that both mirror and deviate from physical gathering sites”, but can effectively create the notion of a collective place for community gathering.

This article demonstrates the ways in which these Indian diaspora Twitter users express support for Brexit and Trump by cultivating a discursive online performance of a networked self. By highlighting their Hindu, Sikh, and Christian Indian diasporic identities, these users situate themselves as socially well-integrated in which they emphasise a non-Muslim identity that reproduces the notion that Muslims are a problematic ‘other’. The political and media establishment is similarly targeted for promoting pro-Muslim policies at the expense of non-Muslim communities in order to advance ‘political correctness’. Thus, these users not only further populist radical right narratives but help it adapt towards new boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. This article sheds light on how such practices amongst Indian diaspora individuals adds complexity in their support for populist radical right agendas in the UK and US.

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Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

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‘We Live Here, and We Are Queer!’ Young Adult Gay Connected Migrants’ Transnational Ties and Integration in the Netherlands

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Abstract

Upon arrival to Europe, young adult gay migrants are found grappling with sexual norms, language demands, cultural expectations, values and beliefs that may differ from their country of origin. Parallel processes of coming-out, coming-of-age and migration are increasingly digitally mediated. Young adult gay migrants are “connected migrants”, using smartphones and social media to maintain bonding ties with contacts in their home country while establishing new bridging relationships with peers in their country of arrival (Diminescu, 2008). Drawing on the feminist perspective of intersectionality, socio-cultural categories like age, race, nationality, migration status, and gender and sexuality have an impact upon identification and subordination, thus we contend it is problematic to homogenize these experiences to all young adult gay migrants. The realities of settlement and integration starkly differ between those living on the margins of Europe—forced migrants including non-normative racialized young gay men—and voluntary migrants—such as elite expatriates including wealthy, white and Western young gay men. Drawing on 11 in-depth interviews conducted in Amsterdam, the Netherlands with young adult gay forced and voluntary migrants, this article aims to understand how sexual identification in tandem with bonding and bridging social capital diverge and converge between the two groups all while considering the interplay between the online and offline entanglements of their worlds.

Keywords

bonding social capital; bridging social capital; connected migrants; digital diaspora; digital migration studies; forced migrants; gay; inter-ethnic social contact; sexuality; voluntary migrants

Issue

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1. A ‘Warm’ Welcome into Europe? The Digitally Mediated Experiences of Young Adult Gay Migrants

In this article, we seek to answer how everyday online digital practices and offline experiences of young gay forcibly displaced migrants and expatriates (ages 15–25 years) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, have impact upon their bonding and bridging social capital. We focus, in particular, on how social media affordances potentially impact intersectional identity formation and emotion management. The on- and offline experiences of young gay connected migrants are not homogeneous. Gay is the adjective to describe men who endure emotional, physical, and/or romantic attractions to other men hereafter. The critical black feminist toolbox of intersectionality seeks to make visible how young gay connected migrants are differentially hierarchically positioned and differentially position themselves (Crenshaw, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 2006). The forced and voluntary migrants involved in this research are similar in many ways (i.e., age, gender, sexual orientation, and city of migration) and negotiate cultural and social contexts (McPhail & Fisher, 2015), while they differ most noticeably on the grounds of migration and the axes of migration status, class, and often religion.
The immigration processes of forced and voluntary migrants into Europe do not embody the European Union’s motto ‘United in diversity’, signifying the continent’s pride of welcoming and embracing racial and sexual orientation differences. Colpani and Habed (2014) argue this slogan functions as a “normative device” by paradoxically targeting “certain Europeans”, as it produces “others from Europe as well as others within Europe” (pp. 36–37). Elite voluntary migrants travel in and out of Europe with ease in contrast to forced migrants (i.e., those fleeing from armed conflict including civil war; and persecution on the grounds of social group or sexuality) who are often met with racism and discrimination, and are situated as geopolitical dangers upon arriving in Europe (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). Furthermore, settlement and integration experiences of gay forced migrants—particularly those hailing from Muslim majority countries—starkly differ from gay voluntary migrants from the white, post-secular Global North (Bracke, 2012; Jivraj & de Jong, 2011). There are also points of convergence: both migrant groups are increasingly “connected migrants” (Diminescu, 2008), who use information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as the smartphone and social media to exchange text, audio and video messages to maintain “bonding” connections with pre-existing social networks and communities (i.e., family, friends, etc.) across geographical boundaries in their homeland, while establishing “bridging” relationships with members of the host country (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2018). Most pertinent here is both groups have to find their way through negotiating cultural and social contexts throughout their entire settlement and integration process, but while the forced migrants are often met with racism, discrimination, and class hierarchies in tandem both on- and offline (Alencar, 2018), expatriates can generally establish and grow their social capital with fewer burdens.

From the four domains important to successful refugee integration and settlement recognized in the literature: (1) conditions of employment, housing, education and health; (2) citizenship and rights; (3) processes of social connection within and between groups; and (4) structural barriers to connection (Ager & Strang, 2008), we focus here on the third and fourth domains, while also emphasizing the urgency of addressing integration and settlement of voluntary migrants such as expatriates, which are often taken for granted. As stated by boyd (2014), if individuals are surrounded by people who have social capital offline in the form of social networks, it is most likely to translate online. Forcibly displaced migrants often struggle to establish new connections having to negotiate with race and class hierarchies (Alencar, 2018), whereas expatriates are typically found to form inter-ethnic social contacts at an accelerated rate (McPhail & Fisher, 2015). We seek to contribute to emerging discussions in digital migration studies that examine the intersections of age, race and class with sexuality (Dhoest, 2018; Szulc, in press).

Research shows trajectories of sexual orientation identity development differ among gay people as a result of maturation, psycho-social development and interacting with changing social circles (Floyd & Bakeman, 2006). The process of sexual orientation identity development becomes even more challenging in the diaspora context. The life trajectory of young migrants is complex when having to juggle (sexual) identity(ies) construction and negotiate various cultural expectations in tandem. This co-occurrence not only negotiates race/ethnicity, language, culture and class, but gender and sexuality are also connected with the conception of transnational identities. For some individuals social media help elevate feelings of isolation during that particular period. Social media afford users the possibility to access and connect with a wider range of audiences surpassing national, racial and ethnic boundaries (McEwan & Sobre-Denton, 2011). Simply put, formerly unacquainted individuals can meet online and communicate typically through online groups, forums, platforms, and apps organized around common (sexual) identities and interests, including Grindr, Planet Romeo, Scruff, Blued, Line and Gaydar. These digital platforms are often publicly or semi-publicly accessible. This form of social capital is typically embedded in the local context of settlement and integration; virtually connecting with users ‘here’ rather than ‘there’ (Shield, 2018). Users have the choice of which online communities they join and with whom they connect. Online groups and communities can be resourceful places to seek and receive (and sometimes offer) cultural, emotional and social resources, and for some gay migrants, they may help lay the groundwork to receive these particular resources, potentially gaining bridging social capital.

What has been studied in excess is the role the internet and social media plays in providing gay people unique opportunities to exchange information, socialize and create communities, and explore and negotiate identities in spaces of their own (Berliner, 2018; Naezer, 2018) while the current literature neglects to bring awareness to the various roles social media play in the lives of diverging groups of gay migrants (Cassidy & Yang Wang, 2018). We aim to move beyond dominant “media-centric” approaches (Smets, 2017) and therefore, this article seeks to understand how the use of ICTs and social media play a part in young adult gay migrants’ everyday lives in the distinct urban setting of Amsterdam, the capital city of the Netherlands. In doing so, we seek to understand these co-occurrences through in-depth interviews inspired by a “non-digital-media-centric” approach (Smets, 2017). An ethnographic non-digital-media-centric approach allows us to move beyond digital fetishism in demanding attentiveness to wider contexts and structural power hierarchies. In our commitment to social justice research, we seek to offer a more holistic and humane perspective of young adult gay connected migrants by emphasizing situated differences, subjectivities and agency.

Before discussing the main findings, we first provide an overview of the current socio-political context. Sec-
ond, we situate our argument across the fields of critical youth, migration and internet studies. Third, we provide methodological considerations. Fourth, we present the empirical findings in three sections as follows: (1) online bonding experiences; (2) online bridging experiences; and (3) inter-ethnic social contacts in Amsterdam. Finally, we present the conclusions and highlight broader implications of this study.

2. Situating the Context

The Netherlands is commonly seen as a ‘promising land’ for migrants, a place of opportunity and tolerance, although this image should be met with skepticism. A substantial number of native-Dutch citizens have come to embody a “defensive localist” stance in that they are territorial of their ground and see it as their own (Keuzenkamp & Bos, 2007). The discussion of nationalism dominated the most recent 2017 national election race. Duyvendak (2011) highlights the extent to which the average native-Dutch citizen tolerates the ‘other’:

Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to be tolerant of those who are much like us...it is much harder to extend the same principles to the strangers in our midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs. (p. 90)

This homogenous conception of culture has polarized into two competing camps of conformity: (1) those of Netherlands-born citizens and those whose views are ‘progressive’ and; (2) those whose are not, which is often projected onto the Islamic cultures (Duyvendak, 2011). The notion of Dutch progressiveness is not only the gay community and their rights and interests, but also the greater LGBTQ community.

