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A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games. / Radulescu, Roxana; Mannion, Patrick; Zhang, Yijie; Roijers, Diederik; Nowe, Ann.

In: The Knowledge Engineering Review, 25.03.2020.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

APA

Radulescu, R., Mannion, P., Zhang, Y., Roijers, D., & Nowe, A. (Accepted/In press). A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games. The Knowledge Engineering Review.

Vancouver

Radulescu R, Mannion P, Zhang Y, Roijers D, Nowe A. A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games. The Knowledge Engineering Review. 2020 Mar 25.

Author

Radulescu, Roxana ; Mannion, Patrick ; Zhang, Yijie ; Roijers, Diederik ; Nowe, Ann. / A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games. In: The Knowledge Engineering Review. 2020.

BibTeX

@article{573e9eb93b884d66a0eed326bf45be7b,
title = "A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games",
abstract = "In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitly consider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective functions. We argue that compromises between competing objectives in MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that these compromises have for the users of a system, where an agent's utility function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. This utility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisation criteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR) and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this article, we explore the differences between these two criteria using the framework of multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstrate that the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radically alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utility functions are used.",
author = "Roxana Radulescu and Patrick Mannion and Yijie Zhang and Diederik Roijers and Ann Nowe",
year = "2020",
month = "3",
day = "25",
language = "English",
journal = "Knowledge Engineering Review",
issn = "0269-8889",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Utility-Based Analysis of Equilibria in Multi-Objective Normal Form Games

AU - Radulescu, Roxana

AU - Mannion, Patrick

AU - Zhang, Yijie

AU - Roijers, Diederik

AU - Nowe, Ann

PY - 2020/3/25

Y1 - 2020/3/25

N2 - In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitly consider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective functions. We argue that compromises between competing objectives in MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that these compromises have for the users of a system, where an agent's utility function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. This utility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisation criteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR) and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this article, we explore the differences between these two criteria using the framework of multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstrate that the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radically alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utility functions are used.

AB - In multi-objective multi-agent systems (MOMAS), agents explicitly consider the possible tradeoffs between conflicting objective functions. We argue that compromises between competing objectives in MOMAS should be analysed on the basis of the utility that these compromises have for the users of a system, where an agent's utility function maps their payoff vectors to scalar utility values. This utility-based approach naturally leads to two different optimisation criteria for agents in a MOMAS: expected scalarised returns (ESR) and scalarised expected returns (SER). In this article, we explore the differences between these two criteria using the framework of multi-objective normal form games (MONFGs). We demonstrate that the choice of optimisation criterion (ESR or SER) can radically alter the set of equilibria in a MONFG when non-linear utility functions are used.

M3 - Article

JO - Knowledge Engineering Review

JF - Knowledge Engineering Review

SN - 0269-8889

ER -

ID: 49911002