(In)visible generations: from integration to equality

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Children of immigrants: Generations 1.5 and 2.0

In recent years, we have seen an increasing call for the reframing of migrant integration in the field of migration studies (e.g. Korteweg, 2017; Dahinden, 2016). There is particularly growing criticism on the grouping of different generations under the (homogenous) category of ‘immigrants’, as it extends the requirement to ‘integrate’ to children of immigrants, who had no say in the decision to migrate or did not even migrate at all (Schinkel, 2013). Even though children of immigrants are socialised in the host country, they are often still viewed as in need of integration and targeted by integration policies. In this policy brief, we focus on the so-called ‘generations 1.5 and 2.0’. By discussing their particularities, we aim to draw attention to the specific inequalities that they are facing in European societies. We conclude by recommending a move beyond the integration paradigm to an equality paradigm that addresses the specific needs of children of immigrants, but at the same time is mindful of the homogenising group categories it constructs.

Before moving to our argument, let us discuss who are generally labelled with the terms ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’. The term ‘generation 2.0’, includes children of immigrants who are born in the host country. As opposed to their parents (labelled the ‘first generation’ or ‘generation 1.0’), this generation did not migrate. The term ‘generation 1.5’, on the other hand, was created by Rubén Rumbaut to describe people that migrated before or during their teens, despite growing criticism on extending the category ‘immigrant’ to children of immigrants, research in the field of migration studies generally distinguishes between different generations within the population of migrant descent. Those who migrated as adults are called ‘the first generation’, while children of immigrants who were born in the host country are labelled ‘the second generation’ and children of immigrants who migrated before or during their teens comprise ‘generation 1.5’. Even though these later generations are socialised in the host country, they are often still viewed as in need of integration and targeted by integration policies. In this policy brief, we discuss the particularities of ‘generations 1.5 and 2.0’ throughout Europe and join others in arguing that policymakers and scholars need to move beyond the integration paradigm towards a paradigm of equality. We suggest that an equality paradigm needs to take into account the specific inequalities that children of immigrants might face, but, at the same time, needs to be critical of the homogenising group designations that are assigned to them.
migrated at a young age following their parents, or together with them (Rumbaut, 1997; 2004). As the experiences of so-said ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’ are different from those that characterise ‘generation 1.0’ and also differ from each other, it is important to define the major characteristics of these generations. However, what should be noted is that ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’ are by no means homogenous groups and that the lived experiences can of course widely vary within the generational groups as well.  

**Particularities of Generation 1.5 and 2.0**

Those who are referred to as ‘generation 1.5’ comprise pre-adolescent, primary-school-age children who have started their studies and socialisation in their mother tongues at schools abroad, but whose education is largely completed in the country of destination. In families where one or both parents migrate first and the rest of the family joins later (when all the necessary conditions for family reunification are met), many of those included under the label ‘generation 1.5’ are temporarily separated from their parents and can therefore suffer from separation anxiety (Favaro and Napoli, 2004). Moreover, young people who join their parents a few years after they migrated, can struggle with accepting their parents’ authority (Favaro and Napoli, 2004; Aguilera-Guzmán et al., 2004). In addition, as observed by Coutin (2007), generation 1.5 is often characterized by a certain legal invisibility, because, even though some move at a young age and have their second socialisation in the host country, in many EU countries they remain foreigners de jure and de facto. Contrary to generation 2.0, there is often no simplified procedure of applying for citizenship for generation 1.5.  

What is particular to so-called ‘generation 2.0’ is that, in many cases (but not always, depending on the country), generation 2.0 possesses citizenship in the host country, which means that they are no longer foreigners and have the same rights as citizens without a migration background. Moreover, generation 2.0 also has higher chances of speaking the language fluently and to have completed their entire education in the host country. Yet, despite these more favourable conditions for socio-economic inclusion, generation 2.0 often feels more discriminated against than their parents (Alanya, Baysu and Swyngedouw, 2015; Silberman, Alba and Fournier, 2007). The differentiated (and stronger) impact of discrimination on generation 2.0 as compared to generation 1.0, might be explained by higher expectations of equal treatment in society among generation 2.0, who has been born and raised in the host country (Westerveen and Adam, 2015).  

Both ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’ can experience difficulties in their identity formation. Generation 1.5 remembers the life ‘before’ and can have difficulties in accepting the life ‘after’. They may struggle with balancing a new culture, a new language and new social norms with old ones and accepting their new ‘double identity’ (Favaro & Napoli, 2004; Bartley & Spoonley, 2008; Ambrosini & Molina, 2004). Similarly, generation 2.0 can experience difficulties with identity construction and feelings of belonging in the host society. They have to reconcile their parents culture with that of the host society without having lived in the homeland of the parents. Moreover, they often have to construct their identity in a context of discrimination and exclusion (Portes, 1995; Rumbaut, 2008). Yet, the commonly found multilingualism among generations 1.5 and 2.0 and possible double nationalities can also provide clear advantages to these groups.