The Netherlands has taken great strides over the past few decades in becoming a relatively LGBTQ-friendly society. Providing an overview of how the Dutch state historically presents itself as an inclusive and accepting nation goes beyond the scope of our argument. Some milestones include the first wave of homo-emanicipation, which was achieved in 1971 when the equalization of the age of consent was passed (Jivraj & de Jong, 2011). As of 1981, the Netherlands deemed persecution on the basis of sexual orientation as reasonable grounds for seeking asylum (Bracke, 2012). In 1986, the Dutch government wrote the first “gay policy memorandum” and in 1987 the Homomonument was revealed in Amsterdam, a space to commemorate the LGBTQ people persecuted because of their sexual orientation (Keuzenkamp & Bos, 2007). In the 1990s, the federal government provided more protection to the LGBTQ community by criminalizing slanders against LGBTQ people and in 1994, the Equal Opportunities Act was enacted (Keuzenkamp & Bos, 2007). A second-wave of homo-emanicipation is linked to the introduction of same-sex marriage and the first same-sex marriage in the world was performed in Amsterdam. The Ministry of Education, Culture and Science created the publication LGBT and Gender Equality Policy Plan of the Netherlands 2011–2015 (Government of the Netherlands, 2012). It should thus pose no questions why LGBTQ people who live in countries that criminalize and persecute LGBTQ people flee to the Netherlands. However, it is crucial to steer clear of the homonationalist trap of situating the Netherlands (within Western Europe) as a safe haven for all LGBTQ people while framing other cultures as homophobic (Buijs, Hekma, & Duyvendak, 2011; Jivraj & de Jong, 2011). Geert Wilders, a member of the Dutch parliament, spreads his pro-gay, anti-Muslim-immigrant framework not only in the Netherlands, but also in countries including Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Germany (Shield, 2017). This right-wing nationalist rhetoric ‘welcomes’ LGBTQ rights, but bashes mass immigration and the Muslim population as threats to their political project (Shield, 2017). It may be due in part to this pro-gay, anti-muslim-immigrant framing that shaped border policies (Shield, 2017) leaving many gay migrants, specifically from the Middle East, to face difficulties at the Immigration-en Naturalisatiedienst (IND [Immigration and Naturalization Service]). During asylum procedures western ethnocentric conceptions of gay sexuality collide with non-European views; gay Muslim asylum seekers have been rejected from obtaining protective refugee status because judges ruled they were “not gay enough” (Rainey, 2017). The dominant discourse, as is also evidenced from the Netherlands rejecting 1 in 5 Syrian refugee applications as part of the EU–Turkey deal because their views are deemed irreconcilable with Dutch norms of gender and diversity (Stoffelen & Thijssen, 2018), revolves around stereotypical Orientalist understandings of the “gender oppression” of passive, vulnerable, de-historicized and victimized refugee women and LGBTQ’s at the mercy of “patriarchal, homophobic, and violent—if not terrorist—Muslim men” (Dağtaş, 2018). An intersectional reading alerts us to not only examine how sexuality differentially hierarchically positions individuals but so does race, nationality, religion, age and migration status in tandem.

3. Theorizing Young Adult Gay Connected Migrants

In theorizing young adult gay connected migrants, we seek to bring in dialogue critical youth, internet and migration studies. Gay people often reveal their sexuality through the process of ‘coming out of the closet’. Fox and Warber (2015) conceptualized sexual identity disclosure through four “levels of outness”: (1) “Mostly in the closet” (only a few people know); (2) “Peeking out” (a wider audience than before knows); (3) “Partially out” (certain audiences know); and (4) “Out”. Coming-out, however, is not a uniform, linear process. Although commonly considered in the light of a maturational sequential process from a first recognition of attraction during childhood towards identity commitment during young adulthood (Troiden, 1989) we also embrace the
perspective of relationality. Alongside maturation, sexual identification is co-shaped by life experiences and “social changes” (Floyd & Bakeman, 2006) and therefore strong variations, including the age of self-identification as gay, are inevitable. We focus on how the specific social changes of forced and voluntary migration are digitally mediated and differently impact the coming-out process for gay young adults. Therefore, the participants of this study could identify in any of the four levels both in the Netherlands and in their homeland.

In this study, we examine (1) the digital practices (e.g., exchanging texts, audio and video messages, online ‘friending’, and the affordances that are being used) via social media, and (2) the social and recreational activities participated in the offline realm, all in the context of settlement and integration. In the field of youth, internet and migration studies there is little known but a lot to be learnt about these particular processes especially regarding young adult gay migrants. Overviewing emerging scholarship addressing the “intersection of queer and migration and digital”, Szulc (in press) recognizes a shared concern for the complex intersectional digital identity formation of gay migrants across local and transnational geographical scales. The themes of (1) communities, (2) individuals, and (3) discrimination feature most prominently: community-oriented studies address how gay diaspora collectives are imaginatively constructed, and may operate as counterpublics; on the individual level digital practices provide insight on process of acculturation and negotiating context collapse, and research on discrimination focusses on the impact of homonationalism discourses and exclusionary ethnocentric platform designs and norms (Szulc, in press). This article seeks to contribute to the second and third theme by focussing on the distinct situated context of individual forced and voluntary migrants, negotiation of platform affordances as well as the wider context of acculturation and possible discrimination.

Social media is seen as a space to build social capital in the form of social networks (boyd, 2014; Dhoest, 2018). Affordances refer to the particular design and characteristics of a platform, which permit a certain radius of action (boyd, 2014). Social media platforms have affordances that can create, change, and challenge relationships that partly overlap with and partly differ from face-to-face communication. Online communication affords users to communicate synchronously. Synchronous communication, similar to face-to-face conversations, happens in real time. For example, the instant messaging app, WhatsApp, is a cross-platform messaging app that allows users to send text, audio and video messages to their contacts in real time. For migrants, the realness of being ‘there’—at distance—even though the user is ‘here’ can enhance the feeling of transnational co-presence (Madianou, 2016). WhatsApp also allows for asynchronous communication via messaging. Asynchronous media, including Facebook wall posts or Instagram comments, create space in time between the potential exchange of messages. This form of communication is also used to sustain the interaction of online Facebook groups and establish a sense of user belonging with other large online communities. It enables users the time to strategically construct and manage their online presentations vis-à-vis collectively expected identity performances.

4. Methodological Considerations

This study is based on the principles of grounded theory and a non-digital-media-centric approach. Grounded theory views research participants as the meaning-makers over their own lives; “to develop theories from research grounded in data rather than to test existing theory by deducing testable hypotheses from them” (van Meeteren, 2014, p. 45). Our argument draws from narrative data gathered through semi-structured face-to-face interviews. This methodological technique is particularly well-suited for explorative studies with vulnerable groups (Dhoest & Szulc, 2016). The interview topic list was divided into four sections: (1) discussing the overall experiences of living in the Netherlands; (2) talking about ethno-cultural roots and the concept of ‘home’; (3) exploring the uses of social media and bonding and bridging social capital; and (4) concerning sexual identities, coming-out, and online identity performances. The social media platforms discussed in the empirical section featured most prominently in the narratives of the study’s participants. Having chosen not to single out particular social media apps a priori is consistent with our non-digital-media-centric approach.

As this research involves vulnerable groups, for whom confidentiality is crucial, ethical considerations were taken seriously. Gaining access and maintaining trust within the forcibly displaced migrant group posed a major challenge. Our fieldwork builds on previously established positive relationships with some of the expatriate participants, however we did not know any of the forcibly displaced migrants prior to our study. We paid special attention to our language when communicating about who we were and our research aims to address existing power hierarchies (researcher vs. participant), which can greatly affect trust. At the beginning of the interview, we obtained written informed consent and asked each participant to provide a pseudonym. Their names in this article are replaced with their pseudonym in order to protect their identity. To further anonymize our study participants, only an approximation of their age is provided. The sample of this research is based on an open call for all gay young adult forcibly displaced and voluntary migrants living in the Netherlands ages 15–25 years. Several methods of recruitment were used to promote the research, including the gay dating app Grindr, Facebook pages of gay organizations and associations, including—but not limited to—those targeted towards expatriates and refugees, and some specifically for gay Muslims. None of the study’s participants were
gathered from social media platforms. Many of the messages we received were not concerning our research. Rather, they were sexually suggestive, and on many accounts were asked “What are you looking for?” or “Hi sexy, how are you?” and some users sent nude photos. There were two specific interactions in which the user was eligible and expressed interest in participating in the research, however they asked if they could get sex in return, a service we could not provide. Snowball sampling proved to be the most effective method for reaching both target groups. As Faugier and Sargeant state, the “more sensitive or threatening the phenomenon under study…the more challenging sampling will be” (1997, p. 791). As Browne (2005) notes, snowball sampling is often successfully employed in studies that need access to “hard to reach” and “sensitive” populations like sexual minorities. The expatriates we previously knew got in touch with their friends to inquire whether they would be willing to participate. A coordinator of IncluUsion, a project run at Utrecht University to provide the opportunity to students with refugee backgrounds whose status is ‘on hold’ to participate in English language courses offered at the university, connected us with potential participants. In total, 11 individuals were interviewed (see Tables 1 and 2). Due to the limited sample size, we intend to be attentive to any relevant variations within and between informant groups and it is not our aim to generalize to wider communities of gay migrants.

Of the 11 participants, five are expatriates, born in New Zealand, the United States, England, and two in Canada. Due to the fact that three of the four countries mentioned are part of the commonwealth and all four are considered progressive Westernized countries in terms of overall LGBTQ rights (Brooks & Daly, 2016) there are strong, important cultural similarities within this group and their current social context. All five participants made the conscious choice and willingly moved to Amsterdam. Three of the participants moved to look for work and the other two moved because their partner is Dutch and lives in Amsterdam. These participants had a seemingly easy process of acquiring a legal visa to live and work in the Netherlands. All of their parents are college or university graduates as well as the participants themselves. Three of the five are Caucasian and the other two are bi-racial. The native language for all five is English. All five participants are openly ‘out’ in both their home country and in the Netherlands.

The second group consists of six forced migrants, five refugees and one asylum seeker, who all sought refuge in another country outside of their homeland because of their sexual orientation. The countries from which they come include: Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia. Four of the six participants are enrolled in either a college or university program, and one has obtained a university degree. Three of the six participants have parents whom are highly educated. One participant has parents whom are retired and three of the six participants have fathers who work and mothers who do not. Most of them shared they could not openly and freely express their sexuality in fear of becoming criminalized or executed, thus not feeling ‘free’ to live a life they desired. Only over time participants grew more comfortable expressing their sexual orientation in the Netherlands. Informants shared they had to first navigate the new cultural values, such as gay rights in the Netherlands, as they are not in line with their home countries.

The interviews were transcribed verbatim and coded using NVivo, the qualitative data analysis computer software package. The first part of the analysis was an iterative process whereby we coded the text according

### Table 1. Forced migrant demographics and their personal self-identification narratives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant's ID</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of outness</th>
<th>Self-identification narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Partially out</td>
<td>I live here in Amsterdam, since one year and a half. I am enrolled in university. My parents were once working in education, but they are both now retired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terek</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Partially out</td>
<td>I came here [the Netherlands] two years ago, three almost. I was really sad leaving everything literally. Coming by myself I didn’t know anyone, like not even a single person. I lived in a village, I didn’t live in Amsterdam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shevan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Partially out</td>
<td>I used to have a normal life, like you, like everyone. And at that time when I was [living there], it was difficult for me to be myself. I felt that I’m a bad person, because I’m gay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I’m here for asylum seeking in the Netherlands. I have my mother, my father and four brothers and one sister. I came here [the Netherlands] to get a protection from [my] country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mo</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I worked in a hotel as an assistant manager for three years and I studied interior design but I didn’t continue it. I like hospitality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sami</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I’ve got two brothers. One in Germany. One, the youngest, is living in Syria and a father. My mother died.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Voluntary migrant demographics and their personal self-identification narratives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant’s ID</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Level of outness</th>
<th>Self-identification narrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>André</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I moved to Amsterdam for love. So yeah. Of course, now my occupation is in the fitness world. I wouldn’t associate myself as any religion, but I could say that I believe there’s a greater being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I moved here a year and a half go for work. I guess that reason alone shows, generally, my career and thinking about, uhm, my level of ambition and so forth shows why I moved here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I’m caucasian. I’m the second oldest of five kids. I have a mother and my father died. I moved here for work and I am a design architect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>My ethnicity is a white, European male. I have a mother, father and two sisters, both younger than me. So, I’m the oldest in my family.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>I moved to New York for university, lived there for six years and then I moved to Amsterdam for love. Uh, I’m half Mexican, half American, so I’m pretty exotic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Empirical Findings: The Contextual Entanglements of Young, Gay Connected Migrants in the Netherlands

All of the participants perceive their smartphones as an integral part of their everyday lives. In contrast to the dominant European expectations of the ‘less privileged’ forced migrant as someone unable to possess and handle advanced technologies (Leurs, 2017), the majority of the participants own a version of an iPhone while the others own models from Samsung, Android, and Sony. The frequency of smartphone use is consistently “most” or “all the time”. For instance, consider Michael, who rarely parts from his iPhone X: “Okay, let’s just say this. If I’m awake for 18 hours a day, I’m on my phone...say, 16 hours per day”. Interviewees use messenger applications like WhatsApp and social networking platforms like Facebook messenger and Skype. Their experiences and perceptions of bonding and bridging social capital seem to converge and diverge with existing literature concerning the digital practices of “connected migrants” (Diminescu, 2008).

5.1. Bonding Social Capital and Paradoxes of Co-Presence

First, we found both groups maintain proximate family and friendship relations with those geographically dispersed by producing a sense of co-presence through social media. Due to its synchronous and rapid transmission of messages, social media create a virtual bond, a multi-belonging to both ‘here and there’, so the physical geographical borders partially no longer constrain family and friend relationships. The majority of forced migrant informants communicate with their parents every day. As Ali explains: “It’s really nice to keep in contact, to let each other know. Family of course, daily contact, because, you know, Middle Eastern, we have to be a bit more connected”. This daily compulsion to connect with his family may be due to the precarious conditions in which his family lives. Some of the families of the forced migrants reside in war-torn countries, which can evoke feelings of anxiety about their family’s safety, and also a sense of guilt that they are living a juxtaposed life—living (mostly) in safety and securely in the Netherlands. For example, Mo, communicates with his mother on a daily basis: “to make her feel better that I’m okay, that I’m doing fine and I—that she can be a little bit proud of me at least and I send some voice messages saying that I’m fine”. In this context, the exchange of messages is used to reassure his mother and to reaffirm the familial/transnational connection, by means of WhatsApp text messages and voice notes; there is an aspect of security in Mo’s communication.

Although co-presence and the exchanges of messages can relieve feelings of anxiety and guilt for both parties (the sender and receiver), in some circumstances exchanges of messages or Skype video calls are not sufficient in fulfilling the emotional support and desires either party needs from their family who are geographically distanced. For instance, Terek sometimes withholds exchanging messages to his mother:

Because I would be really emotional and I know my mom would cry and I do not want that. I don’t want her to know I am crying or her crying or all of that. I think that’s too much. She’s already suffering with a lot of stuff.
Co-presence can contribute to strengthening and tightening the cultural, emotional, and social resources within transnational families, but the effectiveness of these transnational forms of exchanges do not measure up to the face-to-face interactions that have long been the foundation of family relationships. For instance, Shevan, explains:

It’s difficult for me. When I do that, I feel I am still weak and I need this emotional feelings. Sometimes I try to be cold, just to keep myself strong enough, you know. It is not like when you meet them face-to-face. I feel sometimes there is many things missing, because we don’t meet each other. I miss to hug my mother. Sometimes I feel guilty because I am still fine and still okay and they are there.

The compulsion for daily contact among most of the study’s forced migrants echo’s Licoppe’s (2004) findings in that it enhances the reciprocal exchange of reassurance and encourages feelings of connectedness and togetherness on both sides of the borders. In the context of this study, and for the majority of the forced migrant informants, transnational co-presence helps reduce feelings of fear and anxiety relating to the health and safety of their families whom live in precarious situations mostly due to civil war. The majority of transnationalism and digital diaspora literature regarding ICT-based co-presence holds utopian arguments of the “virtual bond” of transnational families and its importance for helping maintain the bi-directional exchange of emotional management of its members (Baldassar, Nedelcu, Merla, & Wilding, 2016). However, the geographical separation cannot be overlooked and social media cannot fully help to overcome feelings of guilt, anxiety, and physical absence brought on by the “death from distance” (Wilding, 2006). Shevan’s statement: “I try to be cold, just to keep myself strong enough” illustrates how he sometimes strategically avoids calling or messaging his family back ‘home’. As noted by Wise and Velayutham (2017), maintaining proximate social relations can have obverse effects. As intensities of reassurance and love glue some transnational families, for some, like Shevan, the intensities of guilt and physical absence implicate transnational connectedness, therefore limiting the possible virtual intimacies, as experienced by the other forced migrants. Emotion management among the forcibly displaced migrants is based on embodied intensities, typically fear and guilt, and emotional connectivity, usually concerning the bi-directional exchange of reassurance regarding the health and safety of family members, while emotion management of expatriates is centered around the act of keeping a bond rather than its content.

In discussing bonding social capital, expatriates also have a connected presence in which they maintain a sense of ‘being there’ for their family and friends living in their homeland. However, their narratives reveal they do not have the same sense of obligations or desire to frequently communicate, and provide and receive reassurance regarding safety and security, as is in the following example of Jack:

Jack: Oh God, it’s terrible. I’m pretty bad at keeping in contact with people….I only give my best friends a couple minute updates here and there.
Jeffrey: What about the communication with your parents?
Jack: I think I contact them once every two weeks. But then again, not set dates or anything.

In the case of maintaining bonding social capital, the act of sending messages seems to matter more than its content. For instance, Chris seldom contacts his parents: “My mom and I usually exchange messages once every couple few days. But it’s often transactional. They’ll often need help with something or we’ll talk about the weather. It’s not the most in-depth conversation”. Expatriates use their smartphones and social media to ‘stand in’ for their lack of physical presence, ICTs do not seem to play an overly important role in sustaining transnational family and friend relations. Their relationships seem to be ‘a given’ and taken for granted, a reality far from the forcibly displaced migrant respondents. The forcibly displaced migrant respondents whom have family and friends living in vulnerable situations often feel a sense of obligation and devotion to ensure their health and safety, while simultaneously reassuring them of theirs.

5.2. Bridging Social Capital and Intersectional Identifications

Using Ager and Strang’s (2008) third domain of successful integration, processes of social connection within groups (connoting group similarity), are a lens through which to investigate the bridging social capital for both forced and voluntary migrants. As emerging theme that is worth highlighting is Facebook is the main social media platform the informants use to connect online with members of the host country, but more specifically, the gay Dutch community. For sexual minorities who routinely face discrimination in the offline world, the online space can be seen as a safe haven to establish connections within groups and with others who have similar interests, beliefs and values, share a common identity, and can offer a sense of belonging to the larger gay community (Gudelunas, 2012). As Gudelunas (2012) points out, gay men also use Facebook in the same manner as their straight counterparts use the site; just as heterosexuals maneuver around Facebook to find and connect with friends, potential sexual partners, and to join groups, so do gay men, including the participants in this study. All interviewees are part of one or more gay inter-ethnic Facebook groups. There is an apparent difference between participants’ level of engagement within these particular groups as a way to build bridging social capital. The difference is not between the forced and volun-
Hassan: The social media is just the source to feel confident or to find people who we want in our life.