Still, both generations might have troubles in their socio-economic life. Generation 1.5 often has difficulties with finding their place in society and adapting to a new school system due to differences in the curriculum, limited skills in the national language as well as stereotypes and discrimination existing in society. Hence, many of those who are counted among ‘generation 1.5’ face difficulties in their studies (Rumbaut & Ima, 1988; Asher & Case, 2008; Favaro & Napoli, 2004). Generation 2.0 is in many European countries also faced with disadvantages in the education system (as well as on the labour market) due to different types of
inequalities and discrimination (Crul, Schneider and Lelie, 2012). Whereas some attain a rise in economic mobility in comparison to generation 1.0 (Konyali, 2014; Beaman, 2017), others experience a decline in intergenerational mobility (Vermeulen, 2010; Alba, 2005).

Main challenges: (in)visibility and inequalities

Regardless of the heightened attention for integration throughout Europe, the needs of ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’ are often not addressed in traditional integration and equality policies. Especially, generation 1.5 remains remarkably invisible in EU policies. For example, Eurostat exclusively distinguishes between the first-generation (i.e. the foreign-born) and the second-generation (i.e. native-born with at least one foreign-born parent). Policies tend to classify generation 1.5 as first-generation migrants and thereby fail to recognise the diverse needs of generation 1.5. Yet, will being relatively invisible in policies, generation 1.5 and 2.0 are far from invisible in everyday life. For example, although integration courses formally only apply to newcomers, in public and political discourse the burden to ‘integrate’ is often also placed on generation 2.0, who were born in the host country. Moreover, depending on the host country as well as different individual factors such as nationality, race-ethnicity and religion, they can be strongly discriminated against and struggle with belonging in society (Beaman, 2017; Rumbaut & Ima, 1988; Asher & Case, 2008; Giusti, 2004).

At the same time, both generations are faced with persisting inequalities as compared to those who are considered as natives. Despite the implementation of a diverse range of policy measures aimed at integration and anti-discrimination throughout the European Union, comparative research still reveals large gaps in, for example, (un)employment rates and school performances between people with and without a migration background (OECD, 2016; OECD, 2015). These disadvantages of (descendants of) immigrants in the education systems and labour markets of EU countries depend on many factors including race-ethnicity, country of origin, socio-economic background, gender, language skills and religion. Although the gaps are largest for the first generation, they also continue to exist for children of immigrants, including both generation 1.5 and generation 2.0. By contrast to non-European OECD countries (where education and labour market outcomes for children of immigrants are on average equal to those of children of native-born parents), generation 1.5 and 2.0 in European countries have much less favourable education and labour market outcomes than their peers with native-born parents (OECD, 2010: 16).

Conclusion: from integration to equality

In this policy brief, we have discussed the characteristics of ‘generations 1.5 and 2.0’ as well as the specific opportunities and challenges that they face. Thereby we aimed to show that these group specificities differ not only between generation 1.5 and 2.0, but, more importantly, between first generation migrants and their children. Yet, current integration and equality policies in the European Union pay little attention to these generational differences within the group of people of migrant descent. Generation 1.5 often remains invisible and is grouped together with the first generation, while the framing of generation 2.0 as belonging to the category of ‘immigrants’ (and therefore in need of ‘integration’) is incorrect and can harm their feeling of belonging. Considering that integration policies do not sufficiently recognise the inequalities that children of immigrants are confronted with in European countries, we join the critics of the integration paradigm and argue for a move towards an equality paradigm (see: Korteweg, 2017). Focusing on equality instead of integration can make the experiences of generation 1.5 and generation 2.0 more visible and allows for the consideration of the particular opportunities and challenges they have. Thereby it is important that public policies, such as education and employment policies, become committed to equality in opportunity and non-discrimination in society.
In addition, within an equality paradigm, policies should become more attentive to the heterogeneity among people of migrant descent and avoid the homogenisation of their experiences by remaining critical of assigned group categories.

Endnotes

1 In this context, scholars also defined a so-called ‘generation 2.5’, referring to people who have one native- and one foreign-born parent (Rumbaut, 2004: 1185; Ramakrishnan, 2004: 381; Noels and Clément, 2015: 453). However, in this policy brief we specifically focus on so-called ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’.

2 In fact, one of the main critiques on the integration paradigm is that it homogenises people’s experiences by lumping together all those who are considered migrants as well as their descendants (Dahinden, 2016: 3-4; Korteweg, 2017: 7). When using the terms ‘generation 1.5’ and ‘generation 2.0’ we do not want to homogenise the diversity within these groups, nor do we want to treat them as natural or objective terms for descendants of migrants. Instead, we use them as conceptual simplifications to refer to two different groups of children of immigrants and to argue for the acknowledgement of the particularities of these groups.

References


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