Jeffrey: You’re referring to what?

Hassan: About the LGBT organizations here. Some things in common you share with them. So for that reason you go to there when you come to here. So, like, you need people who can, where you can feel comfort.

Jeffrey: And to what extent do you feel connected to these groups?

Hassan: Yes. Connected.

Communities individuals become a part of are no longer confined within geographical constraints but are conceivable through online networks. In the case of the informants, a shared sexual identity is a key factor in first, becoming a part of a digital network and second, possibly establishing bridging social capital. In order for a sense of community to become established active engagement is necessary, which includes shared cultural behaviours, social support, and intercultural tolerance and acceptance (McEwan & Sobre-Denton, 2011). Terek is a part of Facebook groups COC Cocktail events and Gay expats in Amsterdam. He has not gained bridging social capital due to his voluntary disengagement within the groups. What is particularly interesting is the fact that he joined these two groups on the basis of his sexuality. However, he feels connected to a lesser extent to the former group than the latter:

I didn’t want to be this classified as a refugee honestly. I am, but it was just too much to hear the word the whole time. I think it’s a stigmatism and it’s like yeah. It’s like a stamp on your head. It’s all about refugee, refugee, refugee. I’m a freaking person as well. I’m a human. I think it was too much for me. Like I just was pushing it away without noticing, without thinking about it. But lately I think, I just hate the word and I just hate being treated like oh, this is how you do, this is what you have to do.

Whereas Hassan eagerly sought out to connect with people online within the greater LGBTQ inter-ethnic community to try and establish bridging social capital, Terek and the other forced migrant participants mostly use gay online communities to solely find gay-related information in relation to Amsterdam without any interaction with its group members. Due to Hassan’s precarious living situation as an asylum seeker in the Netherlands, where social interactions offline are often restrained and personal growth and development is severely limited, a sense of belonging may help him feel grounded during times of uncertainty. These connections may also help Hassan answer questions he may have about his asylum-seeking procedure and to assist him in navigating what it means to be a gay forced migrant in the Netherlands. For the other ten participants, their ‘stable’ living conditions may not necessarily evoke feelings of necessity to establish digital connections. For example, Chris is a part of Gay expats of Amsterdam and Gay parties of Amsterdam, and he explains: “I use Facebook [groups] to often find events, so if I want to know what parties are happening this weekend I’ll use Facebook to discover that”. Online networks do not seem to supplant offline, face-to-face networks though they are an extension of them.

While all of the participants are a part of one or more gay-specific Facebook groups, for the exception of Hassan, the perceived level of connection to, and engagement within, the gay Dutch online community is little to none. The perceived level of connection brings forward two important notions, though symbiotically connected: identity and belonging. These two social patterns can be discussed by using an intersectional approach. The foundation of identity is found in the “articulations and stories about who we think we are (however contextual, situational, temporal or fractured these may be) as well as associated strategies and identifications” while the base of belonging lies “in the notions of exclusion, inclusion, access and participation” (Anthias, 2008, p. 8).

Belonging to spaces, places, identities and locales (i.e., Facebook groups) often evoke feelings of ‘cannot’ and ‘do not’, in the context of access, participation, and inclusion (Anthias, 2008). The emphasis here, for example, is that Terek’s identity, his individual “narrative of self” (Yuval-Davis, 2006) differs from Hassan’s. Whereas Hassan identifies as a gay asylum seeker, thus feels like he belongs and is accepted within the gay-specific forced migrant Facebook groups, Terek identifies himself differently at the intersection of status, class, and ethnicity, accounting for his disengagement within the online group.

Terek uses social media to negotiate his identity, including migration status, class and ethnicity as he experiments in presenting himself to others via online Facebook groups. Although he is a part of COC Cocktail events, he does not identify himself as a refugee, extending Crawley and Sklepars (2018) claim that refugees are primarily defined in terms of their forced displacement from their homeland. Although these types of Facebook groups are generally helpful in providing important cultural, informational, emotional and social resources, it is crucial to not fall into the trap of labelling all refugees and their needs as the same simply because they are “refugees” (Anthias, 2008). In line with Terek’s experiences, Crawley and Skleparis (2018) argue the “categorical fetishism” of labels including refugees should be denaturalized to show how mechanisms of division shape
the wider “politics of bounding”. An intersectional approach is helpful to do the work of denaturalizing, by recognizing the plurality of social positions and identities individuals may be ascribed to and may themselves subscribe to. Terek expresses he is “maybe more comfortable [with expatriates] maybe because they’re mixed, they’re just like me, they’re [from] all over the world”, which may account for why he also joined the Facebook group Gay expats of Amsterdam and feels more connected to the expatriates and the members of the local Dutch community offline. The emphasis here is on expat, an identification marker he does not hold in the eyes of the local Dutch community. It is important to acknowledge that—due in part of their experiences of displacement—they have become transnational, displaying attributes that the elite and empowered western individuals, such as expatriates, are often characterized by (Crawley & Skleparis, 2018). This sense of global cosmopolitanism is evident in both the context of online and offline social networks for many newcomers (Dhoest, 2018).

5.3. Inter-Ethnic Social Contacts and Lived Experiences of Difference

Finally, as we employ the non-digital-media-centric approach to informants’ digital practices and focus on Ager and Strang’s (2008) third domain of successful integration, processes of social connection between groups (connoting group differences), we find both forced and voluntary migrants also form offline inter-ethnic social contacts. Whereas the informants’ bridging and bonding social capital processes connect them with family and friends and the local gay Dutch community respectively, inter-ethnic social contacts are between them and the general local Dutch community. Contact between migrants and members of the local Dutch community is seen to help establish cohesion in culturally diverse societies (Martinovic, 2013), such as Amsterdam. In particular, inter-ethnic social contacts help to advance forced migrants’ entrance into the mainstream job market and to improve their proficiency of the Dutch language (Martinovic, 2013). For the forced and voluntary migrants that joined this study, connecting offline with the members of the local Dutch community seems to be more effective in establishing inter-ethnic social contacts than establishing bridging social capital online. In line with Dekker and Engbersen’s (2014) findings, the majority of the informants illustrate that social media use does not replace the importance of inter-ethnic social contact, but rather it is an extension of it. Forced migrants and expatriates bring their offline networks and incorporate them into their online networks by “exchang[ing] some sort of social media” (Michael). Education institutions are one way to form inter-ethnic social connections. In combination with his mandatory Dutch language training, Mo studies at a local college in Amsterdam and has daily contact with native Dutch students:

So, I had to start a Dutch language course and then I had to go to school every day and that was also another—how do you say—beginning of making connections, talking to people, meeting people, not locking yourself inside your apartment.

He is also a part of a gay men’s non-religious choir where he meets gay Dutch men: “I have a couple of Dutch friends when I met them when I was in the choir and very little expats actually. So mostly they’re Dutch people, because I really wanted to speak Dutch and I learned a lot”. Shevan also actively participates in LGBTQ organizations, such as the Federatie van Nederlandse Verenigingen tot Integratie van Homoseksualiteit COC Nederland (COC), and notes:

Dutch people are nice. Sometimes when you meet them, when you talk to them, you feel like they have distance. And sometimes they are rude, but when you really break this wall between you and them, you will see how they are friendly.

In addition to school and extra-curricular activities, work is also a place for inter-ethnic social contact. Terek, a university graduate, works for the government and engages with native Dutch colleagues. However, he feels like he does not ‘fit in’ among the Dutch:

I think my closest is Alexander (native Dutch) and then his friends are really nice. But I tried honestly. I didn’t belong or, I don’t know there was something wrong. I think there was something wrong. I think I was not ready maybe to immediately go.

For Terek, attitudinal characters seem to affect the type of inter-ethnic contact he has. Given that forced migrants and expatriates often find themselves in differing mobility trajectories and circumstances upon arrival (i.e., forced migrants having to go through the process of inburgering [obligatory integration procedure]) it can create contrasting needs and desires for inter-ethnic social contact. Some inter-ethnic contact experiences have been quite traumatic for some forced migrants, like Shevan, who have faced discrimination and violence:

One time I did the [Utrecht] marathon and I ran for the LGBT rights in [the Middle East] with the Rainbow flag and that T-shirt with a logo for supporting the LGBT rights. After the marathon I was on my way coming back to my house and I met someone and he punched me at my nose because I’m gay. I went at that time to the police. And the police, they advised me or they told me, maybe it is better that you not tell that you are gay. So I was shocked….But I learned later that it’s not true, you cannot be yourself in every place in the Netherlands.

This resonates with an analysis of police reports conducted by Buijs et al. (2011) which found violence against
homosexuals in Amsterdam occur on a very regular basis. Furthermore, results from the survey amongst Amsterdam youth demonstrated high acceptance levels of homosexuality in general, but low acceptance in terms of public displays of homosexuality and gender deviant behavior (Buijts et al., 2011). The gay-friendly discourse and title the ‘progressive Dutch’ (Buijts et al., 2011), in relation to gay rights, that circulates the Dutch national identity must be met with caution. Shevan’s experience illustrates that the homonationalism rhetoric of the Netherlands is at odds with institutional representatives that recommend individuals mask their sexuality to try and prevent hate-crimes like such from happening. It is also important to follow with extreme caution of not falling into the homonationalist trap of situating the Netherlands (within Western Europe) as the Mecca for gay people. Further investigation needs to be brought forward to examine the reason(s) why the forced migrants of our study face discrimination and violence based on their sexual orientation while the expatriates did not.

6. Conclusion

Upon arrival to Europe gay people inhabit an in-between space where they live between imperatives and various norms, expectations and desires scuffle. Contributing to the emerging interdisciplinary area of digital migration studies (Leurs & Ponzanesi, 2018) the focus of this article is on how gay young adults in the Netherlands negotiate their parallel coming-of-age, coming-out and migration, across online and offline spaces. In particular, drawing on a grounded theory approach to 11 in-depth interviews conducted in Amsterdam, the Netherlands we compared gay young adult forced and voluntary migrants. Sexual identification in tandem with bonding and bridging social capital at the interplay between their online and offline entanglements of their worlds diverge and converge between the two groups. Their narratives add further complexity to the concept of “connected migrants” as set out by Diminescu (2008): gay young adult migrants use smartphones and social media to maintain affective bonding ties with their home country while simultaneously establishing new bridging relationships with peers and potential sex partners in their country of arrival. Drawing on the feminist perspective of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 2006)—which alerted us socio-cultural categories like migration status, age and sexuality have an impact upon identification and subordination—we demonstrated it is problematic to homogenize these experiences to all gay young adult migrants. In our pursuit of a non-digital-media-centric approach to informants’ digital practices we first noted how the personal trajectory of mobility has an influence on transnational family relations. Forced migrants demonstrated an ambiguous stance towards bonding capital and the affordances of transnational synchronous communication: while they sense a compulsion to connect and in order to constantly reassure they are faring well, transnational co-presence is also a painful reminder of their intense juxtapositions with loved ones, family members and friends who share their emotions, fears and material hardship. The informants’ digital experiences and their offline contexts illustrate the non-universality of categories, particularly sexuality and migration status, denaturalizing the hierarchical division of transnationally mobile human subjects. Findings on the institutional normalization of anti-gay violence perpetrated against young gay forced migrants also offers grounds to question the celebratory discourse of gay-friendly Netherlands. Demonstrating the dominant heteronormativity of most academic research (Szulc, in press); sexuality, beyond normative heterosexuality remains an often overlooked layer in youth studies, internet studies and migration studies. Our findings however demonstrate sexuality is an important factor which demands further scrutiny, for example to add further depth to Alencar’s (2018) claims that forcibly displaced migrants often struggle to establish bridging capital having to negotiate with race and class hierarchies. One limitation of this study is its fairly small sample size. As the relationship between forced and voluntary migrants and their bridging and bonding experiences were uncovered by this study, future research could benefit from a larger number of participants to gain additional empirical insights. Further research is also needed to better understand and hear how members of the local gay receiving communities in Europe perceive online and offline connections with migrants. In order to offer a corrective to stereotypes of both refugees and western homonationalism, additional social justice oriented scholarly work is needed to achieve greater awareness of how other members of LGBTQ migrant communities engage with social media and smartphones to negotiate their positionality vis-à-vis mainstream Dutch and European norms and expectations.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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The Cancer’s Margins Project: Access to Knowledge and Its Mobilization by LGBQ/T Cancer Patients

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Abstract
Sexual and/or gender minority populations (LGBQ/T) have particular cancer risks, lower involvement in cancer screening, and experience barriers in communication with healthcare providers. All of these factors increase the probability of health decisions linked with poor outcomes that include higher levels of cancer mortality. Persistent discrimination against, and stigmatization of, LGBQ/T people is reflected in sparse medical curriculum addressing LGBQ/T communities. Marginalization makes LGBQ/T persons particularly reliant on knowledge derived from online networks and mainstream media sources. In what is likely the first nationally-funded and nation-wide study of LGBQ/T experiences of cancer, the Cancer’s Margins project (www.lgbtcancer.ca) conducted face-to-face interviews with 81 sexual and/or gender minority patients diagnosed and treated for breast and/or gynecological cancer in five Canadian provinces and the San Francisco Bay area (US). With specific attention to knowledge access, sharing, and mobilization, our objective was to document and analyze complex intersectional relationships between marginalization, gender and sexuality, and cancer health decision-making and care experiences. Findings indicate that cancer care knowledge in online environments is shaped by cisnormative and heteronormative narratives. Cancer knowledge and support environments need, by contrast, to be designed by taking into account intersectionally diverse models of minority identities and communities.

Keywords
biographical knowledge; biomedical knowledge; cancer; cancer care; gender; health disparities; health equity; information access; LGBT health; minority cancer patients; transgender; treatment

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1. Introduction

The design of culturally competent and medically effective cancer treatment and care is dependent upon understanding both sexual diversity and gender diversity as key elements of the body of knowledge that shapes minority population health. Research has revealed a number of cancer health disparities for members of sexual and/or gender minority populations (LGBQ/T)\(^1\), including: avoidance of screening, longer time between follow-up appointments, less screening reliability, issues with service provision and refusal, poor healthcare provider communication, and lower self-rated health (Boehmer, Glickman, Winter, & Clark, 2013; Burkhalter et al., 2016; Jabson, Farmer, & Bowen, 2015; Kamen, Smith-Stoner, Heckler, Flannery, & Margolies, 2015; Peitzmeier, Reisner, Harigopal, & Potter, 2014; Tabac, Sutter, Wall, & Baker, 2018; Taylor & Bryson, 2016). Recently, there have been calls in the field of oncology for better information about the cancer health experiences of gender and sexual minority populations (Burkhalter et al., 2016; Griggs et al., 2017). Critical perspectives on breast and gynecologic cancer and the organization of health care and knowledge have also prioritized a reorganization and re-branding of these cancers so as to move away from the problematic and reductive categorical representation of these cancers as “women’s cancers” (Jain, 2007; Klawiter, 2004; Sulik, 2011; Taylor & Bryson, 2016).

Recently, the American Society of Clinical Oncology released a position statement outlining the importance of addressing cancer health disparities and the suboptimal care that sexual and/or gender minority patients experience across the cancer trajectory (Griggs et al., 2017). While many cancer care providers have supportive attitudes towards sexual and/or gender minority populations, they lack training and knowledge about the unique health needs of these populations. A recent survey of cancer care providers found that only 47% of cancer specialists assessed themselves as being well-informed on LGBQ/T health (Tamargo, Quinn, Sanchez, & Schabath, 2017). Additionally, less than half of cancer specialists correctly answered questions about specific LGBQ/T cancer health needs and disparities: including quality of life and sexual activity, differences in cancer risk profiles, and disclosure and health outcomes (Tamargo et al., 2017).

Medical education and training for providing care to sexual and gender minority populations is woefully inadequate (Banerjee, Walters, Staley, Alexander, & Parker, 2018; Obedín-Maliver et al., 2011), and results in cancer care providers who are not prepared to treat a wide diversity of sexual and/or gender minority patients (Tamargo et al., 2017). The importance of sexual and gender minority health knowledge among health providers cannot be underestimated as qualitative research has shown that increased LGBQ/T health knowledge is directly associated with increased willingness and capacity to provide culturally competent cancer care (Banerjee et al., 2018). However, the inclusion of sexual and gender diversity in cancer treatment, as well as related knowledge seeking, health communication, and treatment decision-making, remain profoundly under-studied areas of cancer research (Burkhalter et al., 2016; Watters, Harsh, & Corbett, 2014).

The advent of easily accessible cancer health information online has changed the ways that patients make decisions about their health (Ziebland & Herxheimer, 2008). However, claims that online access to health knowledge contributes positively to consumer health have been called into question by extensive research evidence of unequal distributions of both health knowledge and access to knowledge (e.g., Bryson & Stacey, 2013; Jabson, Patterson, & Kamen, 2017; Newman, Biedrzycki, & Baum, 2012; Orgad, 2006) that are linked to the lack of “structural competency” that produces population-level marginalization (Donald, Dasgupta, Metzl, & Eckstrand, 2017; Metzl & Hansen, 2014). Public access to structurally competent health knowledge for members of minority populations remains an under-researched social determinant of health disparities (Newman et al., 2012). In particular, marginalized patient groups have uneven access to online cancer health knowledge and are excluded from the online knowledge ecologies proliferated by cancer support programs and organizations (Gibson, Lee, & Crabb, 2016). Conceptualizations of accessing information online as a key component of media literacy include not only the technical skill required to access media, but also a measure of cultural knowledge and competency (Orgad, 2006).

Research has shown that online knowledge seeking can assist patients to become increasingly more informed about their health (Wald, Dube, & Anthony, 2007). Recent research has confirmed that when patients have a positive relationship with care providers, online health information seeking can improve relationships with providers because it can provide greater opportunities for discussion (Tan & Goonawardene, 2017). However, additional research on clinical interactions suggests that there are barriers to patient-provider interactions and communications between cancer care providers and sexual and gender minority patients (Agénor, Bailey, Krieger, Austin, & Gottlieb, 2015; Bryson et al., 2019; Gibson, Radix, Maingi, & Patel, 2017). Specifically, problematic communication between providers and patients exacerbates already-existing population-based health disparities. In North America, most cancer care is organized around the model of “shared decision-making”, which only works well when there is a strong evidence base to inform care decisions coupled with a high degree of cultural competence that informs patient-provider communication (Grabinski, Mycktayn,

\(^1\)Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Queer, and Transgender. Our use here of the acronym LGBQ/T is not intended to denote any kind of simplistic or static ontology, experience, or coherency between categories of sexuality and gender and their relation to identity, embodiment, visibility, and group recognition. We acknowledge the subjugatory and liberatory effects of these locationally and discursively situated and highly contestable signifiers.
Lee, Philpott-Streiff, & Politi, 2018; Kirby et al., 2018). Sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients face a doubled health disparity in terms of, first, having less positive relationships with their providers (Boehmer & Case, 2004; Matthews, Breen, & Kittiteerasack, 2018) which then, secondarily, prevents them from being able to take advantage of the improved health decision-making that might otherwise result from online health information seeking and subsequent patient-provider interactions.

Quantitative research suggests that LGBQ/T folks are likely to go online to seek health information, and, when seeking health information for themselves and others, have a higher probability of being exposed to incidental health information online than heterosexual populations (Jabson et al., 2017). When sexual and gender minority people are gathering health information online, their risk of being exposed to and utilizing inaccurate health information is increased (Jabson et al., 2017). Therefore, understanding how sexual and/or gender minority people with cancer access, navigate, and coordinate cancer knowledge both online and in face-to-face communication will inform the design of culturally and medically competent web-based information and support systems. No previous research to-date has specifically addressed the need for evidence concerning online knowledge seeking and access by LGBQ/T cancer patients. The Cancer’s Margins project directly addresses the need for research concerning LGBQ/T health informatics. The analysis presented here is intended to advance knowledge concerning cancer health knowledge access and the mobilization of support by LGBQ/T people diagnosed with breast and/or gynecologic cancer.

2. Method

The design of the Cancer’s Margins research methodology is informed by theoretical frameworks from the Social Study of Medicine (SSM) that deploy sociocultural and post-structural approaches to an analysis of subjectivity, the mobilization of knowledge, and experiential narratives of health and wellbeing (e.g., Bryson & Stacey, 2013; Diedrich, 2007; Mol, 2002). When applied to sexual and gender minority population health issues, SSM methods allow analyses to take into account the subjective experiences of participants as being valuable and credible sources of knowledge, while also simultaneously considering the larger structural and historical contexts shaping those experiences. This analysis of the role of knowledge access in varied discursive contexts pays particular attention to online knowledge ecologies, including in particular, the specific roles of biomedical and biographical knowledge (Bryson et al., 2019) that patients navigate and coordinate in the flux of cancer health decision-making. This analysis seeks to identify both kinds of knowledge and also, the access and mobilization techniques that are typical for sexual and gender minority cancer patients. Where the context of cancer treatment is organized around cisgender and heterosexual narratives of treatment and support, the biographical and embodied knowledge of sexual and gender minority patients is discordant relative to the ubiquitous “women’s cancer” narratives of femininity, gender, embodiment, identity, and decision-making.

Our analysis asks: What types of knowledge and social support are sexual and/or gender minority breast and gynecologic cancer patients seeking in the multiple contexts of cancer health decision-making, including online and elsewhere? Cancer’s Margins also investigates how sexual and gender marginality, both distinctly and intersectionally, discursively and materially shape access to and mobilization of knowledge and support for cancer patients.

Cancer’s Margins participants were recruited from urban, suburban, and rural locations in 5 Canadian provinces: British Columbia (BC), Manitoba (MB), Ontario (ON), Quebec (QC), and Nova Scotia (NS). The sample also includes pilot interviews with LGBQ/T people diagnosed and treated for breast and/or gynecologic cancer living in the San Francisco Bay Area (BA). Using non-random, purposive recruitment methods—such as snowball sampling—that are considered optimal for use with “hard-to-reach” populations (Bonevski et al., 2014), a diverse sample of LGBQ/T participants was recruited (see Table 1). The sample (n = 81) varied in age, sexual and gender identity, race and ethnicity, dis/ability, socio-economic status, as well as in the type of cancer and stage. Many studies of LGBQ/T health exhibit a problem of unrepresentative samples in terms of race and also, gender diversity (Meyer & Wilson, 2009). Cancer’s Margins’ deployment of proactive and focused recruitment practices resulted in a sample that is broadly representative of the Canadian population regarding race and ethnicity (Statistics Canada, 2017). Since there are no national demographic data concerning gender diversity, it is hard to say what a representative sample should look like. Participants were asked directly if they identified as transgender or gender nonconforming in any way; 10 participants answered affirmatively, and 71 participants answered “no”. Of the 71 who answered “no” to this question, 31 self-identified as “cisgender” or “woman”. The other 38 of the 71 participants (who did not self-identify as transgender or gender nonconforming) nevertheless used a variety of non-normative identity terms to describe their gender (e.g., kinky femme, genderqueer, butch, etc.) that indicated a more complex relationship to gender than what arises in cisgender narratives. The age range of participants was between 33 to 75 years old and all had been diagnosed with and treated for breast and/or gynecologic cancer. Interviews focused on eliciting information about participants’ understanding of intersectional elements of their identities and histories, as well as their experiences along the trajectories of cancer care from screening, to diagnosis, treatment, and ongoing surveillance and/or metastatic care, including their access to knowledge and the mobilization of knowledge, as these relate to support net-
Table 1. Participant demographic table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographic Location</th>
<th>Age</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>MB: CA</td>
<td>47–56</td>
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<tr>
<td>ON: CA</td>
<td>57–66</td>
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<td>QC: CA</td>
<td>67–75</td>
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<tr>
<td>NS: CA</td>
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<td>BA: US</td>
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<table>
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<th>Gender: Do you identify as Transgender?</th>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
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<tbody>
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works, treatment decision-making, and experiences of care and information seeking. Research ethics approval was received from the research ethics review boards at each of the investigators’ home universities.

This qualitative data analysis of Cancer’s Margins interview transcripts focuses on participants’ experiences with seeking knowledge or support and the knowledge mobilization practices and techniques employed by sexual minority and gender minority cancer patients. Data analysis included the use of MAXQDA qualitative data analysis software to perform the initial coding of all transcripts, as well as the refinement of the coding system for consistent inter-coder reliability across the dataset of 81 transcripts.

3. Findings

3.1. “What it Really Meant, What We’re Dealing with”: Patient-Provider Communication, Disclosure, and Online Biomedical Knowledge Seeking by Sexual and/or Gender Minority Cancer Patients

A cancer diagnosis typically precedes an intensive engagement with medical systems and providers. Participant accounts of the complex and laborious coordination of biographical and biomedical knowledge sources during cancer health and treatment decision-making reveal significant use of online knowledge seeking for themselves and for/by people in their support networks. Informational support was a key driver in online knowledge seeking activities. For example, Dana talked about a friend, a primary member of Dana’s cancer support net-

work and also a sexual minority community member diagnosed with cancer, who provided Dana with research she had done on breast cancer.

“She was on the Internet, and she’s a very smart cookie. So she was looking at just about anything she could find, including medical research.” Dana (BA, 64, Caucasian, gentlemanly butch, breast cancer)

Many participants reported that both they and their support network members spent more time online subsequent to their cancer diagnoses, and that accessing information online had become a primary source of knowledge. They recalled being online for “many hours”, or spending the “whole day online”, pointing to a consistently high pattern of Internet use related to cancer diagnosis and treatment decision-making.

“I get on the Internet for many hours every day now.” Heather (BA, 54, Caucasian, kinky femme, femme dyke, breast cancer)

“I would always use the Internet for research.” Barbara (BA, 54, Caucasian, femme, queer, metastatic breast cancer)

“I would spend a whole day online, looking at things, and then I would get a bit burned out from that. But then I would do it (again) because I would get reassured, by finding out different things, and just knowing what’s what, a little bit.” Paula (BC, 48, Japanese Canadian, gender nonconforming, queer, breast cancer)

2The demographic information following each quote from the transcripts includes the participant pseudonym as well as those particular words that each participant used to communicate the specificities of their locations relative to categories of location, age, race and/or ethnicity, modes of gender identification and sexual identification, and type of cancer diagnosis.
“It was like breastcancer.org, the discussion boards on chemotherapy, side effects in treatment kind of things, was like my bible; my go-to. I would go there and read and read and read and read.” Holly (BA, 44, Jewish, femme, queer bisexual, breast cancer, BRCA1 gene)

Participation in shared decision-making models is directly affected by the quality of patient-provider communication that, for sexual and gender minority patients, is often encumbered by power differentials between patients and providers and also, by the existence of mistrust and a very high level of vigilance by patients about the possible impacts of disclosure related to either minority sexuality or gender. Additionally, there is a significant impact of the lack of evidence pertaining to LGBQ/T cancer patients on the quality of patient-provider interactions about cancer health decisions. While online information seeking is performed by many cancer patients of all sexualities and genders to seek further clarification of biomedical information, the increased barriers to communication and knowledge access in relation to care providers experienced by sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients makes the use of online resources to make sense of biomedical information all the more crucial as a source of information for cancer health decision-making. Gender and sexual minority patients have an already hindered access to knowledge based on barriers present in the patient-provider relationship. Patients who are marginalized in the clinic will seek the information they need from other sources, and the Internet is consistently found to be an increasing source of health knowledge. Participants reported that clarification of medical knowledge took place throughout the trajectory of their cancer experiences and identified the period of diagnosis and staging to be particularly significant.

“It wasn’t until I actually saw the pathology readout that I got some of those things explained. And what I did is, I sat there with the pathology report, and an online guide to the pathology ‘Your Pathology Report’ and tried to sort of match it up.” Holly (BA, 44, Jewish, femme, queer bisexual, breast cancer, BRCA1 gene)

“I was wanting to learn more about the stages and the grades of cancer—to try and understand the levels and the scales….I did a bit of research about that, just to understand my (diagnosis)….It was to explain and to confirm for me what it really meant.” Diane (NS, 39, Caucasian, femme, lesbian, uterine cancer)

“Then (I) started going on the Internet too. Started looking at things. I think (I) just started with basically a Google search. You could go on to some of the medical sites; it was here in Canada….The one I found was actually very good because it explained and showed diagrams and explained all the pieces of it. So it was like, ‘Oh okay, so that’s what it is. And that’s what we’re dealing with.’” Donna (MB, 53, Caucasian, lesbian woman, breast cancer)

Disclosure of sexual and/or gender minority identity to health care providers is a key communication issue and is highly related to quality of healthcare outcomes generally, and specifically, cancer health outcomes and quality of life and wellness measures. Cancer care providers frequently neglect to ask about the sexual and gender identities of their patients, which constitutes an increased barrier to communication and rapport, inflating the risk of disparities in care for LGBQ/T cancer patients. With disclosure being directly linked to better experiences of cancer care and wellbeing (Kamen et al., 2015), it is significant to note that Cancer’s Margins participants consistently reported that they actively managed the disclosure of their sexual and gender identities—often hiding their identities in online environments—in order to access support and information in cisnormative and heteronormative online environments.

“I don’t talk about it. I’m totally closeted….I keep it undercover in the online group.” Barbara (BA, 54, Caucasian, femme, queer, metastatic breast cancer)

Our findings reveal that sexual and gender minority cancer patients perform significant cancer health knowledge seeking online and suggest that web-based knowledge and support environments could be an effective and efficient way to access both biomedical and biographical cancer health knowledge and support for LGBQ/T patient populations by reducing the amount of navigation and coordination that patients need to do to sort through the support and information online to find what is relevant to them. Online resources that provide information specifically for LGBQ/T cancer patients may partially alleviate the additional knowledge seeking burden on these marginalized patients as a result of barriers in their communication and relationships with care providers.

3.2. “It Didn’t Work for Me”: Cisnormativity and Heteronormativity as Barriers to Online Knowledge Access and Mobilization

Given the lack of competence in working with sexual and gender minority patients that has been assessed in cancer care providers, marginalized patients are positioned to “manage the unmanageable” (Mason, 2001, p. 39) by being tasked with finding a provider who is both medically competent and culturally competent. Participants reported that they specifically went online to find knowledge and information about providers who were, in some way, reputed to be willing, experienced, and/or “friendly” in working with sexual and gender minorities and used this information to make decisions about providers.
“They had a list of (care) providers that are that are quote unquote ‘LGBT friendly.”’ Angela (BA, 33, Caucasian, queer, dyke, breast cancer, uterine cancer)

As previous research on online cancer resources has noted (Gibson et al., 2016), the marginalization of sexual and gender minority populations compels many patients to seek out culturally competent providers—with no suggestion as to how to accomplish this—placing the responsibility to resist the cisnormative and heteronormative narratives of cancer care onto individual patients.

Sexual and gender minority cancer patients are highly attuned to find biographically relevant knowledge as a key element of the navigation of online knowledge and support. Cancer’s Margins interviewees talked about what they noticed online and how they made decisions about whether or not a particular resource was a good fit. They paid attention to the language and topics used in order to assess the level of LGBQ/T inclusion in a wide array of knowledge ecologies.

“I went online and I started to do research….It’s all very mainstream” Shirley (BC, 52, Jewish, femme, dyke, breast cancer)

The pink ribbon branding of breast cancer support sites is also part of the systemic barriers for sexual and gender minority patients seeking cancer information. Participants reflected that the feminized gendering of cancer websites was a barrier to their engagement and inclusion in accessing knowledge or support online. The branding of a website that uses the pink ribbon approach to breast cancer was interpreted by LGBQ/T participants as an effect of heteronormative and cisnormative narratives.

“I was opposed to the pink ribbon effect that was a major marketing tool for non-profit sites focused on women and cancer.” Olivia (QC, 60, Caucasian, lesbian woman, breast cancer)

Our analysis revealed that the cisnormative and heteronormative narratives that inform patient experiences of biomedical care also shape the representation of online biomedical information, as well as support websites. The cisnormative and heteronormative narratives of cancer that are invoked on cancer websites were perceived as a barrier to online engagement by interview participants who were seeking inclusive locales for knowledge and support.

3.3. “Talking on Different Wavelengths”: Gender Minority Patients, Shared Decision-Making, and Structural Competency

We have previously reported on the alarming lack of coordination between gender affirming care and cancer care for gender minority patients (Taylor & Bryson, 2016). In the analysis reported here, gender minority patients reported that online cancer knowledge was uncoordinated with knowledge concerning gender affirming care. Despite extensive knowledge seeking, none of the transgender participants in the Cancer’s Margins study reported accessing any cancer health information or support online that was specific to gender minority populations and many indicated that they were lacking support.

“I spent a lot of time trying to find information about (transgender cancer patients online). Because the first thing, when you tell people you have cancer, and you’re trans, is “Oh, it is because of your hormones?” A lot of people say that, which drives me nuts. Like you did this to yourself. You know, there’s millions of trans people and not all of them have cancer! I don’t even think there’s any studies to show that the rates are higher. I was looking at all the possibilities and I didn’t really find any information.” John (ON, 33, Asian-Canadian, trans man, queer, breast cancer)

Ethnographic accounts of cancer care systems and marginalized cancer patient experiences have pointed to heteronormative and cisnormative knowledge systems as organizing factors in cancer care (Jain, 2007; Klawiter, 2004). The Cancer’s Margins project findings have also detailed deleterious effects of cisnormativity on trans and gender nonconforming cancer patients (Bryson et al., 2019; Taylor & Bryson, 2016). Participants described at length how cisnormative and heteronormative knowledge systems influenced many aspects of their care, such as support access and patient-provider relationships, and led to substandard care and a lack of attention to the specific aspects of patients’ experiences that were key aspects of minority sexuality and/or gender identity.

“The thing that was just blatantly absent was the queer element. Nobody talked about it. It was completely absent from discussion on the boards.” Serena (BC, 39, Caucasian, punk femme, bisexual, breast cancer)

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While most of the transgender participants reported accessing some form of gender affirming care, their cancer care did not in any way take this into account. The lack of information at the intersection of cancer health and gender affirming medical care prevents the meaningful integration of medical knowledge and culturally competent care for gender minority cancer patients and creates an enormous barrier to informed and shared decision-making. Patient-provider communication was completely stymied by this lack in structural competency for gender minority patients.

“I keep running across that: ‘I’m the unique patient that they don’t have any experience with’...And you know, specialists at the best of times don’t really want to get their information from their patients. They don’t want to be educated by their patients because it tips the power imbalance, doesn’t it?” James (BC, 58, Caucasian, trans man, bisexual, cervical cancer)

Particularly in relation to hormone administration, oncologists were unaware of the benefits to the trans cancer patient that would accrue from coordinated care regimens. When attempting to engage in shared decision-making with their care providers, gender minority participants were keenly aware of the lack of available biomedical information about their gender affirming cancer health needs.

“There’s a growing awareness that lesbian and gay people have specialized needs (but) trans healthcare is way, way out there. Even though I think that would be easier to address medically, because there is actually a biological (context)....but, it’s so far from people’s minds...they couldn’t advise me one way or the other. (My doctor) said, ‘You know, there aren’t really numbers to support, in your case, if it’s going to help you or not’....But, there’s no shortage of information for biological women who are female identified to access information.” John (ON, 33, Asian-Canadian, trans man, queer, breast cancer)

When gender minority cancer patients seek out cancer health information online, they often attempt to coordinate additional bodies of knowledge, such as biomedical knowledge about gender affirming care. However, neither patients nor their providers have the knowledge needed for decision-making about the overlaps in cancer risk, cancer treatment, and gender affirming surgical and hormonal care. John directly described how the lack of coordination of online gender minority health knowledge and cancer health knowledge created a barrier in his communication and his informed and shared decision-making with his surgeon:

“There’s certainly no trans stuff, not even online, that I could find or that was what I needed....I had said to (my surgeon), “In the time that I’ve been waiting, I’ve been doing a lot of research online....Are there sources of information that are better than others, in your experience?'. He said “Google breast cancer” I was like, ‘Oh my friend, we are talking on different wavelengths here’. So I realized that he wasn’t a source of information. I was waiting for my surgery, and he didn’t hook me up with any resources or anything.” John (ON, 33, Asian-Canadian, trans man, queer, breast cancer)

Despite, or perhaps as a result of, the lack of gender minority specific information and support online, gender minority participants had clear and direct ideas about how to make online cancer knowledge and support websites more available and accessible to marginalized communities.

“Each page that you go to is clean looking. In other words, don’t have a lot of stuff on each page. Have it so the type is fairly large. And don’t put backgrounds like, black with blue lettering. I’ve seen that on websites. Terrible. You can’t read the damn thing, right? For people who are visually impaired, you have to have it really good, right? Make a site that you can also access for deaf people—signing the information. If you put people in, of course, a wide variety of people—not just a bunch of white folks, which drives me crazy when I go to websites. I also want to see culturally-specific information as well. In terms of the website, you just gotta have lots of good information.” Jolene (ON, 59, Caucasian, genderfluid, transgender, queer, metastatic breast cancer)

Cancer support and information websites that are inclusive and accessible for sexual and/or gender minority people need to show complexity in their portrayals of cancer patients and the kinds of knowledge they might find useful in making cancer health decisions. Transgender and gender nonconforming participants, as well as a significant portion of gender diverse sexual minority participants, showed a high degree of health literacy and media literacy that they used to coordinate various sites of knowledge. These findings suggest that both online engagement and support—in relation to biomedical, biographical, and experiential knowledge—are primary considerations in efforts to address LGBQ/T cancer health disparities. Support targeted specifically to gender minority populations needs to be a key element of health informatics design in order to engage the wider population of LGBQ/T cancer patients.

3.4. “People Like Me, People Like Us”: The Credibility of Online Information, Decision-Making, and Experiential Knowledge

Participants in the Cancer’s Margins research project reported that they often accessed health knowledge online and that they were concerned about the quality of
that knowledge. Participants expressed concern about the accuracy and credibility of cancer health information that might be available online, and Internet sources were generally regarded with some suspicion concerning credibility.

“You never know what’s true and what’s not.” Debrah (ON, 72, Jewish, lesbian woman, metastatic cervical cancer)

A number of participants brought up the source of the information as a primary part of their concern. Suzette pointed out that the source of the information is directly part of the issue of credibility.

“Anyone can put anything up there. So, you know, how valid is the information? Where is it coming from?” Suzette (NS, 59, Caucasian, lesbian woman, breast cancer)

In order to mitigate the risks of using erroneous knowledge to guide decision-making, Cancer’s Margins participants sought out knowledge and networks that were specifically by and for sexual and/or gender minority populations, and prioritized experiential knowledge from other sexual and/or gender minority people diagnosed with cancer.

While many participants reported preferring a face-to-face interaction with other LGBQ/T cancer patients, they were often seeking out peers online because there was a wider community network to connect with other LGBQ/T cancer patients online than there was for them locally.

Information and experiential knowledge-sharing was seen as less credible and less relevant to decision-making when it was more general and not specifically geared towards sexual and/or gender minority patients.

“When you know that things like this exist, that there are other people that are living the same thing as we are, people like us.” Sylvie (QC, 37, Caucasian, French Canadian, lesbian woman, ovarian cancer)

“When I watched the videos of LGBQ/T cancer patients, it really made me feel better. It was like a breath of fresh air in a period of discouragement. It was really good to see someone who looked a lot more like me.” Olivia (QC, 60, Caucasian, lesbian woman, breast cancer)

For LGBQ/T interviewees, the role of sexual and/or gender minority population(s)-specific information was important to provide validation and support for identities, embodiments, and lives that were subjected to the disrepair produced by a diagnosis with cancer.

“I think it’s absolutely critical. I’m old school gay, right? I like having our own stuff. I’m not into integration here. I think we’re losing—don’t even get me started on this. We have already lost so much. I will always fight for separate LGBT stuff. It’s critical.” Emily (ON, 61, Caucasian, femme, dyke, cervical cancer)

3.5. “Someone That You Actually Click With”: Locating and Facilitating LGBQ/T Community and Network Support

Given that different types of support are needed by patients undergoing cancer treatment, our findings contribute new knowledge concerning how LGBQ/T cancer patients make extensive use of online tools to counteract the relatively lower levels of support in health decision-making that they experience in person. Participants reported that they also went online in order to organize their support: coordinating, scheduling, and delegating support tasks.

“I put an announcement on the website. My partner, a week after my surgery, needed to go to a conference. There’s part of me that wanted people to bring me certain things....So I put it online. And people did stuff (in person to support me).” Ninet (BA, 56, Israeli, radical feminist dyke, uterine cancer)

Cancer’s Margins interviewees who were seeking people similar to themselves went online to connect with other LGBQ/T people and to facilitate interactions that would not be as easily accessed in person. For participants, especially those who were living in smaller or more remote communities, the ability to reach a wider pool of people for various types of support was essential, but they specifically needed to locate other sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients that they could identify and connect with.

“The circle of gay and lesbians is so much smaller in small communities—and having a hard time to find someone that you actually click with in that small community, because you’re different. Having cancer on top of that, I wanted to be able to connect with a lesbian who has breast cancer.” Marianne (ON, 51, Aboriginal Canadian, gay woman, breast cancer)

By going online to seek out community and network support, participants were able to reach a larger and wider pool of potential interlocutors, and thereby increased the probability of connecting with other LGBQ/T people. A significant sub-group of participants also noted that they were not able to locate support for their partners and that impeded access to support was an added stress during their cancer treatment. Participants were acutely aware of the impact of their cancer on their partners and support networks. Participants identified support for their partners as being entirely lacking in their experiences online. Partner support was highly prioritized by participants and many participants talked about the
possibility of their primary support persons getting online support or getting support for their relationships online during treatment.

“What if we did this specifically for lesbians to talk together, especially about how relationships are affected? It could be a chat line...Often we’re left with information that could be shared and typically is not: feelings, tips, medical and psychological decision-making, and relationships.” Olivia (QC, 60, Caucasian, lesbian woman, breast cancer)

3.6. “Information That Could Be Shared”: Blogging and LGBQ/T Cancer Patients’ Contributions to Mobilizing Sexual and/or Gender Minority Knowledge

Cancer patient blogs contain valuable information about people’s cancer experiences and researchers have used blogs by cancer patients as data sources for understanding the role of blogs and communication networks in shaping cancer patients’ experiences. Chung and Kim (2008) looked specifically at the impacts of blogging on cancer patients and found that “emotion management” and “information-sharing” were some of the most significant uses of blogging for cancer patients. None of the research available on cancer patients and blogging practices has looked at sexual or gender minority status.

Several Cancer’s Margins participants used blogging to communicate their experiences and contribute to the diversity of online cancer knowledge. Participants described using blogs to communicate the process of cancer treatment and decision-making across the cancer trajectory to their extended network group of friends, coworkers, family, community, etc. Blogs were intended to reduce the work carried out by patients in communicating with support networks. Blogs often began as a way to communicate practical support issues with a larger support network and then, in time, provided a highly significant level of emotional and esteem support.

“Would you like to know why I started blogging?...I realized how hard it was going to be on him, to have to constantly update everybody about everything. And I thought if I blogged then his friends and family—I mean, it really was about him first. They could just go somewhere and see it, and he wouldn’t constantly have to ask me what’s going on and then distribute it....That’s why I started it. And then it turned into the life support thing, life saver, I don’t know, rope, this thing that was going to carry me through when I was really upset and I could sit down and write about it.” Holly (BA, 44, Jewish, femme, queer bisexual, breast cancer, BRCA1 gene)

Participants also reported that they used blogging to share experiences with others because they felt there was limited information that was specific to them as members of sexual and/or gender minority populations. Blogs, in this sense, were also seen as a form of service or obligation to other patients to fill in the gaps in cancer information that is available and accessible online for sexual and/or gender minority patients. Blogs allowed participants to create and mobilize experiential cancer knowledge that was specific to them as members of one or more marginalized groups.

“I think my main thing was to provide something for (LGBQ/T) people who ended up in that situation themselves. I couldn’t find anything that would tell me what I was about to go through. That’s why I decided to put it out there for other (LGBQ/T) people...I wanted (those) people to have some idea what to anticipate.” Jake (BC, 52, Caucasian, butch dyke, ovarian cancer, BRCA1 gene)

Blogging afforded participants an online opportunity to mobilize their own “experiential evidence” (Ziebland & Herxheimer, 2008); that is to say, knowledge that was relevant and specific to their community and support networks. This contribution to knowledge mobilization was taken up by participants as a duty of care to their LGBQ/T community so as to refuse the heteronormative and cisnormative narratives of cancer care, and, simultaneously, to create a culturally appropriate emotional support system.

4. Conclusions

The Cancer’s Margins project advances knowledge concerning how sexual marginality and gender marginality shape access to knowledge and the processes by which marginalized cancer patients engage with knowledge access and mobilization. This analysis advances knowledge about the ways that sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients access knowledge and support and the implications for cancer health decision-making and patient-provider relationships and communication.

Cancer’s Margins participants were highly aware of the need to coordinate their online activity with their face-to-face treatment, knowledge, and support networks. The persistent presence of heteronormative and cisnormative narratives in the organization of cancer care knowledge specifically, and health care more generally, put participants in a position where they needed to perform extra work to compensate for the failure of care systems to respond to their cancer health decision-making needs. Marginalized patients must do a lot of extra labour to manage and coordinate various fields of knowledge in cancer care environments. Our interviewees shared techniques that they used to navigate cancer knowledge ecologies. They reported that knowledge about cancer and relatedly, decision-making was not designed to meet current standards regarding culturally competent care. The specific techniques that participants used to coordinate knowledge access across diverse locations included: managing disclosure, sorting
applicable information from cisnormative and heteronormative narratives, and seeking biographical and medical knowledge from other sexual and gender minority cancer patients, in addition to knowledge mobilization techniques such as blogging.

Our analysis provides evidence that LGBQ/T cancer patients are making extensive use of online cancer knowledge and support, despite widespread “informational and institutional erasure” (Bauer et al., 2009) of sexual and gender minorities. By going online, participants were able to widen their scope of knowledge access, contribute to LGBQ/T-specific knowledge, while increasing the likelihood of finding other LGBQ/T cancer patients with experiential knowledge. To inform their cancer health decision-making and to account for the lack of communication and structural competency in cancer care, LGBQ/T patients sort through biomedical and biographical knowledge that is shaped by heteronormative and cisnormative narratives so as to glean knowledge that aligns with their experiences. Our findings also reflect that LGBQ/T cancer patients had an altruistic commitment to knowledge-sharing and mobilization with others in LGBQ/T communities and a robust intersectional lens to shape visions of culturally competent online knowledge-sharing. This analysis also provides evidence that LGBQ/T cancer patients have considerable health literacy and media literacy and use LGBQ/T community networks and experiential knowledge to ameliorate the risks presented by cisnormative and heteronormative health knowledge structures.

We have made an argument for the necessity of undertaking a sexual and gender diversity analysis in both online and face-to-face support programming for sexual and/or gender minority cancer patients. The current organization of cancer knowledge and support spaces excludes sexual and gender minority cancer patients. The strong overall preference expressed by participants for both sexual-minority-specific and gender-minority-specific online knowledge and support points to particular need for online cancer support that takes into account the unique needs of sexual and gender minority populations. Knowledge and support spaces need to be designed in such a way as to recognize that sexual minority cancer patients and gender minority cancer patients have related, but distinctly different, experiences of cancer health and care.

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Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

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compency approach. Academic Medicine, 92(3), 345–350.


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